Janet Levy: Although I disagree with the author’s somewhat optimistic view of the viability of using clan architecture as an alternative to Hamas, I’ve highlighted key points of importance in his article.
Key points:
– American approval for Hamas to conduct Gaza security operations contradicts the so-called “peace plan” and guarantees its rebuilding.
– Hamas has endured despite military setbacks, maintaining 10-15% of its rockets, keeping its leadership in Doha, and preserving its military command structure. It has increased its reserves by 15,000 fighters and is planning for quick reconstitution.
– Clashes in some neighborhoods show that Hamas is removing other options to maintain its power.
– The security vacuum mentioned by Trump results from Hamas’s totalitarian control, which has prevented the development of alternatives.
The author sees some hope in clan administrative capabilities, which could boost economic activity, improve infrastructure, and create different social dynamics. Critics warn that empowering clans might lead to the formation of hostile fiefdoms.
– The Israeli military must stay in control throughout the transition period.
– The Palestinian Authority has proven itself completely unable to address Gaza’s urgent security needs.
– The technocratic committee described in Trump’s plan lacks enforcement power.
– Israeli military operations against Hamas must continue despite the restrictions of the American-orchestrated “ceasefire.” The terrorist group must remain legitimate military targets regardless of American statements about temporary approval.
Gregg Roman | MEF | October 15, 2025
25th anniversary of Hamas celebrated in Gaza. By Fars Media Corporation, CC BY 4.0, Wikipedia
The October 13, 2025, announcement that Hamas has received American approval to conduct security operations in Gaza represents a catastrophic strategic error that undermines the long-term objective of excising the terrorist organization from Gaza’s governance. President Trump’s statement that “we gave them approval for a period of time” to address lawlessness fundamentally contradicts his own 20-point peace plan’s core principle: Hamas must have no role—direct, indirect, or in any form—in Gaza’s future governance. While the remaining 19 points of the framework continue to be negotiated and implemented, this premature legitimization of Hamas’s security role virtually guarantees its complete reconstitution.
The strategic imperative remains unchanged: empowering Gaza’s clan structures, which represent 72 percent of Gaza’s 2.3 million residents through 608 registered mukhtars and six major Bedouin confederations, to fill the governance vacuum as Hamas is systematically removed.
Fatal Miscalculation of Hamas’s Security Role
The partial destruction of Hamas’s military infrastructure has created what should be a unique opportunity for fundamental governance restructuring. However, as the American brokered ceasefire demonstrates, Hamas has survived as an organizational entity despite military degradation, retaining approximately 10-15 percent of its rocket arsenal, maintaining its external leadership in Doha, and preserving its military command structure under Izz al-Din al-Haddad. The organization’s recruitment of 15,000 new fighters during the war, according to U.S. intelligence assessments, means it enters this transition period with renewed human resources eager to demonstrate commitment to the cause.
The Hamas Interior Ministry’s October 13 offer of amnesty to gang members who join its security forces reveals the organization’s strategy for rapid reconstitution. Every individual accepting this amnesty becomes a Hamas operative, expanding the organization’s intelligence network and territorial control under the legitimate cover of maintaining public order. The ongoing clashes in Sabra and Shuja’iyya neighborhoods between Hamas forces and independent actors demonstrate that Hamas is not preventing lawlessness, but systematically eliminating alternatives to its authority.
The “period of time” urgently requires immediate precise definition.
Weren’t we all told that this 20 point plan was a take-it or leave-it offer. Hamas has declined to “take it” and thus, there is no agreement on their current activities. I’m sure DJT and Bibi are aware of this discrepancy.
I remember quite clearly that Hamas were voted in. Where do these new numbers come from?
This is a big issue. If they still have so many rockets and it can be proven, they must be destroyed right away. There is no point in waiting for anything at all.
Either we know where they are or it can’t be proven. You can’t have it both ways.
The Qataris must solve this problem. There can be no safe haven for these leaders. Either they are on board or they need to expect more unwelcome guests,
Are we missing the point here or something? Is this some kind of mechanism to identify the gang members == terrorists or a complete derogatory denial of the fact that they lost the war? Maybe they didn’t lose the war from their point of view.
The vaunted clans are too afraid of their own courage to step up to the plate and show themselves willing and capable to take the reins. They can only rule over their own clans and as soon as the real governing force is gone, they will fight amongst themselves until the rejuvenated Hamas is the new ruler.
The stories about how individual clan-related forces protected World Food Programs was discarded by every media report. The programs were attacked in an on-going fight to retain control of the prices exacted by Hamas. These programs were always in danger and Israel was blamed.
The path forwards can only be followed if the clans really get together and fight to remove Hamas themselves. Otherwise, they are no better than Hamas and the Gazan population will not benefit from their endeavors.
If the clans can oust Hamas, they may be consequential for the future of this strip of land, but if Hamas continues to “police” the region, There is no hope for the clans and their populations.
Must we remind the world about how the US ended the war against Japan in 1945? Apparently it was a choice between two alternatives and one of them was chosen as being most likely to succeed.
I see the alternatives for Israel in the not-too-distant future as being similar to the choices for the US in 1945; perhaps even clearer in many respects.