Peloni: The ardent pursuit of peace by Israel and its US allies is part of the reason that peace remains so illusory. The other part is that the Arabs really don’t want peace. They want something for nothing, and selling hudnas to starry-eyed schlemiels has come to be realized as the best avenue by which to gain an advantage over Israel by its neighbors posing as peace partners. If the Arabs want peace, they can have it. If they want something else, why should such demands be entertained on the basis of promising little more than blue sky? As Mordechai Kedar explains below, reciprocity and not concessions is what should form the basis of any and all relationships between Israel and its Arab nations.
Veteran Middle East scholar outlines ten guiding principles that he argues should shape any future negotiations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, emphasizing reciprocity, full normalization and opposition to linking an agreement with the Palestinian issue.
David Bedein | TheJ.ca | August 12, 2026
As speculation continues regarding the possibility of diplomatic normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, Israeli Middle East scholar and former intelligence officer Dr. Mordechai Kedar has published what he describes as ten guiding principles that should govern any future negotiations.
Writing in Kiddush Times, Kedar argues that Israel should approach any talks from a position of strategic confidence rather than urgency. He contends that any agreement must be based on reciprocal recognition, mutual interests and full normalization, while avoiding concessions that extend beyond the bilateral relationship.
Kedar’s recommendations come amid renewed regional discussions about Saudi-Israeli relations following years of quiet security cooperation and changing geopolitical dynamics, particularly the shared concern among both countries regarding Iran’s regional influence.
According to Kedar, history offers important lessons that Israeli policymakers should not overlook.
He points to the February 14, 1945 meeting between U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Saudi Arabia’s founding monarch, King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, aboard the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal.
According to the publication, Roosevelt later told a joint session of Congress that his conversation with Ibn Saud had significantly influenced his understanding of what he described as “the Moslem problem” and “the Jewish problem.” Kedar further asserts that archival material preserved in the Peter Bergson collection at Yale University documents commitments made during that meeting regarding Zionist aspirations.
Kedar argues that the historical relationship established between Washington and Riyadh continues to influence Saudi policy toward Israel today.
Saudi Arabia’s Motivation
The first of Kedar’s “commandments” challenges what he believes is a common misconception about Saudi intentions.
“It is of the utmost importance to realize that the Saudis do not actually want peace with Israel,” he writes.
According to Kedar, Saudi Arabia’s principal motivation is confronting Iran rather than establishing a long-term strategic partnership with Israel.
He argues that if the Iranian threat were to disappear, Saudi interest in normalization could diminish significantly.
For that reason, he recommends that Israel negotiate from a position of strength, viewing any agreement as cooperation with a transactional regional partner rather than assuming a permanent alliance.
Israel Should Not Negotiate From Urgency
Kedar’s second principle emphasizes that Israel should avoid projecting urgency.
He argues that Israel has existed for nearly eight decades without diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and therefore should not negotiate under time pressure.
According to Kedar, displaying excessive eagerness would only increase the price Israel might be asked to pay.
Instead, he contends Israel should consistently remind both international partners and Saudi negotiators that normalization would improve one bilateral relationship but would not fundamentally transform the broader Middle East.
Reject Linking Peace to the Palestinian Issue
Perhaps Kedar’s strongest recommendation concerns the Palestinian issue.
He argues that Saudi normalization should remain entirely separate from negotiations involving the Palestinians.
Referring to the 1978 Camp David Accords, Kedar contends that former Prime Minister Menachem Begin made a strategic mistake by accepting provisions related to Palestinian autonomy.
According to Kedar, Israel should avoid repeating what he views as that precedent.
If Saudi Arabia wishes to support Palestinians, Kedar writes, it should do so independently rather than making Israeli concessions a condition for normalization.
He also argues that recent regional conflicts have reinforced Israeli concerns about the creation of a future Palestinian state.
“The current war with Iran and the Palestinian, Lebanese and Yemeni terrorist organizations has proven to Israelis, as well as to the Americans, the Saudis and the entire world, that Iran and its regional proxies are determined to eliminate the entire State of Israel,” he writes.
Reciprocity in Recognition
Another major theme throughout Kedar’s proposal is reciprocity.
He argues that every Israeli recognition should be matched by a corresponding Saudi recognition.
Among his recommendations, Kedar proposes that Israel recognize Saudi custodianship of the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina.
In return, he says Saudi Arabia should formally recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s historic and eternal capital.
He also proposes reciprocal recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people and Saudi Arabia as an Islamic state.
Kedar further argues that Saudi Arabia should recognize what he describes as the Jewish people’s right to live throughout the Land of Israel, from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River.
Media, Embassies and International Forums
Several of Kedar’s recommendations focus on practical aspects of normalization.
He calls for reciprocal commitments preventing incitement in each country’s media.
He specifically mentions Al Jazeera if Qatar were ever to become involved in negotiations.
Regarding diplomatic representation, Kedar argues that while Israel could permit Saudi Arabia to determine the location of Israel’s embassy inside the kingdom, Saudi Arabia’s embassy in Israel should be located in Jerusalem.
He also recommends that both countries agree not to vote against one another in international organizations while preserving each nation’s right to abstain.
Limiting Outside Influence
Kedar also advises that negotiations remain strictly bilateral.
He argues that the United States and European governments should not participate directly in negotiations because, in his view, their interests may not always align with Israel’s security priorities.
“The Americans always want a deal, even a bad one,” Kedar writes, arguing that outside mediators could pressure Israel into concessions.
Similarly, he cautions against relying on international guarantees or defense treaties.
Pointing to historical examples including the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and regional defense agreements involving Saudi Arabia, Kedar argues that Israel’s security must ultimately depend upon its own capabilities rather than international commitments.
Full Normalization, Not Symbolic Peace
Kedar concludes that any agreement should represent complete normalization rather than simply the absence of conflict.
He distinguishes between salaam, meaning peace, and sulh, which he describes as comprehensive normalization encompassing tourism, commerce, culture, science, sports, aviation, academia and technology.
Under his proposal, Israeli flags should be displayed openly during international events hosted in Saudi Arabia, Israeli athletes should receive the same recognition as competitors from other countries, and Israeli cultural and commercial participation should occur without restriction.
“Peace for peace, recognition for recognition, normal relations for normal relations,” Kedar writes, summarizing what he views as the guiding principle for any future agreement.
While Saudi Arabia has not formally recognized Israel and no negotiations have been publicly announced, Kedar argues that if talks eventually occur, Israel should enter them with clearly defined objectives rooted in reciprocity rather than concessions.
His proposal reflects a broader debate within Israel over how normalization efforts should proceed and what strategic, diplomatic and security conditions should govern any future agreement between Jerusalem and Riyadh.
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