The Islamification of Texas

Peloni:  This is an important article.  The West is being conquered.  This article describes the process by which this conquest is taking place.

Islamification Process Of Da’wa and Its Constitutional and Social Implications

By Wm Gawthrop, Ph.D.

Islam is a challenger civilization. The Islamic worldview divides the world into the House of War and the House of Islam (dar al-harb and dar al-Islam) and a state of war, not peace, perpetually exists between Islam and unbelieversi,ii,iii,iv,v,vi,vii,viii,ix,x,xi,xii,xiii. The purpose of waging war is “one of two things: it is either for (the non-Muslims) conversion to Islam or the payment of the jizya.xiv,xv,xvi,xvii,xviii,xix Dawa and jihad become the tools for advancing the ideology toward its defined goals.xx Jihad can be violent. Dawa is seduction. Dawa will use Jihad if the seduction is resisted.

Dawa is the conversion tool; a form of missionary work, and an Islamic strategy for reshaping the modern world.

Political da’wa employs religious outreach reshaping society, law, and governance in pursuit of Islamic civilizational authority. The strategy is to get into the mainstream of local politics, education, media, create mentoring and outreach teams, convert individuals, and induce societal surrender through a gradual process.

Dawa transforms non-Islamic environments from within. It is primarily non-violent, patient, and incremental. Its long-term objective is the normalization, acceptance, and eventual dominance of Islamic norms, institutions, and governance principles in your neighborhood.

Stage 1: Individual Targeting and Identity Conversion

The initial stage of Islamification focuses on individuals. Political da’wa uses personal mentorship—not mass preaching. It seeks the socially influential, emotionally unsettled, or the spiritually searching. These individuals are approached in private settings: homes, universities, community centers, social gatherings, and workplaces.

The process is deliberate. Trust is cultivated slowly. Friendship is used as leverage. Religious instruction begins with gentle moral themes and gradually expands to a complete worldview. Converts are guided to see Islam not only as a faith but as a comprehensive political-legal system that claims authority over every facet of life.

Converts are encouraged to shift their primary loyalty away from their culture of origin. They are urged to see themselves as members of a transnational community (the ummah) whose unity supersedes any national or civic identity. The ultimate goal is belief, obedience, group loyalty, and ideological discipline.

Stage 2: Building Parallel Communities

The next stage expands from personal identity to community formation. These emerging communities are intentionally structured to resist assimilation into the broader society. They promote an inward-facing culture, encourage separation from non-Islamic social life, and normalize patterns of dress, behavior, gender roles, and social expectations that mark a visible, permanent distinction from the host society.

To support this separation, parallel institutions begin to form:

  • Islamic schools and after-school programs
  • Religious arbitration bodies
  • Halal businesses and financial services
  • Charity systems independent of public welfare
  • Community centers and youth organizations
  • Informal neighborhood committees that function as moral police

Each institution appears benign in isolation. They reduce dependency on mainstream civic structures and build an autonomous social ecosystem whose norms differ from those of the surrounding non-Islamic community.

These systems create an information barrier. Messaging becomes internal. Critical voices from outside are dismissed as hostile. Reformist or dissenting Muslims are pressured or ostracized. The community becomes harder for outsiders to understand, influence, or integrate into.

The result is fragmentation—a society within a society.

Stage 3: Institutional Penetration and Influence

Political da’wa influences public systems. Its actors pursue positions of trust and authority in order to shape governance from within. The targets include:

  • School boards
  • University departments
  • Diversity and cultural-competency programs
  • Law enforcement advisory roles
  • Municipal community-engagement offices
  • Interfaith councils
  • Public libraries and cultural associations
  • Political appointments and local commissions

Political da’wa advocates pitch themselves as the authentic representatives of their community. They request accommodations, shape training curricula, advise public agencies, and pressure institutions to avoid content perceived as critical of Islam.

Muslims resisting political da’wa are deliberately marginalized so that institutions engage only with those who advance the desired political narrative. Schools, police departments, hospitals, universities, and local governments unknowingly incorporate ideological assumptions aligned with da’wa objectives into their policies and programs.

