Peace Index: September 2007
Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Prof. Tamar Hermann
Some two-thirds of the Jewish public think that from Israel’s standpoint it is impossible to go on indefinitely in the current state of relations between Israel and the Palestinians, and a similar rate thinks that among the issues on its agenda, it is urgent that the Israeli government invest in attempting to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians. Yet a large majority of this public does not believe the Annapolis conference will significantly advance the chances of reaching a permanent Israeli-Palestinians peace, or even achieve a basic clarification of the differences between the two sides. Given these low expectations, it is no surprise that only a small minority reports steadily following the preparations for the conference.
A considerable majority of the Jewish public opposes, even in exchange for a permanent peace agreement, transferring the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem to the Palestinians so they can serve as the capital of Palestine. And on the refugee issue there is a wide, across-the-board consensus that Israel should not agree to the return of a single refugee to Israel itself.
The low level of expectations for the conference is undoubtedly connected to the perception of a wide gap between the two sides’ positions.
A considerable majority of the Jewish public opposes, even in exchange for a permanent peace agreement, transferring the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem to the Palestinians so they can serve as the capital of Palestine. And on the refugee issue there is a wide, across-the-board consensus that Israel should not agree to the return of a single refugee to Israel itself.
It was also found that there are more opponents than supporters in the Jewish public of giving the United States, should the talks reach a dead-end, the arbitrating authority to determine what concessions each side should make to enable reaching an agreement.
But most of all, it appears that the Jewish public does not trust its government. Throughout the political spectrum, an overwhelming majority thinks Ehud Olmert and his government are not strong enough to sign a peace agreement with the Palestinians in Israel’s name, assuming such an agreement would entail substantial concessions by Israel. Those are the main findings of the Peace Index that was carried out from Monday to Wednesday, 8-10 October.
About two-thirds—65%—of the Jewish public think that from Israel’s standpoint it is impossible to continue indefinitely in the present state of relations with the Palestinians (29.5% say it is possible to go on this way), and 62% think that among the issues on the government’s agenda, the Palestinian issue is the most urgent or moderately urgent (35% see it as moderately not urgent or not urgent at all).
Interestingly, when Jewish Israelis are asked to assess the possibility of continuing the current situation from the Palestinian standpoint, the data are quite similar—62% say it is impossible from the Palestinian standpoint while 26% believe it is possible.
As noted, though, a majority does not expect the coming Annapolis conference to bring about a shift—only 39% of the entire Jewish public see a chance that in its framework the sides will be able to clarify the disagreements between them (57% see no such chance), and an identical rate believes the conference can increase the chances of reaching a permanent peace agreement (56% think it cannot).
A segmentation of the responses to the question by Knesset voting reveals that the most optimistic—62.5%—are Meretz and Labor voters immediately followed by Kadima voters at 54%. Forty percent of Shas voters believe in the conference’s chances to bear fruit while only about one-third of voters for the rest of the parties are optimistic, and only about one-quarter of Likud voters, who are the most pessimistic about the conference, think it can contribute to achieving a peace agreement.
At the same time, about 60% think the participation of Arab states such as Egypt, Jordan, or Saudi Arabia could raise the conference’s chances of leading to significant achievements. Interestingly, only a 30% minority would want to see Hamas representatives at the conference. In other words, currently the Jewish public does not perceive Hamas as a desirable partner for dialogue even if it changes its positions and agrees to engage in direct talks with Israel.
The low expectations for the conference are apparently the reason that only 20% reported regularly following the preparations for the event, while about half said they follow them sometimes and 29% reported not following them at all.
The data show that the public’s readiness for concessions in the framework of such a conference is not high. Some 59% oppose, in exchange for a peace agreement, transferring the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem to Palestinian sovereignty so that they can serve as the capital of Palestine (33% support it). Even firmer is the Jewish public’s position on Palestinian refugees’ return to Israel in the context of a permanent peace settlement: 87% are not prepared for the return of even a single refugee, 6% are prepared for the return of up to 100,000, and 3% are prepared for whatever number is decided.
