Unraveling Israel’s Qatar-Gate Scandals: A Former Deputy Commissioner’s Critique

Jalal Tagreeb and Peloni

Avi Weiss,

Introduction

In a detailed interview aired on TOV Israeli television, Avi Weiss, a retired Deputy Commissioner of Israel Police, presented a comprehensive critique of what he terms multiple “Qatar-gate” scandals plaguing Israeli politics. Weiss argues that these overlapping investigations represent prosecutorial overreach, politically motivated charges, and a fundamental misunderstanding of the evidence. His analysis comes at a critical juncture, as two separate but interconnected cases involving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s associates have captured national attention and sparked intense debate about national security, foreign influence, and the integrity of Israel’s legal system.

The cases Weiss discusses involve allegations that close advisors to Netanyahu worked on behalf of Qatar while in the Prime Minister’s employ, including Eli Feldstein and Jonatan Urich. These individuals face charges ranging from contact with a foreign agent to breach of trust, money laundering, and the disclosure of classified information. Weiss contends that the charges are largely baseless, built on legal theories that do not apply to the defendants, and timed strategically to prevent any possibility of a presidential pardon for Netanyahu.

The Fifth Dimension Affair: The First Qatar Connection

Weiss begins his analysis by identifying what he calls the “original Qatar-gate,” a scandal that predates the current investigations by several years. This involves the Fifth Dimension company, a cybersecurity firm that developed artificial intelligence technology for information gathering and analysis. The company was chaired by Benny Gantz, a former IDF Chief of Staff who would later become Defense Minister and a political rival of Netanyahu, with Ram Ben-Barak, a former Deputy Head of the Mossad, serving as president.

According to Weiss, the Fifth Dimension affair emerged from an FBI investigation in the United States involving former U.S. Army General John Allen, who was suspected of conducting foreign lobbying work for Qatar without proper registration. Court documents revealed that Allen had business ties with Fifth Dimension and helped negotiate a potential deal with Qatar valued at approximately $72 million. The Israeli Ministry of Defense stated that Fifth Dimension was not registered as a defense exporter, meaning any attempt to trade sensitive technology with Qatar would have been illegal.

Despite these revelations, Israeli prosecutors decided not to investigate Gantz or Ben-Barak in connection with the alleged effort to sell espionage technology to Qatar. Weiss suggests this double standard sets the stage for understanding the current prosecutions, implying that political considerations rather than legal merit drive decisions about whom to investigate. The Fifth Dimension company ultimately closed in 2018 after its Russian investor, Viktor Vekselberg, was sanctioned by the United States, cutting off the company’s funding.

The 2022 World Cup: Setting the Stage

Weiss draws attention to the public relations campaign surrounding Qatar’s hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, which he identifies as a crucial link between the various Qatar-related scandals. He notes that prominent Israeli politicians, including Gantz and then-Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, publicly praised Qatar’s role and importance to regional stability. Gantz stated that Qatar was “a country of international importance that contributes to maintaining stability in our region,” while Lapid called the World Cup hosting “a diplomatic achievement.”

More controversially, Weiss describes how three former heads of Israeli security agencies traveled to Qatar for the World Cup semifinals on a private jet. The trip included the former Shin Bet chief, the Mossad chief, and the head of Military Intelligence. According to Weiss, the tickets to the semifinal match were worth approximately $30,000 each, and the officials received additional gifts including gold watches. The officials later claimed they traveled to Qatar to inspect security arrangements for Israeli visitors, but Weiss dismisses this as a false justification, noting that most Israelis had already left after being unable to afford the expensive semifinal tickets.

This trip became significant in the current investigations because it established a pattern of Israeli officials accepting hospitality from Qatar. When Prime Minister Netanyahu later attempted to defend contacts with Qatar, he pointed to these trips, arguing that if former security chiefs could visit Qatar and praise the country, his aides’ work should not be considered problematic. The Shin Bet later clarified that its chief’s presence at the World Cup was part of professional security preparations approved by Netanyahu in advance, not personal entertainment.

The Bild Leak Case

One of the two major cases Weiss discusses involves the leak of classified intelligence to the German newspaper Bild in September 2024. This leak occurred in the immediate aftermath of one of the war’s most traumatic moments: the discovery that Hamas had executed six Israeli hostages who had survived eleven months of captivity. The murders triggered massive protests across Israel, with estimates of over 500,000 people assembling at various sites, demanding that Netanyahu reach a hostage deal with Hamas.

