Israel’s Unilateral Move: Preferable to a Bad Agreement with a Terrorist Organization 

– Amos Yadlin (Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University)

  • Israel chose an alternative that, at least in the short term, places Hamas in a difficult strategic position. Israel regained international legitimacy for its actions; Hamas was again cast as a terrorist organization lacking all credibility that for the sixth time violated a cease-fire that Egypt and the international community initiated and Israel accepted.
  • Israel decided to deny Hamas veto power over cease-fires and took the initiative back into its own hands, clarifying that it was not negotiating with Hamas and not granting it any achievement, neither in terms of a cease-fire nor in terms of an agreement.
  • By its action, Israel establishes four premises that present Hamas with a new strategic situation:

    1. The demands for which Hamas went to war are no longer on the table. Hamas is left without the siege being lifted, without an airport or seaport, without salaries, without prisoner releases, and without the reconstruction of Gaza.
    2. Hamas is left with a Gaza in ruins, a humanitarian crisis, hundreds of dead, thousands of wounded, one-quarter of a million refugees – and no way to deal with it.
    3. If Hamas continues to fire at Israel, despite Israel’s vastly superior firepower, Israel will continue to pummel Hamas. Its political and military leadership will continue to live in underground bunkers.
    4. Unlike in previous rounds of fighting, Israel and Egypt will ensure that Hamas will be unable to rebuild its force – Egypt by continuing to prevent smuggling and Israel by the freedom of action it has reserved for itself to prevent Hamas’ force build-up.
  • Should Hamas continue the current level of rocket fire at Israel, this will force the Israeli government to reconsider the option of expanding the military operation – one that enjoyed a greater element of surprise, and was free of the need to deal with the attack tunnels.
  • Should Hamas choose the “drizzle option,” i.e., returning to the situation of limited fire on the Israeli communities bordering Gaza, Israel will have to make it clear that the policy of response preceding Operation Protective Edge is no longer valid and that any fire will be met with an extreme response.’
  • Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin, director of INSS, served as the IDF’s chief of Defense Intelligence.
August 4, 2014 | 5 Comments »

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5 Comments / 5 Comments

  1. IL will have to facture in the re-entry of Iran on the Hamas side. The West will ignore the role of Iran.

  2. Israel’s Unilateral Move: Preferable to a Bad Agreement with a Terrorist Organization

    Thanks Amos Yadlin!

    No more negotiation with terrorists (directly or indirectly)!
    A country that wants to achieve “peace” with terrorists without resisting them should be the first to show the entire world by taking actions for itself in order to lead by example.
    If not, let it mind its own business and stop interfering in the affairs of Israel, a sovereign country that legitimately and rightfully defends its citizen from terrorism.

  3. General Yadlin’s printed premises are alot easier to absorb than his full length lectures, which I have personally never been able to understand nor survive. Perhaps one reason is they put me to sleep after about three minutes(3 minutes is like an hour). Great cure for insomnia, but it just seems to me that despite all of it’s purported brilliant strategic analysis and planning, it never quite works out does it Amos. Amos Yadlin probably-obably graduated magna cum Abba Eban School of Constructive Ambiguity. To his credit, I would consider buying a used car from this man.

  4. Attrition serves Israel’s purposes well. Hamas cannot be reasoned with so its preferable to deter it. Hamas will have to decide how many blows its willing to absorb in the cause of jihad.