This stage is quiet, professional, and often welcomed by well-meaning administrators who mistake political manipulation for community partnership.

Stage 4: Normative Conditioning and Legal Soft-Power

Political da’wa reshapes cultural norms by sustained advocacy, media pressure, litigation threats, and appeals to pluralism and tolerance.

The objectives include:

  • discouraging criticism of Islamic doctrine through social intimidation,
  • creating an expectation that institutions must avoid “offense,”
  • normalizing informal blasphemy standards,
  • expanding religious accommodations into areas of governance,
  • embedding Islamic moral norms into diversity policies or school lessons,
  • framing skeptical or opposing voices as bigoted or hateful.

Da’wa networks interpret concessions as evidence of leverage. What begins as voluntary accommodation soon becomes expected submission. What becomes “expected” eventually becomes “required”.

Islamification achieves soft authority: social control without formal power.

Stage 5: Informal Coercion and Community Enforcement

Political da’wa uses informal coercion. This coercion is not always illegal, but it is effective. Pressure includes:

  • mass complaints to employers or school boards
  • online harassment campaigns
  • coordinated protest groups
  • public shaming
  • reputational threats
  • accusations of racism or Islamophobia
  • intimidation of dissenting Muslims
  • disruption of public events

Institutions capitulate out of fear of public backlash, legal battles, or damage to their reputations. Capitulation strengthens the perception that Islamic norms deserve special protection and that resistance is futile or socially dangerous.

This phenomenon creates anticipatory compliance: schools, universities, governments, and companies censor themselves to avoid conflict before it even arise achieving what no formal legal system could accomplish: the steady establishment of religious taboos in a secular public sphere.

Stage 6: De Facto Legal Influence

When political da’wa reaches maturity, the cumulative impact becomes apparent. Even without changing written law, Islamic norms begin shaping the behavior of courts, schools, media, and government offices.

Several patterns emerge:

1. Parallel legal expectations
Cultural pressure may cause law enforcement, judges, or administrators to overlook, reinterpret, or hesitate to enforce laws when cases involve sensitive religious issues.

2. Gender-discriminatory norms
Internal community enforcement may subject women and girls to unequal treatment, honor-related pressure, or community-based adjudication.

3. Restrictions on criticism
Individuals avoid speaking openly on topics involving Islam to avoid retaliation.

4. Claims of religious necessity
Institutions alter long-standing rules—even constitutional principles—to avoid accusations of insensitivity.

5. Transformation of civic identity
The central idea emerges that religious identity, not citizenship, is the primary source of fairness, belonging, and authority.

Though no official legal change has occurred, the practical effect is a shift in the balance of authority: from secular law to religious norms, from national cohesion to communal identity, from open debate to restricted speech.

Constitutional Vulnerabilities Exposed

This process exploits structural vulnerabilities in democratic societies:

1. Broad religious-freedom protections

While essential for liberty, these protections can be manipulated when religious organizations pursue political goals under the cover of spiritual outreach.

2. Deference to minority representation

Governments often choose the most organized or vocal group as a “representative,” unintentionally empowering ideological actors over moderate voices.

3. Fear of accusations

Administrators fear being labeled discriminatory, creating a climate in which political demands are treated as protected religious expression.

4. Lack of oversight for religious arbitration

Informal courts can function without transparency, enabling coercion and unequal treatment.

5. Fragmented communities

Parallel societies reduce national cohesion and weaken neighborhood identity.

Without proactive, constitutional, policies, these vulnerabilities reshape civil society.

