Dr. Moti Kedar: ‘Turkey’s Provocative Warships — Erdogan Is Playing With Fire

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Dr. Mordechai Kedar explains the deep historical and ideological roots which defines much of the growing tensions between Saudi Arabia and Turkey today.  The roots of past Great Power competitions between these two nations have a direct and meaningful bearing on the shaping of current events, including the future of Gaza.  Kedar recalls that in the Middle East, history is not a distant memory but is instead the motivation which drives political behavior, something which is lost on many in the West who have little knowledge or interest in the history.

With this in mind, Kedar explains that the Ottoman Empire ruled much of the Arab world for centuries, including Syria, Lebanon, the Land of Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and the Hijaz, which includes Mecca and Medina.  Many Turks, and particularly Turkey’s President Erdogan , maintain a perceived claim over those lands based on this history.  Indeed, Erdogan has made no effort to hide the fact that he sees himself as the heir to the Ottoman caliphate and that Turkey should reclaim its position as the religious and political ruler over these lands. Notably, he often points to the return of Jews ruling over Israel after nearly 2,000 years as an argument that Muslims too can “return” to lands they once ruled.

Saudi Arabia, however, currently controls Mecca and Medina. While the Saudi royal family does not originate from the Hijaz, they gained control of it following the defeat of the Ottomans in World War I.  Adopting the title “Guardians of the Holy Places,” the Saudis came to assume the religious authority which was previously held by the sultans of the Ottoman empire. This historical context significantly contributes to Turkish resentment and competition with the Saudis.

Kedar explains that the historical context, there also exists an important ideological struggle between these two powers. Erdogan’s Turkey aligns with the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist movement that seeks to eliminate Western influence, eliminate Western presence and eradicate Western culture in Arabia.  They also seek to impose Islamic law, and replace the relative existing regimes under the rule of the Caliphate. Saudi Arabia, in contrast, practices a state-controlled Islam, which is centered around the support of its established regime.  Hence, the contrasting ideological perspectives are that of revolution and stability.  This leaves an irreconcilable division between the relative ideologies underlying the current regimes in Turkey and Saudi Arabia which are mutually exclusive.  It also shapes their contrasting positions on Hamas in Gaza. Turkey openly supports Hamas, recognizing it as a Brotherhood affiliate, while Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain see Hamas as a threat.

The competition between Turkey and Saudi Arabia also touches sectors like energy as Turkey contests maritime gas agreements which exist between Lebanon, Cyprus, and others, while insisting that Mediterranean waters cannot be divided into exclusive economic zones. Although the international community rejects Turkey’s position, Erdogan’s regime is quite adept at applying diplomatic and military towards its goals.

Turning to Gaza, the TOV host raises a question about the role being played by Donald Trump, who maintains friendly ties with both Erdogan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.  Noting that Trump does not want new wars in the Middle East, Kedar reminds us that the US president is preoccupied with crises which he sees as more germane to American interest, including Venezuela, Ukraine, Russia, and China. Importantly, Kedar observes that the U.S. cannot be relied upon to grasp the complexities of Middle Eastern history and motivations, and that Israel should not expect that America will act to manage Turkey.

Regarding the subject of an Arab force in Gaza and the creation of a second Palestinian state, Kedar explains that while the Saudis may publicly endorse such ideas for diplomatic purposes, neither they nor Israel truly believe a Palestinian state will emerge anytime soon.  Despite this fact, Kedar cautions that symbolic statements made by MBS can represent motivation enough to influence other Muslim states to do the same, despite the danger which might ultimately result from them doing so.  The result of this could be quite detrimental to both the interests of the Saudis and Israel.

In closing, Kedar addresses the role of Egypt under President Sisi.  While Egypt fears instablity from the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, avoids any significant confrontation with them due to the combined interests of domestic sensitivities and economic incentives, the latter of which aligns Sisi’s own son with the Brotherhood’s attempts to smuggle arms into Gaza.

Middle Eastern motivations are always fluid, but they are significantly shaped by a deep understanding of regional history, ideological distinctions, and shifting power balances, all of which the West has little interest in navigating as they advance repeated efforts to force peace upon warring societies which have no possibility of long term peaceful cooperation.  With this in mind, Israel must be cautious as it navigates the demand for solutions which are intrinsically opposed to long standing regional realities, even to suit its American ally.