Peloni: Egypt will forever be challenged with its failure in the Yom Kippur War, something which they have planned to reverse ever since, despite it being a peace partner with Israel for more than three decades. This obsession has driven its leader, Pres. Sisi, to make consistently bad choices, but choices which continue to pursue the goal of eliminating the shame of having been defeated by Israel, even as the official position in Egypt remains that it was Egypt, not Israel which won that war.
Jalal Tagreeb
In a candid commentary, Khaled Hassan – National Security & Foreign Policy Expert and Council Member of Israeli President’s Voice of the People Initiative – an breaks down the roots and consequences of the growing rift between Egypt and the Gulf states, arguing that the crisis stems from two deeply interconnected failures — one strategic, and one emotional.
A One-Way Relationship
Hassan’s first and most fundamental criticism targets Egypt’s decades-long strategic posture toward the Gulf. Over the course of his lifetime – roughly 35 years – he has never witnessed Egyptian policymakers seriously ask the question: “What can Egypt offer the Gulf?” Instead, the conversation has always flowed in one direction: How much investment can the Gulf bring? How much aid? How much political support? This transactional, extractive mindset, Hassan argues, has left Egypt without a coherent foreign policy framework – one that never considered what it means to be a genuine, contributing partner rather than a perpetual recipient.
This miscalculation was on full display when a major regional crisis erupted. President el-Sisi’s visit to the UAE came notably late — arriving after the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Jordan’s King Abdullah. Given that the UAE had, by el-Sisi’s own acknowledgment, provided Egypt with support that “saved it from drowning,” Hassan contends the Egyptian president should have been the first Arab leader at the door, not the third. Instead, Egypt appeared to be calculating, yet again, what it stood to receive — rather than what it owed.
The Danger of Blind Hatred
The second cause which Hassan identifies is more cultural and more alarming: a form of blind, consuming hatred – specifically, hatred of Israel – that he argues has distorted the Egyptian public’s ability to reason clearly about its own national interests.
He draws a striking contrast: after the fall of Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, ordinary Egyptians were vocal in denouncing Hamas and similar groups as terrorist organizations. Yet, following Hamas’s October 7th attack, public sentiment in Egypt shifted dramatically. Suddenly, the same people were hailing Hamas fighters as heroes of resistance, cheering on the Houthis for firing missiles at Israel, and effectively embracing the same ideological allies as the Muslim Brotherhood – simply because those groups were targeting Israel.
Hassan’s point is not to defend Israel, but to highlight how this hatred has become self-destructive. The Suez Canal, he notes, has already lost over $10 billion in revenue. Egypt’s economy is struggling under the weight of rising fuel and gas prices triggered by the conflict. And yet, he says, a significant segment of Egyptian public opinion remains convinced that any actor willing to strike at Israel — regardless of ideology, regardless of consequence — deserves support.
Egypt’s Diplomatic Blunder
Perhaps the most striking example Hassan offers is this: just two or three days before war broke out in the region, Iran’s chargé d’affaires in Cairo publicly announced that Egypt and Iran were on the verge of exchanging ambassadors and normalizing diplomatic relations – a move that would have warmly embraced the very regime the Gulf states and their Western allies were preparing to confront. While the entire region was bracing for conflict, Egypt was, in effect, announcing a new friendship with the opposing side.
Will Egypt Learn?
Hassan draws a pointed parallel between Egypt’s irrational public mood and Hamas’s own strategic logic: both, he argues, are willing to bring catastrophic harm upon themselves as long as it inflicts even minor damage on Israel. “Fortunately,” he adds, “the Gulf doesn’t think this way.” The Gulf states, he argues, understand that deliberately harming your own country in order to fire a symbolic missile is not resistance – it’s self-destruction.
As for Egypt’s future, Hassan is not optimistic. He believes Egypt’s recent flurry of diplomatic activity — Sisi’s belated UAE visit, the scramble to reassert alignment — is driven by fear of losing Gulf support, not by any genuine strategic rethinking. He doubts the underlying patterns of behavior will change, and that Egypt will likely repeat the same mistakes.
He closes with a clear statement of his own position: his full support lies with the Gulf in this conflict. In his view, the enemy is Iran — a regime that has struck civilian populations and whose downfall he openly welcomes, alongside his hope for freedom for the Iranian people.
Source: https://youtu.be/gYnksiipaWM?si=GXAwUj7_jhXkbGib
Jalal Tagreeb is an East Jordanian freelance researcher and translator who works in the United Kingdom and abroad, specializing in Islamic Studies and History. Formerly rooted in conservative Sunni Islam, he was once an active Muslim apologist who frequently debated secularists. Following a series of decisive intellectual defeats, he undertook a profound re-evaluation of his beliefs, ultimately culminating in his public renunciation of Islam.
He now focuses on analyzing cultural and ideological contrasts between the West and the Middle East. Through his writings and translations, he aims to foster meaningful dialogue, encourage critical engagement with Islamic tradition, and promote intellectual honesty. His writings, debates, and a selection of his previously refuted Islamic arguments can be found here: Jalal Tagreeb, Author at The Freethinker.
He can be contacted at servantjiff@gmail.com.
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