Summary

Political da’wa is not violent in its early stages, and that is precisely why it is effective. It advances through persuasion, patience, and persistence using the strengths of open societies—their freedoms, fairness, and goodwill—to impose a worldview fundamentally opposed to pluralism, assimilation, and constitutional supremacy.

i (Book) Pruthi, R.K. The Encyclopedia of Jihad, (Vol 1-9), Anmol Publications, PVT, LTD, New Delhi: (2002, (Vol I), p. 3. The editor was awarded a Phd from Kurukshetra University, Harayana, India, and served as the Deputy Director (Research) at Indian Council of Historical Research, New Delhi.

ii (Book) Malik, S.K. The Quranic Concept of War, Adam Publishers, Delhi: (1992), p. 3 of the un-numbered preface. “Islam views the world as though it were bipolarized in two opposing camps –Darus-Salam facing Darul-Harb – the first one is submissive to the Lord in co-operating with the God’s purpose to establish peace, order and such other pre-conditions of human development, but the second one, on the other hand, is engaged in perpetuating defiance of the same Lord. Such a state of affairs which engages any one in rebellion against God’s will is termed as ‘Fitna’ – which word literally means test or trial. The term ‘Fitna’ refers us to misconduct on the part of a man who establishes his own norms and expects obedience from others thereby usurping God’s authority – who alone is sovereign. In Sura Infa’al Chapter 9, Verse 39, it is said, ‘And fight on until there remains no more tumult or oppression and the remain submissive.’”

The author served as a Brigadier General Malik in the Pakistani Army. Endorsing the text as “a useful contribution” to the discussion of jihad General M.Zia-Ul_Haq, Chief of Staff of the Army and later President of Pakistan, noted: “This book brings out with simplicity, clarity and precision the Koranic philosophy on the application of military force, within the context of the totality that is jehad.”

iii (Book) Khadduri, Majid, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore (1955), p. 63-64. “It follows that the existence of a dar al-harb is ultimately outlawed under the Islamic jural order; that the dar al-Islam permanently under jihad obligation until the dar al-harb is reduced to non-existence; and that any community accepting certain disabilities – must submit to Islamic rule and reside in the dar al-Islam or be bound as clients to the Muslim community. The universality of Islam, in its all embracing creed, is imposed on the believers as a continuous process of warfare, psychological and political if not strictly military.” Dr. Khadduri founded the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies Middle East Studies Program, Johns Hopkins University and authored more than 35 texts on multiple Islamic issues.

iv (Book) Khadduri, Majid. The Islamic Law of Nations: al-Shaybani’s Siyar, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore: (1966), p.17: “The state of war should, accordingly, come to an end when the dar-al-harb had disappeared. At such a stage the dar al-Islam, as the abode of peace, would reign supreme in the world. It may be argued, therefore, that the ultimate objective of Islam is the achievement of permanent peace rather than the perpetuation of war. Thus the jihad, in Islamic theory, was a temporary legal device designed to achieve Islam’s ideal public order by transforming the dar al-harb into the dar al-Islam.” Dr. Khadduri founded the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies Middle East Studies Program, Johns Hopkins University and authored more than 35 texts on multiple Islamic issues.

v (Book) Bernard Lewis, Cultures in Conflict, New York: Oxford University Press: (1995), p. 14. “The world was divided into the House of Islam, where the Muslim faith and law prevailed, and the House of War, where they did not, and between the two there would be a perpetual state of war, interrupted only by truces, until the Word of God was brought to all humanity. For most Muslim writers, Christendom — first Byzantine and then European — was the House of War par excellence.” Dr Lewis is a widely recognized scholar of Oriental Studies and is regarded as one of the West’s leading scholars of the Middle east.

vi (Book) Global War On Terrorism: Analyzing the Strategic Threat – Discussion Paper Thirteen, Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington, DC: (2004), p. 39. “The dar al-Islam is in perpetual war with the dar al-harb.” See also, p. 40 “Islam is a peaceful religion that is in perpetual (but not necessarily constant) warfare with the dar al-Harb. ‘This obligation [Jihad] is without limit of time or space. It must continue until the whole world has either accepted the Islamic faith or submitted to the power of the Islamic state.’ Lewis, Bernard, The Political Language of Islam. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press: (1988), p. 73”

vii Quran 2:216 Jihad is ordained for you though you dislike it, and it may be that you dislike a thing which is good for you and you like a thing that is bad for your. Allah knows but you do not know.

