Shifa Hospital Prepared Emergency Logistics for October 7 While Monitored by Shin Bet

Yossi Baum | X | March 9

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Breaking: The Director of Shifa Hospital, Released by Ronen Bar, Was Responsible for Hamas’ Emergency Logistics in Preparation for the Massacre—With the Assistance of the Shin Bet

Is Israel Pulling the Plug on Gaza?

Hamas’ operational directive ahead of October 7 included the preparation of massive emergency stockpiles, knowing with certainty that war was imminent, as revealed by @Motty53.
Attached is an internal conversation between Gazan officials indicating that Hamas holds a massive fuel reserve, as evidenced by an IDF recording released at the start of the war.

The man behind this entire operation was Shifa Hospital director, Mohammed Abu Salmiya, a senior Hamas operative. The goal was to facilitate the accumulation of reserves and massive stockpiles under the guise of humanitarian needs—for Gaza’s hospitals.

It should be noted that in previous years, Hamas launched a massive project to transition Gaza to solar energy, funded by the World Bank, the EU, the UN, and other occasional contributors—aimed at ending Gaza’s dependence on Israeli electricity. The Hamas government even granted exemptions for this project.

This initiative progressed rapidly but suffered significant damage during Operation Guardian of the Walls (May 2021) when IDF strikes destroyed large portions of the infrastructure, calling into question the economic viability of the investment.

However, private homes and small-to-medium businesses that installed solar panels on their rooftops were apparently not damaged, and their usage continued to expand.
As of March 2023, approximately one-third of Gazan households and 50% of businesses—including hospitals—were estimated to use solar energy, a figure supported by parallel Israeli studies (links in the comments).

Public vs. Private Sector Energy Use

While the private sector continued expanding solar energy, the public sector, particularly Hamas’ military machine—its tunnels and command centers—could no longer rely on solar power.
As a result, 13 public hospitals in Gaza transitioned to solar energy. And what is located directly beneath those hospitals? Hamas’ military headquarters.

Thus, hospitals not only served as physical shields but also humanitarian shields.

Hamas strategically used both solar panels and generators running on diesel—which was imported into Gaza in massive quantities with Israeli approval, under the supervision of the Shin Bet and IDF authorities.

The Electricity Blackout: Real or a Hoax?

There is significant doubt about the so-called “power outage” announced today by Minister @elicoh1, since Hamas likely holds the largest fuel reserves in Gaza.

Who Approved Hamas’ Stockpiling?

It must be emphasized: every shipment entering Gaza requires Israeli approval, especially fuel, solar panels, and dual-use materials—which were always closely monitored and required Israeli authorization.

Abu Salmiya wasn’t just responsible for ordering solar panels and fuel—he also handled “baby food” and other hospital supplies.

Within the IDF, several parallel bodies manage these approvals:

Under Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, a four-branch bureaucracy emerged to oversee goods entering Gaza, creating competition (and possibly chaos) between them:

1. COGAT’s Gaza Coordination & Liaison Administration (CLA)

   • Reports to COGAT Commander Maj. Gen. Rassan Alian
   • Current head: Col. Abdallah Halabi (replacing Col. Moshe Tetro, who was promoted to IDF attaché in Belgium—interesting choice, no?).
   • Headquarters: Shde Teiman base, with outposts at the Gaza crossings.

2. “Influence Unit”

   • Built on Unit 522, commanded by Brig. Gen. (Res.) Harel Kanfo, reporting to Southern Command.
   • Headquarters: Southern Command base in Be’er Sheva, with branches in IDF divisions, brigades, and battalions around Gaza.

3. New “Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit” for Gaza

   • Led by Brig. Gen. Elad Goren, effectively under COGAT but competing with both Gaza CLA and the “Influence Unit”.
   • Headquarters not yet finalized—currently based at the border crossings, with outposts in divisions, brigades, and battalions.

4. Crossings Authority

   • Manages Erez and Kerem Shalom crossings, among others.

Where’s the Catch?

The operations of all these units, which maintain daily contact with Hamas, are closely intertwined with the Shin Bet, the final approving authority.
Without the Shin Bet’s approval, nothing moves—not even a SIM card. The Shin Bet has full intelligence on every shipment, and it is supposed to determine not only what enters Gaza, but how much.

Yet, these bodies—including the Shin Bet—reportedly granted Hamas almost free rein, particularly in 2023, approving shipments and quantities that had never been authorized before.

Key Detail: Abu Salmiya Had Nearly Automatic Approval

As Shifa Hospital’s director, Abu Salmiya was in constant contact with Israeli officials regarding hospital supplies.

• His requests were routinely approved, almost automatically—a de facto “green card.”
• As a result, he faced minimal scrutiny—if any at all.

Bottom Line: Who Bears Responsibility?

Ronen Bar—the man responsible for:

• The failure to warn of the October 7 attack
• The failure to locate Sinwar
• Minimal intelligence on the hostages

…is also the one who must answer how Hamas was allowed to stockpile supplies for war under his watch.

Now Everything Makes Sense:

• Why the Shin Bet released the Shifa Hospital director—against all security logic.
• Why Brig. Gen. Meir Hen (Ohana), released “by mistake,” received only a minor disciplinary note.
• Why so many on the Left, including the New Israel Fund’s organizations—especially “Physicians for Human Rights”—pushed so hard for his release.
• Why the government used the “prison overcrowding” excuse to justify his release—so the public wouldn’t ask tougher questions.
• Why the Shin Bet, in its official statement, described Abu Salmiya as supposedly having “low risk potential.”

Final Note:

This morning, @Doron_Kadosh reported that COGAT’s unit wasn’t even included in the IDF’s “investigations.”
I think you all know why.

Links and additional sources in the comments.