In this charged atmosphere, Eli Feldstein, serving as Netanyahu’s military spokesman, leaked a classified intelligence document to Bild. The document, which Israeli military censors had prohibited from publication in Israel, contained an intelligence assessment suggesting that Hamas was using the hostage issue to manipulate Israeli public opinion. The leak to a foreign outlet not subject to Israeli censorship allowed the information to become public despite the censorship order.

Feldstein faces charges in this case alongside an individual named Rosenfeld. Weiss emphasizes that a critical third person is missing from the indictment: Jay Footlik, an American lobbyist with connections to Qatar. According to Weiss, without Footlik’s testimony, the case cannot proceed properly, yet Footlik has not been questioned despite being central to the allegations. Israeli police issued an arrest warrant for Footlik, but efforts to secure his cooperation through U.S. authorities have been unsuccessful, with the U.S. Department of Justice canceling scheduled interviews without explanation.

In a series of interviews aired in December 2025, Feldstein made explosive allegations that Netanyahu was directly involved in and approved the leak. Feldstein claimed he told Netanyahu in advance that he was trying to obtain the classified document, and that after publication, Netanyahu thanked him for his work. These revelations have intensified scrutiny of the Prime Minister’s role, though Netanyahu’s office has denied all allegations and characterized Feldstein as an unreliable witness trying to shift blame.

The Main Qatargate Affair

The second and more extensive investigation concerns allegations that Feldstein and Urich conducted public relations work on behalf of Qatar while employed by Netanyahu. This case centers on the claim that they received payments through intermediaries to promote Qatar’s image in Israeli media, particularly emphasizing Qatar’s role as a mediator in hostage negotiations while criticizing Egypt’s involvement.

Leaked correspondence revealed a sophisticated influence operation. Text messages showed that Yisrael Einhorn, a former Netanyahu campaign adviser who had relocated to Serbia, drafted pro-Qatari messages and sent them via WhatsApp to Feldstein, who forwarded them to Urich for dissemination to Israeli journalists. In one exchange, Einhorn described their work as “manufacturing reality.” The messages often claimed to represent the views of “senior security officials” or “senior American officials” but were in fact fabrications designed to shape public perception.

The charges in this case include contact with a foreign agent, receiving bribes, fraud, breach of trust, money laundering, and disclosure of classified information. Weiss systematically challenges each of these charges, arguing they represent a fundamental misapplication of Israeli law.

Weiss’s Legal Critique

Central to Weiss’s argument is the contention that Feldstein and Urich were never state employees, and therefore cannot be charged with crimes that apply exclusively to public servants. He cites a document from the prosecution itself stating that the suspects “were not absorbed into state service” and “were not absorbed into work in state service.” If they were not state employees, Weiss argues, how can they be charged with crimes like breach of trust, bribery, and misuse of classified information that require the defendant to hold an official position?

Regarding Feldstein specifically, Weiss explains that he sought higher-level security clearance in April 2024 to work officially within the Prime Minister’s Office. The Shin Bet denied this clearance due to an undisclosed past offense, allegedly related to drugs. While Feldstein maintained a lower-level security clearance from his previous work as an IDF spokesman, he never received the classification necessary to access the most sensitive materials in the Prime Minister’s Office. From that moment, Weiss argues, the Shin Bet and military intelligence were responsible for ensuring Feldstein did not access inappropriate materials, not Netanyahu.

As for Urich, Weiss notes that he had an open investigation related to an incident involving former State Attorney Shlomo Filber. Because of this pending case, prosecutors themselves opposed Urich’s transition from working for the Likud party to becoming a state employee. His attorney requested that the prosecution allow Urich to move from party employment to state employment so he could participate in official meetings, but prosecutors refused, citing the open investigation. Weiss finds it absurd that prosecutors now charge Urich with offenses applicable only to state employees when they previously prevented him from becoming one.

The Jay Footlik Connection

A key figure in Weiss’s narrative is Jay Footlik, an American Jewish political consultant with an extensive career. Footlik served as an adviser to President Bill Clinton, Secretary of State John Kerry, and Israeli President Shimon Peres. In 2019, his firm ThirdCircle signed a $2.5 million contract with the Qatari embassy in the United States to advance Qatar’s interests, registering properly under U.S. foreign agent laws.