We asked: if in the course of the conference it turned out that because of the gaps between the two sides’ positions they could not reach an agreement, would it in your opinion be desirable for the United States to play the role of arbitrator and determine what concessions each side should make to enable reaching an agreement? Fifty-two percent opposed giving the United States this role while 41% supported it—even though we have found more than once in the past that the Jewish public perceives the United States as an “honest broker.”
Beyond the perception that the gaps between the sides are too large to arbitrate in the conference and beyond the unwillingness to make concessions on issues that the Palestinians will clearly raise as requisites for reaching a settlement (Jerusalem and the refugees),
it seems that one of the main reasons for the Jewish public’s low expectations for the conference is the assessment of a large majority—77%—that the prime minister and his government are too weak to sign a peace agreement with the Palestinians in Israel’s name, assuming such an agreement would entail significant concessions.
A segmentation of views of the government’s and prime minister’s strength shows that there is indeed a connection between these assessment and voting in the elections. But even among voters for Kadima—the prime minister’s party— only 27% see the government as strong enough to take a strategic step and only 20% of voters for Labor, the senior partner in the coalition, think so. That is, the assessment that the current government is too weak is common to the large majority of the voters for all the Jewish parties.
On a different issue, we looked into whether or not there is public support to replace soldiers with civilians from private security firms at the crossing points between Israel and the West Bank. It turns out that a large majority of the Jewish public—69%—see such a decision as unwise and only 29% favor it. That is, the Jewish public apparently trusts only in the IDF.
Interestingly, there was not a single party (including Meretz) for which a majority of voters supports a decision to civilianize the crossings.
The Arab sector: this time too, on issues we checked, clear disparities were found between the Arab public’s and the Jewish public’s positions. Unlike the Jewish public, which sees it as impossible to continue the current situation from the standpoint of both sides, a certain majority of the Arab public thinks that from the Israeli standpoint it is possible to sustain indefinitely the current state of relations with the Palestinians—47% vs. 42%. However, regarding the Palestinian standpoint a majority of the Arab public sees it as impossible to continue this way—51% vs. 41% who assess it as possible.
The Israeli Arab public’s optimism about the possible results of the Annapolis conference is slightly greater than that of the Jewish public. Some 37.5% think it could achieve a basic clarification of the sides’ disagreements and just about the same percentage think it cannot bring this about; 46% say the conference could increase the chances of reaching a permanent peace agreement compared to 37.5% who do not think so. At the same time, the extent of personal interest in the preparations for the conference is similar in the two publics, and so are assessments about the participation of Arab states: 62% of the Arab public (60% of the Jewish public) think such participation can contribute to improving the results.
As expected, in the Arab public a majority, albeit not large—53%—favors including Hamas in the coming Annapolis conference. There is also a majority, unlike in the Jewish public but again not an overwhelming one, that favors transferring the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem to Palestinian sovereignty—63%, and allowing the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel—71%. And, also unlike the position of the Israeli Jewish public, a majority of the Arab public—53%—favors giving the United States the authority to determine the concessions that each side should make in case the talks reach a dead-end. Indeed, a higher rate of the Arab public than of the Jewish public sees the Olmert government as strong, but here too the majority—54.5%—regards it as too weak to make major concessions in Israel’s name.
As for civilianizing the crossings, here too a majority opposes the decision—50% vs. 28%. Very possibly, though, the Arab public opposes this for completely different reasons than the Jewish public, particularly opposition to the checkpoints’ existence in the first place.
Indexes:
General Peace Index: 54.2 (Jewish Sample: 48.3)
Oslo Index: 35.1 (Jewish Sample: 32.3)
General Negotiations: 51.6;(Jewish Sample: 49.2)
The Peace Index Project is conducted at the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research and the Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution of Tel Aviv University, headed by Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Prof. Tamar Hermann. The telephone interviews were conducted by the B. I. Cohen Institute of Tel Aviv University on 8-10 October 2007, and included 580 interviewees who represent the adult Jewish and Arab population of Israel (including the territories and the kibbutzim). The sampling error for a sample of this size is 4.5%.
For the survey data see: http://www.tau.ac.il/peace
