“They hid the intelligence from the leadership”: Chief Superintendent Avi Weiss on the confidential report that exposes the cover-up of October 7

Peloni

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• In an interview on TOV, Avi Weiss, a retired Police Chief Superintendent, states that before October 7, 2023, he had planned to publish an article criticizing what he described as intelligence failures by the Shin Bet and the Israel Police regarding both Israeli Arabs and Gaza.

• His concerns were based in part on his research into spyware use and on findings from a State Comptroller report related to the 2014 Gaza conflict (“Operation Protective Edge”).  He emphasizes that the State Comptroller report described instances in which intelligence and information were not fully shared with relevant decision-making forums.  Weiss also relied on warnings previously made by Major General (res.) Yitzhak Brik regarding Israel’s military preparedness in all of this.

• He states that while he did not anticipate the October 7 attack in advance, he believed there were significant warning signs and systemic failures apparent beforehand.
• Weiss referenced books by journalist Erez Tadmor and journalist Amos Harel which also support aspects of his analysis.
• He explains that indications of an impending attack existed before the morning of October 7, which includes specifically unusual activity involving cellular SIM cards in Gaza beforehand as intelligence and surveillance systems detected unusual signs in the days and hours before the attack.
• Weiss discussed reports that militants had gathered near the border fence during the early morning hours before the attack and that the reports by observers and surveillance systems should have prompted earlier action to preempt the attack.
• Weiss presents new video footage and geolocation/timing analyses which indicates militants entered Israeli territory earlier than the officially acknowledged timeline which is said to have begun at 6:29am.  He describes methods he said were used to estimate the timing of events, including analysis of audio data and the position of the sun.
• Weiss addressed footage from Ofakim and that the timing shown in the footage suggests militants had crossed the border earlier than indicated by official accounts.  He also discussed footage from the Erez crossing area and argued that militants had gained control there earlier than publicly acknowledged, ie before 6:29 am on October 7.  He also states that he had repeatedly presented evidence to the military and said that his conclusions were rejected.
• Weiss mentioned demands by bereaved families and organizations for investigations and access to additional footage related to October 7 and that videos and other materials were collected after the attack by military, security, and police bodies.
• Weiss argued that some videos and metadata had also been altered or withheld, making independent analysis more difficult.
• Weiss concludes that based on these facts, official investigations and public accounts do not accurately reflect what happened in certain locations, including Erez.  Weiss said that the removal or modification of video data prevented investigators from establishing precise timelines.  He also discusses forensic analyses which indicate some of the videos had been manipulated or altered.
• When asked why security institutions would not disclose all information, Weiss gave two main explanations which would explain why information is intentionally withheld from the public:
  1. The public is not yet ready to accept the full picture of what took place on October 7.
  2. Officials seek to protect themselves from potential investigations and resulting consequences.