Peloni: A bleak outlook for America and its allies in the coming years as the expense and emphasis on defensive measures are failing for a variety of reasons discussed below.
While President Trump says the US is not short of weapons he has told Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky that the US does not have Patriot interceptors to send to Ukraine because “we need them for ourselves.”
The best face to put on the situation is that some in the Pentagon leaked information that US stockpiles of critical weapons were dangerously depleted. The urgency in the leak came from the possible renewal of hostilities against Iran and the fear that it would become close to impossible to defend against Iranian missile and drone strikes if supplies ran out. Others think the leaks were inspired by Iran war opponents trying to scuttle a decision to resume attacks against Iran.
In any case, the metrics are the metrics and they are not good.
The supply shortage in the Iran war took place because US production of weapons fell behind current needs. The US emptied its war supplies supporting Ukraine, without accounting for what would happen if the shelves were empty.
Two of the most important land-based air defense systems, THAAD and Patriot, reportedly are in dangerously short supply. U.S. and allied forces have expended close to 80% of total U.S. THAAD interceptor stocks relative to pre-war inventory levels. At least two to three AN/TPY-2 X-band radars—the primary radar component for the THAAD system—have been confirmed damaged or destroyed in Middle Eastern host countries following Iranian targeted strike operations including the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base (Jordan) where a U.S. Army forward-deployed AN/TPY-2 radar was destroyed by a drone strike; at the Prince Sultan Air Base (Saudi Arabia) where high-resolution satellite imagery confirmed an AN/TPY-2 radar array and its support shelter sustained heavy fire damage from a precision strike, disabling the unit’s tracking capabilities, and in the UAE at al-Ruwais where additional strikes targeted radar facilities tied to the regional THAAD network near al-Ruwais, causing operational degradation.
Meanwhile, Patriot air defense systems operated by U.S. and allied forces have sustained both physical damage and operational degradation. In Bahrain satellite imagery confirmed that Iranian precision strikes hit and destroyed key components of a U.S.-supplied Patriot battery at Riffa Air Base, alongside damage to hardened structures at the site. Defense assessments (including analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies) highlight that coalition forces expended approximately 65% of their total PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptor inventories. The U.S. entered recent operations in the Middle East with an estimated total of over 2,300 to 2,500 PAC-3 interceptors. Over 1,500 PAC-3 interceptors have been expended in defense against ballistic missiles and drone salvos, maybe more. Distributed across active U.S. Army Patriot batteries, 800 remaining rounds average out to roughly 13 PAC-3 interceptors per battery—enough to load only about two launchers out of a standard 6-to-8 launcher battery setup. An additional 400 older PAC-2 interceptors remain in reserve, though these rely on blast-fragmentation rather than “hit-to-kill” kinetic impact, making them less effective against advanced ballistic threats.
PAC-3 Patriot interceptors are made by Lockheed in Camden, Arkansas. Lockheed produces around 600 rounds per year although under new US government contracts Lockheed is working to expand production. There are, however, a number of bottlenecks including production of the advanced seeker head for the missiles (made by Boeing) and manufacture and curing of the missile’s dual-pulse solid fuel rocket engines.
Boeing’s Huntsville, Alabama plant is the sole manufacturer of the active Ka-band millimeter-wave radar seeker for the PAC-3 MSE. The end-to-end lead time for a PAC-3 MSE interceptor is roughly 24 months for missile assembly and up to 30 months for component procurement and propellant curing. A seeker ordered today takes over two years to clear testing, integration at Lockheed Martin, and field deployment.
Global demand for Patriot interceptors (combining PAC-2 GEM-T and PAC-3) stands at a backlog of over 4,300 rounds—representing roughly 7 years of output at pre-surge production rates.
The U.S. Army’s inventory of MGM-140 ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) is virtually depleted, following sustained operational expenditures in West Asia and military transfers to Ukraine. Reports based on internal Pentagon data indicate that U.S. forces have fired more than 1,300 ATACMS since early 2026, leaving the overall inventory at “virtually zero” or “rock bottom”. ATACMS production has been phased out and is being (slowly) replaced by PrSM, a longer range guided missile. PrSM is still in low rate initial production. From an operational point of view, until PrSM ramps up production, the army cannot support the precision-missile part of the HIMARS system. This means no more supplies either for Ukraine, the Persian Gulf or sensitive locations, especially Taiwan and Korea. ATACMS forms a core component of South Korea’s Kill Chain and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) frameworks—part of the military’s “Three-Axis” strategy to conduct rapid, precision counterbattery strikes against North Korean long-range artillery, bunker complexes, and missile sites near the DMZ. The US Marines also thought they could use ATACMS to stop a naval invasion of Taiwan, but without supplies this isn’t possible.
155mm Ammunition
The global supply of 155mm artillery shells remains under extreme strain. The 155mm artillery shell is widely considered the single most important heavy ground-fires munition in modern land warfare. Standardized across NATO and allied militaries, it serves as the backbone of tactical and operational fire support.