Before engaging Feldstein, Footlik sought a legal opinion from attorney Gidon Sher, who confirmed that it was permissible to hire Israelis to provide public relations services for Qatar, as Qatar was not classified as an enemy state of Israel. Weiss emphasizes this point repeatedly: Qatar maintains close ties with the United States, hosts the largest U.S. military base outside American territory, and has never been officially designated as an Israeli enemy. Therefore, working on Qatar’s public relations, while perhaps controversial, should not constitute a crime.

Footlik allegedly paid Feldstein’s salary while he worked in the Prime Minister’s Office, using intermediaries to handle the financial arrangements. Weiss argues that the failure to question Footlik represents a critical gap in the investigation. Without Footlik’s testimony explaining the nature of the employment relationship, the financial arrangements, and the scope of work, much of the evidence becomes hearsay. Judge Menahem Mizrahi of the Rishon LeZion magistrate court acknowledged this problem, writing that the case rests on “mountains hanging by a hair” without Footlik’s testimony.

Specific Charge Refutations

Weiss methodically dismantles each charge in the indictment. On the accusation of “contact with a foreign agent,” he sarcastically asks who this foreign agent is supposed to be. The answer, he says, is Footlik, a Zionist Jew who contributes money to Israel, advised multiple U.S. administrations, worked with Shimon Peres, supported hostage families, and invested significant resources in promoting their cause. When American authorities learned that Israeli investigators wanted to question Footlik, they reportedly told Israel to stay away, calling it a “dirty political investigation.”

Regarding the charge of disclosing classified information, Weiss questions what classified information Feldstein supposedly shared. The claim that Qatar is a better mediator than Egypt hardly qualifies as state secrets, he argues. He suggests prosecutors conflated this charge with the separate Bild case to create the appearance of a more serious offense.

On bribery charges, Weiss emphasizes that ordinary citizens cannot legally receive bribes under Israeli law, only public officials. Since Feldstein was not a state employee, the charge makes no sense. The same logic applies to charges of fraud and breach of trust, which require the defendant to hold a position of public trust.

Weiss reserves particular scorn for the money laundering charge, explaining that Israelis working abroad typically receive payment without VAT (value-added tax) and report income without it. To charge someone with money laundering for not paying VAT on money received without VAT demonstrates, in his view, either ignorance or bad faith.

Perhaps most bizarrely, Weiss notes that prosecutors charged Feldstein with “wearing a uniform without authorization.” He suggests this charge was added simply because Feldstein occasionally wore military attire, creating yet another baseless accusation to pile onto the indictment.

Judicial Skepticism

Weiss emphasizes that five different judges have reviewed aspects of these cases, with Judge Mizrahi of Rishon LeZion being the most prominent. According to Weiss, all the judges who examined the evidence concluded that prosecutors had built their case “on air” with insufficient foundation. These judicial assessments, he argues, demonstrate that those who actually understand how to evaluate evidence recognize the prosecution’s weaknesses.

Prosecutors requested that the Shin Bet provide a formal security assessment stating that Feldstein and Urich’s public relations work for Qatar damaged Israeli national security. The Shin Bet, understanding the implications, declined to provide such an assessment. Without it, a key charge in the indictment related to harming state security could not be sustained. This led to the dismissal of the most serious accusation against Urich: knowingly disclosing classified information with intent to harm state security, an offense carrying a potential life sentence.

The Timing Question

Weiss dedicates significant attention to explaining why these cases emerged when they did, arguing the timing reveals political motivations. He suggests the investigations and publicity around them serve as a message to President Isaac Herzog regarding potential pardons for Netanyahu. The implicit threat, according to Weiss, is that even if Herzog were to pardon Netanyahu in his three ongoing corruption trials (known as Cases 1000, 2000, and 4000), additional cases wait in the pipeline. By publicizing the Qatar-gate allegations, prosecutors signal that removing Netanyahu from legal jeopardy would be futile because they can always generate new investigations.

This interpretation aligns with Weiss’s broader critique that Israeli prosecutors have engaged in a sustained campaign against Netanyahu, selectively enforcing laws and manufacturing cases to achieve political objectives. He sees the Qatar-gate investigations as the latest iteration of this pattern, using the legitimate concern about foreign influence to construct criminal cases against individuals who committed no actual crimes.

