Can tribal leaders in Hebron bring peace with Israel?

The fact that the Sons of Iraq or the leaders of Jordan and Iraq emerged under US and British support, illustrate that these tribal structures often require outside support.

Seth J. Frantzman

A recent article at The Jerusalem Post speaks about meeting with the top Hebron sheikh who wants to pull out of Palestinian Authority. The article claims that Sheikh Wadee’ al-Jaabari is the leader of Hebron’s most influential clan. Now “and four other leading Hebron sheikhs have signed a letter pledging peace and full recognition of Israel as a Jewish state.”

A letter has even been drafted. Jaabari has reached out to Israeli officials, the report says. Eight sheikhs are “believed to lead 204,000 local residents.”

There is an enduring allure of sheikhs and clans being able to offer a new initiative in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In Gaza there has been talk since October 7 that clans and tribes might emerge to challenge Hamas. So far they have not emerged. In their place a few militias apparently have been backed by Israel.

Arab tribes in the Arab revolt

What is interesting about the narrative of sheikhs, tribes and clans being able to rise up as peace partners is that this narrative still exists in 2025. More than 100 years ago the British allied with Arab tribes during the Arab revolt against the Ottomans.

At the time the British officer T.E Lawrence had journeyed from Egypt to meet with Sharif Hussein bin Ali, a leader of a tribe and also the Sharif and Emir of Mecca. With his sons, Ali, Abdullah and Faisal, the Sharif led a revolt against the Ottomans with British help.

We know what became of this revolt and its mixed legacy. Abdullah became the king of what is now Jordan and his descendants still rule the country. However, Abdullah’s decision to intervene in 1948 during the Israeli war of independence eventually led to his assassination in Jerusalem in 1951 at the hands of a Palestinian Arab.

Ali became the king of the Hejaz but was expelled by the Saudis in the 1920s and he died in Iraq. Faisal briefly sought to become king of Syria in 1920 but he was expelled by the French and ended up in Iraq. He ruled as king of Iraq from 1921 until his death in 1933. His grandson was overthrown and killed in 1958.

The false hope of sheikhs and clans can be seen in the mixed legacy of the Arab revolt. This was not just a group of sheikhs, tribes or clans. It was an important group with a long legacy and powerful history. However, even with this historic Islamic ties and their base of support in the Hejaz, they didn’t fare that well when they tried to move outside their realm. They survived in Jordan primarily because the Kingdom of Jordan in the 1920s was partly a tribal society.

They were able to balance that with British military support even when the Kingdom became home to large numbers of people fleeing the 1948 war. As such, Jordan became demographically more Palestinian than Jordanian over time. Is it correct to call Jordan a successful “tribal” state run by “sheikhs” and “clans.”

There is no doubt that was the initial binding element, but it survives because the king was able to move beyond that. The Kingdom worked with Circassian minorities, Christians, Palestinians and the clans of northern Jordan to create a state. It faced huge challenges, including the possibility of a Nasser inspired rebellion, a civil war in the 1970s and even plots from Syria and Iraq.

The end of the other tribal initiatives that grew out of the Arab Revolt illustrate how “tribes” and “sheikhs” cannot generally govern successfully in larger states that are urbanized. This doesn’t mean they can never succeed. People point to the Gulf states as examples of tribal and sheikh success.

However, those states are relatively small and they began primarily as British protectorates. The local sheikhs were able to first receive a stable small state and then grow it over time. They never had to rule over other urban elites, as they grew their state around a tribal structure.

Another place that people point to the success of “clans” and “sheikhs” is in the Arab Awakening movement in Iraq, also known as the Sons of Iraq or Sahwah. This group of Sunni tribal leaders emerged for only a short period of time between 2006 and 2008 mostly, to help secure a part of Iraq during a time of uncertainty and insurgency against US rule in the country. However, what was the legacy of this initiative? It had no real staying power and didn’t really govern or project stability. In essence, it was a short success during a period of chaos.

Tribes, clans can only be counted on to provide limited stability in small regions

There are many other examples people will point to in order to show how tribes, clans and sheikhs are part of the fabric of the region, and a type of structure that might be relied on. However, evidence shows that generally the tribes and clans in the region can only be counted on to provide limited stability in small regions, usually when government institutions break down. The Shammar tribe in Iraq and Syria, for instance, may be a large tribal structure and it may be important. However, its relevance doesn’t extend to running either country.

Some people make a simplistic argument that the Middle East is basically a collection of “tribes” and that there are no real “states.” They argue that the weaker and “failed” states all exist because they do not reflect the underlying “tribes.” In this narrative, the current successful Arab countries of the Gulf are successfuly because they are rooted in tribes; and the apparent weakness of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and other countries is because the “tribes” have not been invested in enough. This understanding of the region lacks a real appreciation of the diversity of the Middle East.

While it may be true that tribal structures are important in some areas, the fact is that the modern urbanized Middle East has had the same affect that urbanization has had on people all over the world; reducing clan and tribal structures and moving people in masses to cities. When people become educated and there are institutions, tribal structures begin to fray. Arab nationalism, for instance, weakened these structures. No one can seriously argue that Egypt, a state rooted in the power of the people of the Nile valley, is really a “tribal” state. It exists in opposition largely to “tribes.” Lebanon, because it is such a diverse state, is not best divided into “tribes.” Syria is also a diverse state and is not best seen as a “tribal” state. One may argue that many parts of Iraq have strong tribal elements. There are Kurdish tribes, Yazidi tribes, and Sunni tribes. However, the power of these various groups within larger groups has largely persisted because Iraq has been in such chaos over the years; from the Saddam era to the insurgency and the ISIS war.

Now, let’s return to the Palestinian Arabs and the false hope of tribes. The growth of Fatah in the 1960s and 1970s and then Hamas in the 1980s is largely in opposition to tradition tribal or clan elements in society. After the 1948 war the collapse of Palestinian Arab society, due to massive movement of refugees and displaced people, meant that traditional village and beduin sheikh rule broke down; along with the traditional urban elites and “effendis.” There was a brief period where traditional rulers re-emerged in the 1950s. Nationalism pushed them to the side, as did Arab socialism and communism and eventually the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Why would tribal and clan structures re-emerge after so many decades of being weakened? They might be tapped on a very local level, but the idea that they might command the allegiance of hundreds of thousands appears mistaken. Tribal sheikhs can’t run schools or institutions, they don’t run universities, or hospitals. If an “emirate” emerges in Hebron what land will it control. Will it be armed? Who will administer education and universities and colleges in the area? Who will build wells and pave roads? The Gulf states only work because the traditional tribal structure took on the responsibility of governance.

However, there’s no evidence that this is happening among clans in Hebron or Gaza. The fact that the Sons of Iraq or the leaders of Jordan and Iraq emerged under US and British support, illustrate that these tribal structures often require outside support. They feed off weak states but they rarely replace states, especially when they are foised on existing urban and rural structures.