Years of high-intensity consumption in Ukraine, operational usage in West Asia, and multi-national stockpiling efforts have drawn down Western inventories to historic lows. Over the past four years, the U.S. War Department has drawn down its 155mm reserves by over 3.6 million rounds—with over 3 million transferred to Ukraine, 112,000 used for internal training/testing, and 218,000 transferred via Foreign Military Sales (FMS). A new $469 million automated facility in Mesquite, Texas (operated by General Dynamics OTS) was intended to forge 30,000 projectile bodies per month. The OTS contract was halted after three years and the three new manufacturing plants in Mesquite failed to produce a single round. The US Army is trying to work with a new contractor for 155mm shells, but it is years away from expanding manufacturing much beyond what existing factories produce.
Implications
The 155mm debacle is just one of many roadblocks that will slow US rearmament. There are plenty of other problems including critical supplies, critical materials, sunset components, production bottlenecks, and significant skilled labor-shortage issues.
Meanwhile the US is trying to patch up its procurement system and throw money at the shortages. If this ends up in another 155mm debacle, the implications are grave.
Optimistically, manufacturing adequate supply inventories will require around 5 to 10 years and in some cases for major systems (ships, submarines for example) a lot longer. On balance, the US will be in a weapons’ deficit for at least a decade.
The lack of enough military supplies will severely compromise US security policy in the years ahead. If key allies are unable, unwilling or too slow in building up their own stockpiles, critical alliances will be compromised to the point of becoming nonfunctional. US potential adversaries will almost certainly test the United States, jacking up pressure along the fault lines of the international system. Results could include the complete collapse of Ukraine, a Chinese military operation against Taiwan, or efforts by North Korea to gain a stranglehold over South Korea. The US may find its presence on the peninsula too dangerous to be continued as US forces stationed there face a nuclear threat.
The US still has some significant assets. The US retains strong, superior airpower still unmatched by China and Russia. American command and control systems are significantly improved, and are being augmented by artificial intelligence and better sensors. The US leads most other countries in battlefield systems integration. But, while trying to catch up, US land forces remain short on critical supplies such as anti tank weapons and artillery and are behind in fielding tactical and mid-range strike drones. The Navy looks capable on paper, but the fleet is ageing, new construction is weak and slow, and reliance on aircraft carriers remains an issue. If China proliferates its counter-carrier weapons to its allies and friends, the US fleet could find itself in real trouble. Even US carriers in far-distant Guam are at risk. The US relies on a sea triad made up of carriers, Arleigh Burke class destroyers with AEGIS air defense systems, and nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). It takes 7 to 12 years to build a single nuclear submarine.
In addition, the US has failed in protecting US defense systems and technologies from compromise. Sloppy or non-existing security measures over the past three decades have left US systems at severe risk, and there is no sign whatsoever that Washington has any incentive to plug the leaks and punish the transgressors. This failure amounts to a massive scandal. There isn’t a Chinese military system that has not benefited from ripping off American technology. The only real differentiator is China is much better at industrializing weapons than the United States, and light years ahead of Europe.
It is easy to forget that US power is mainly predicated on expeditionary forces, something like the UK in World War 1 and World War 2. Expeditionary forces need to be constantly supported and supplied. In World War 1 including the Battle of Mons and the Battle of Le Cateau—the small, professional force of roughly 80,000 men, the UK expeditionary army was nearly exhausted by the end of 1914, though it successfully helped stop the German advance at the First Battle of the Marne. Britain paid a very high price, particularly in France and Belgium. 887,858 total military deaths and over 1.6 million wounded, with the vast majority of these European theater casualties occurring on the Western Front in France and Flanders.
In World War 2 Britain’s expeditionary force fared poorly. During the 1940 Battle of Dunkirk and the campaign in France, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) suffered roughly 66,000 to 68,000 total casualties—including around 11,000 killed, 14,000 wounded, and over 41,000 captured or missing. They also abandoned nearly all their heavy equipment, trucks, and tanks.
The US does not have a separate expeditionary army or, looked at another way, the US Army, Marines, Navy and Air Force are almost entirely expeditionary by design. The US maintains troops in Europe, the Middle East, in Korea and Japan and keeps bases outside the United States for land, air and naval forces. In terms of fighting strength, the US has around 160,000 to 175,000 troops stationed outside the United States, with the most important located in Europe, South Korea and Japan. A significant setback at any of these locations would be, under any circumstance, extremely painful. The US would either have to try and reinforce deployed forces, or rescue them. In an era of missiles and drones, getting supplies and reinforcements through will be a significant challenge.
Under current conditions, the US needs to redesign its defense posture, significantly improve defense production and augment vital stockpiles, and evaluate how it can support US allies and US interests during the coming decade of supply shortages. At the same time, America’s allies have to do vastly more for their own security simply because the coming decade is fraught with risk and danger.
The next decade could be the most challenging for peace and security since the end of the Cold War.
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