viii Quran 2:193 And fight them until there is no more Fitnah (disbelief and worshiping of others along with Allah) and all and every kind of) worship is for Allah (Alone). But if they cease, let there be no transgression except against Az-Zalimum (the polytheists and wrong doers.)

ix Quran 9:5 Then when the Sacred Months have passed, the kill the Mushrikun wherever you find them, and capture them and besiege them, and lie in wait for them in each and every ambush. But if they repent and perform As-Salat (Iqamat-asSalat), and give Zakat, then leave their way free. Verily, Allah is Oft-Forgiving, most Merciful.

x (Book) Ibn Rushd, Abu al-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad. The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer (Vol 1 -2), Garnet Publishing, Reading, UK: (1994) (Vol-I) p: 454-487. Better known as Averoes, ibn Rushd (d. AH 595/CE1198) served as a Qadi (Jurist) in Seville and Cordova. This text has been incorporated into the “Great Books of Islamic Civilization” initiative by the Center for Muslim Contribution to Civilization, under the patronage of H.H. Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, Amir of Qatar.

xi (Book) al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller. p. 599-605, passim. See specifically “The caliph fights all other people until they become Muslim” p. 603 and “it is offensive to conduct a military expedition against hostile non-Muslims without the caliph’s permission (A: though if these is no caliph, no permission is required.)” p. 602.

xii (Book) al-Mawardi, Abu al-Hasan. Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya w’al-Wilayat al Diniyya (The Ordinances of Government), Garnet Publishing, Reading, UK: (2000), p. 63.

xiii Despite the fact that Islam is a religion of jihad and war,(emphasis added) its sanctions are to avoid discord, fitna. Haddad, Yvonne. “Muhammad Abduh: Pioneer of Islamic Reform” in Rahnema, Ali, Pioneers of Islamic Revival. World Book Publishers, Beirut (2005),  p. 55

xiv (Book) Azmi, Islamic Economics, p. 82 : Jizyah. “The term is derived from the ‘jaza’ meaning compensation.  In Islamic fiscal terminology the term is used for the levy taken from the non-Muslim inhabitants of the state (ahl al-dhimmah) in lieu of the protection provided to them. Jizyah is the financial obligation upon non-Muslim citizens of the Islamic state in lieu of which they are granted protection of life and property and freedom to practice their religion.”… “Jizyah was not only a tribute of military defeat and political subjugation, but rather by its payment the Non-Muslims enjoyed protection and other benefits from the Islamic state.”

xv (Book) Ibn Rushd, Distinguished Jurist’s Primer, (Vol. I), p. 464 The Muslim Jurist’s agreed that the purpose of fighting the People of the Book, excluding the (Qurayshite) People of the Book and the Christian Arabs, is one of two things: it is either for their conversion to Islam or the payment of the jizya.

xvi (Book) Khadduri, Majid. The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani’s Siyar. Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore: (1966), p. 5.

xvii (Book) Kelsay, John. Arguing the Just War in Islam. Harvard University Press, Cambridge: (2007), p. 102.

xviii (Book) The Encyclopaedia of Islam (Vol 2), p.538.

xix (Book) al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 602.

xx (Book) Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani’s Siyar. p. 15.


 

Dr. William Gawthrop retired after 48 years in U.S. Army (Intelligence/Counterintelligence) and as a GS-14 government intelligence analyst. A Joint Military Intelligence College Master of Science, Strategic Intelligence, graduate, he also completed the two Army and Marine Corps Command and Staff Colleges and the Army War College Defense Strategy Course. He earned a PhD in Criminal Justice, focusing on the civilizational clash between Islam and the U.S.. His research centers on tensions between Islamic Law and U.S. Constitutional Law, and the U.S. Government response. He is author of The Criminal Investigator–Intelligence Analyst’s Handbook of Islam, second edition.

February 23, 2026 | Comments »

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