Comparative Standards

Throughout his analysis, Weiss repeatedly contrasts the treatment of Netanyahu’s associates with that of other political figures. He returns frequently to the Fifth Dimension affair, noting that despite clear evidence of attempted deals with Qatar, neither Gantz nor Ben-Barak faced investigation. He also references the officials who traveled to Qatar for the World Cup, accepting expensive hospitality, yet received no scrutiny. These comparisons, he argues, reveal that prosecutorial decisions depend on political identity rather than legal standards.

Weiss also draws parallels to Netanyahu’s main corruption trial (Case 4000), providing a detailed example of prosecutorial misconduct. He describes how the indictment claimed Netanyahu improperly pressured the Walla news site to keep a video about Arabs voting on its homepage during elections. However, a police investigator later revealed that Walla was the third outlet to post the video, hours after other major news sites. Moreover, Walla published an update the same day stating that Arabs were not rushing to polls, contradicting Netanyahu’s message. This evidence, which completely undermined the charge, was hidden from the defense and the public for years until the investigator came forward. Weiss uses this example to illustrate how prosecutors suppress exculpatory evidence and rely on the public’s inability to properly evaluate claims.

The Serbia Connection

An intriguing subplot involves Yisrael Einhorn’s relocation to Serbia, where he now serves as an adviser to Serbian President Aleksandar Vu?i?. Weiss notes that Einhorn left Israel for Serbia in 2020, conveniently placing himself beyond the easy reach of Israeli authorities. When Israeli investigators traveled to Serbia to question Einhorn, the Serbian Prosecutor General reportedly warned them that if they continued investigating Einhorn, he would issue arrest warrants against the Israeli investigators and prosecutors for conducting a political persecution case, and would seek to extradite them.

This remarkable confrontation, if accurately described, suggests that at least one foreign official viewed the Israeli investigation as politically motivated rather than a legitimate criminal probe. Weiss expresses admiration for the Serbian Prosecutor General’s willingness to defend principles that he believes Israeli authorities have abandoned.

Feldstein’s Credibility Problems

While Weiss defends Feldstein and Urich against the specific criminal charges, he acknowledges significant credibility issues with Feldstein as a witness. He notes that Feldstein has provided three, four, or even five different versions of events with no connection between them. This inconsistency explains why prosecutors could not rely on him as a state witness even if they wanted to. The December 2025 interviews, in which Feldstein directly implicated Netanyahu, came after months of shifting stories and self-contradictory claims.

Weiss also addresses concerns that Feldstein may have engaged in misconduct within the Prime Minister’s Office beyond what is charged. If Feldstein was untrustworthy, deceived journalists, and provided false briefings as some allege, perhaps he committed more serious offenses. Weiss responds that Feldstein’s lower-level security clearance prevented him from accessing truly sensitive materials, and the Shin Bet and military intelligence bore responsibility for enforcing those restrictions. Feldstein and Urich did what all public relations professionals do: present their clients’ positions in the most favorable light, which necessarily involves selective presentation and persuasive framing rather than neutral reporting.

Conclusion

Weiss’s analysis presents the Qatar-gate scandals as a case study in prosecutorial overreach and politically motivated investigation. His central arguments focus on technical legal deficiencies: defendants charged as state employees who were not state employees, crimes alleged without the necessary legal elements, and evidence suppressed or mischaracterized. He situates these cases within a broader pattern of selective prosecution targeting Netanyahu’s political camp while ignoring similar or worse conduct by political opponents.

The investigations continue to evolve, with prosecutors indicating they will submit their findings within sixty days for decisions on formal indictments. The inability to question Jay Footlik remains a significant obstacle, and judges have expressed skepticism about the strength of the evidence. Meanwhile, Feldstein’s explosive allegations about Netanyahu’s direct involvement in the Bild leak have shifted attention toward the Prime Minister himself, raising questions about whether he will face direct investigation.

Whether one accepts Weiss’s interpretation or views it as a partisan defense of Netanyahu’s circle, the Qatar-gate affairs raise profound questions about the boundaries between legitimate public relations work and illegal foreign agent activity, the standards for prosecuting national security offenses, and the role of prosecutorial discretion in democratic societies. As these cases proceed toward potential trials, they will test Israel’s legal system and further inflame the already intense political divisions within Israeli society. The coming months will reveal whether prosecutors can address the evidentiary weaknesses that judges have identified, or whether these investigations will collapse under their own contradictions as Weiss predicts.