Peloni: The change in IRGC leadership makes little difference as only in Iran might a rogue such as Muhammad Baqr Ghalibaf be considered a moderate, as the IRGC would need to conduct some serious off-shore job hunting to find anyone who could truly qualify as a moderate to lead the regime forward. So, yes, the new lineup will be seen to be as radical and unyielding as all those before them. The various threats of ultimate doom for Iran which failed to be enforced over the past months by the US has only made the regime, broken and splintered as it is, all the more certain that their faith is being rewarded in the form of holding the US from making good on their promises. Additionally, the reports of America being out of bullets, as it were, will play an even greater point of validation of the radical Armegeddonist ideology which fuels the resolve of the IRGC, no matter who might be placed in charge of it. So attacks on tankers are continuing. So too are the calls for America to surrender, which should be understood to be sincere announcements of Iranian victory rather than as catcalls from an imploding regime. While the regime may ultimately implode, such a reality remains elusive, and the pronouncements of their sense of strength should be understood to be more real than imagined despite what has taken place. So as Trump is waiting to see the regime collapse as the weight of the US economic war on Iran strengthens, it would be wise for Trump to add to his economic war severe attacks on the power centers of the IRGC and it Basij associates. By doing so, further fragmenting the organization which continues its mocking US war efforts and ignoring the economic hurdles taking effect in Iran will come to see those effects having a greater and more meaningful impact, and Iran’s continued strikes on shipping gives Trump the basis on which to conduct such strikes.
Janatan Sayeh
The latest reshuffle of Iran’s government looks less like renewal than a game of musical chairs among regime veterans.
Islamic Republic Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, whose status and capacity to rule remain unclear, appointed officials to seven posts on August 9. They include the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), chief and deputy chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, commander and deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), commander of the IRGC Navy, and commander of the Basij paramilitary force.
The SNSC and Basij appointments are the most revealing. Mojtaba placed hardliners atop the two institutions central to the regime’s survival in a crisis, with one responsible for directing war and the other internal security.
The regime under Mojtaba remains every bit as hardline as it was under his father, with each appointee carrying a record of anti-Americanism and domestic repression. Recycling officials and preserving continuity in Tehran’s decision-making leaves Washington facing the same uncompromising hardliners — just in different seats.
New SNSC Chief Brings Terror, Repression, and Anti-Deal Record
Now at the helm of the SNSC, Mohsen Rezaei founded the IRGC’s intelligence unit after the 1979 Islamist takeover to “counter anti-revolutionary activity.” He then served as IRGC commander from 1981 to 1997. The Treasury Department sanctioned him in 2020 under Executive Order 13876 for his ties to the supreme leader, highlighting his role in the July 1994 terrorist bombing of the AMIA Jewish Center in the Argentine capital Buenos Aires, and remains subject to an Interpol Red Notice.
Mojtaba appointed Rezaei as his military adviser in March this year. In a June interview, weeks before the Memorandum of Understanding between Washington and Tehran collapsed, Rezaei was already laying the groundwork to shield Khamenei from blame, arguing that “the path he had in mind was better than the path taken by the SNSC.” Rezaei was subsequently appointed to lead the council, Iran’s primary defense and national security forum for decisions on war, internal security, and the nuclear program.
He publicly opposed the April ceasefire with the United States and Israel, calling instead to “sink all U.S. Navy ships.” In July, he threatened that Tehran’s retaliation against the United States would be escalatory rather than “proportional.”
Mojtaba Entrusts the Basij to a Veteran of Repression
Hossein Taeb, a Shia cleric, and Mojtaba fought in the same battalion during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, forging a relationship that later evolved into years of behind-the-scenes collaboration in Iranian internal politics.
Taeb moved through various security posts before commanding the Basij during the 2009 protest crackdown. That October, amid heightened regime concern over internal dissent exposed by the unrest, then Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei elevated the IRGC’s intelligence branch into the standalone IRGC Intelligence Organization and appointed Taeb its first chief.
The United States, Canada, the European Union, and the United Kingdom have all sanctioned Taeb, who commanded the Basij during the violent repression of the 2009 protests.
In his decree, Mojtaba tasked Taeb with further embedding the Basij across Iranian society, directing him to “strengthen the people-based intelligence network” and pursue the goal of “Every Iranian, a Basiji,” thereby expanding the regime’s grassroots surveillance and mobilization apparatus. The Basij is the IRGC’s nationwide volunteer paramilitary and ideological mobilization force. It is embedded in universities, workplaces, and neighborhoods, serving as a key pillar of the regime’s internal security.
Internal Rivalries Do Not Change Tehran’s Strategy
The latest reshuffle may reflect internal rivalries and a new leadership choosing officials it trusts to execute its agenda. But these are disputes over personnel and implementation, not over the regime’s core strategy.
Washington should not mistake internal rivalries for an opening. These competing factions remain aligned on the policies that threaten the United States, its allies, and the Iranian people. The Trump administration should therefore maintain sanctions enforcement and the naval blockade of Iranian ports, which resumed on July 14 and has since intercepted roughly 59 vessels.
Janatan Sayeh is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he focuses on Iranian domestic affairs and the Islamic Republic’s regional malign influence. For more analysis from the author and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Janatan on X @JanatanSayeh. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_Iran. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
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