Peloni: As the Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy has come to focus upon burden sharing among its allies and partners, it becomes critical to properly vet those allies and partners as being reliably supportive of US interests. The fact that Turkey violated its support of its alliances with Washington and the West is what drew Trump’s ire when Erdogan first took possesion of the Russian S-400. Simply parting with the possession of this weapon system can not be the basis of restoring faith in Turkey as a reliable or dependable partner. Its vocal abuses and threats to well established US partners demonstrates that Turkey is not worthy of any level of trust which might be placed in it divesting itself of the Russian war system. So, why is Trump placing so much Trust in Turkey? And why should Trump’s partners and allies do the same?
Sinan Ciddi | July 10, 2026
President Trump departed the NATO Summit in Ankara without announcing Turkey’s reinstatement in the F-35 program, a major disappointment to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
This omission is significant because it highlights the broader strategic issue at stake.
Ahead of the NATO Summit, Trump raised expectations that he might lift sanctions and reopen the door to Turkey’s purchase of America’s most advanced fighter aircraft.
Instead, he told reporters that he had “not made up his mind,” leaving US policy unchanged: Turkey is still barred from receiving F-35s unless a formal decision is made. Responding to Turkish reporters’ questions, Erdogan was evasive, stating that we should “continue to watch this space.”
Trump’s decision should not be seen as a diplomatic slight; it is sound policy.
Turkey was removed from the F-35 program in 2019 after taking delivery of Russia’s S-400 air-defense system. The Pentagon warned at the time that Ankara could not possess both the S-400 and the F-35, because the Russian system could collect sensitive data on the aircraft’s stealth capabilities. Congress later reinforced this position by making any F-35 transfer contingent on Turkey no longer possessing the S-400. Ankara has done nothing meaningful since 2019 to meet that condition.
That is the central fact that Erdogan wants Washington to forget. Turkey is not being denied the F-35 because of bureaucratic delay or anti-Turkish prejudice. Rather, the aircraft is being denied because it knowingly introduced a Russian intelligence-collection risk into NATO’s defense ecosystem and has refused to reverse course.
Nor is the S-400 the only concern. Erdogan’s Turkey has grown increasingly hostile toward key US allies and partners. Ankara has escalated its rhetoric against Israel, threatened Greek sovereignty, entrenched its military presence in occupied northern Cyprus, and sought leverage over Europe through coercive regional behavior.
Turkey also continues to deepen its exposure to China in strategic sectors, including telecommunications. This matters because Washington’s concerns over Huawei and Chinese 5G infrastructure (in part) helped derail the UAE’s pursuit of the F-35. The same standard should apply to Turkey.
If the United States worried that Chinese access to Emirati digital infrastructure could compromise the F-35, it cannot pretend that Turkey’s similar vulnerabilities are irrelevant.
The F-35 is not simply another defense sale. It is a flying intelligence platform, a node in a larger allied system, and one of the most closely guarded weapons programs the United States has ever developed.
Selling it to a government that hosts Russian air-defense technology, destabilizes the Middle East, courts China, and intimidates fellow NATO members would not strengthen the alliance. Instead, it would endanger it.
Washington has learned this lesson before. In the 1970s, the United States sold F-14 Tomcats to Iran when Tehran was still a formal ally. After the Islamic Revolution, those aircraft became assets of an adversarial regime. The lesson is not that America should never arm partners; it is that Washington must judge allies by behavior, not labels. Turkey may remain a NATO ally on paper. Under Erdogan, however, it too often behaves as a spoiler rather than a partner.
The F-35 program is not a bargaining chip to reward flattery or summit hospitality. Rather, it represents a strategic asset whose compromise would damage US national security for decades.
Congress should therefore hold the line. No F-35s should be transferred to Turkey unless Ankara verifiably removes the S-400, ends conduct that threatens US allies, and demonstrates that its defense and telecommunications infrastructure is not vulnerable to Russian or Chinese exploitation.
Erdogan wanted a public reversal in Ankara. He did not get one. That is a win for the United States, NATO, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, and every country operating the F-35.
The question now is whether Washington can resist the next round of Turkish pressure. Erdogan has spent years demanding the privileges of alliance while undermining the obligations that make alliance possible. The F-35 should not reward that behavior.
Sinan Ciddi is a senior fellow and director of the Turkey program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), in Washington D.C.
Maybe Erdogan should offer the USA (or Israel?) full access to its S400 program.