INTO THE FRAY – Gaza: Delaying the inevitable…again

By MARTIN SHERMAN 

Delaying the inevitable does not make it less inevitable—only more costly 

A fool can throw a stone in a pond that 100 wise men cannot get outSaul Bellow, (1915-2005) 

The ultimate test of this agreement will be a test of blood. If it becomes clear that [the Palestinians] cannot overcome terror, this will be a temporary accord and…we will have no choice but to abrogate it. And if there is no choice, the IDF will return to the places it is about to leave in the upcoming months-– Yossi Beilin on the Oslo Accords. 

Everything is reversible – Yitzhak Rabin on the Oslo Accords

The targeted assassination of the senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorist, Bahaa Abu al-Ata, strikingly underscored two—curiously contrary—things.

The paradox of Israel: Techno-tactical genius; strategic imbecility

The one is Israel’s remarkable expertise and aptitude at the techno-tactical level that enabled such precise intelligence gathering and minimal collateral damage in the deadly accurate strike against the arch-terrorist.

The other is Israel’s blatant ineptitude, indeed imbecility, on the strategic level that has made the need for such impressive displays of techno-tactical genius to be employed so frequently, necessary in the first place.

Indeed, in the last three decades Israel has surged from success to success in virtually every field of human endeavor except in what might turn out to be the most vital—securing its long term survival as the nation state of the Jewish people.

Perversely, despite manifesting extraordinary ability in developing the country beyond recognition in terms of its standard of living, its economic output, its national infrastructure, its cultural contribution, and its diplomatic outreach, it has lurched from strategic blunder to debacle with alarming regularity. Ill-considered territorial concessions exposed Israel to predictable—and predicted—dangers, which have gravely undermined its strategic robustness.

After all, as I have been at pains to underscore on previous occasions, warnings of the perils entailed in relinquishing territory to Arab control were disdainfully dismissed as “Right-wing scaremongering”.

But even for many of the skeptics and opponents of the misguided approach that aimed at mollifying brutal tyrannical regimes with an ill-advised concoction of territorial withdrawal and political appeasement, today’s grim realities have outstripped their gravest fears.

Withdrawal & War: Direct causal link

Indeed, the very notion that a second-tier terror organization could paralyze almost half the country, at will, for days on end, would have seemed inconceivable when the dogma of land-for-peace and its corollary of Palestinian self-government, first began to dominate Israeli strategic thinking—particularly with regard to Gaza.

For, while it might be a matter of speculation as to what dangers Israel might have had to face had it avoided withdrawal from, and evacuation of, Gaza, there can be no argument as to severity of the dangers it is presently facing, having evacuated and withdrawn from it.

Indeed, there is a direct line of causal links between the decision to withdraw the IDF from territory in Gaza and to permit the deployment of armed terrorist militias in the hapless coastal enclave—first in 1994 with the triumphant arrival of Yassar Arafat and then in 2005 with Israel’s evacuation of the entire Strip—and the current turmoil.

By providing the forces of Judeophobic terror a territorial base, on which to develop the means to assault the Jewish state from the skies, on the ground, beneath the ground and from the sea, Israel has been forced to invest enormous efforts to devise solutions for problems that should have never arisen in the first place.

Without the IDF deployed throughout the Strip—a deployment facilitated in large measure by the presence of thriving Israeli communities there—the Gazan terror groups were free to pursue the production, procurement and stockpiling of weapons and to develop military infrastructure previously unimagined.

Reluctance to recognize recalcitrant realities

The latest round of rocket fire against Israel has once again renewed the debate on what solution there is for Gaza—if any.

By chance, this was precisely the topic I focused on in last week’s column, just a few days before Tuesday’s violence erupted.

In it, I pointed out that virtually all conceivable policy alternatives have been tried—unsuccessfully—except for the one that actually address the root of the problem.

This has been studiously avoided by pundits and policymakers alike and only raised in conversation in derisive tones—less it be (mis)taken as a proposal worthy of serious consideration. 

At the very foundation of the Gaza problem, is the ill-founded notion that it could be solved by foisting self-government on the Gazan-Arabs. It has been the foolhardy attempt to implement this notion—despite desperate warnings of the consequences— that has led to three decades of trauma and tragedy for Jew and Arab alike. Pigheaded persistence with the same policy rationale will invariably reproduce the results of the past, with increasing costs and intensity.

As I pointed out last week, negotiated transfer of self-governance to Gaza failed, which led to an even more bizarre attempt to confer self-governance unilaterally—which has precipitated the current situation of continuous and increasingly lethal Judeocidal violence.

Reluctance (cont.)

This perennial failure to resolve the hostility has endured despite massive international support that made Gaza one of the highest per capita recipients of foreign aid on the face of the globe, only to have the bulk of it (mis)appropriated and channeled into efforts to produce the means to assault Israel—or to pad the pockets of well-placed cronies of the regime.

Some have suggested demilitarization of Gaza, apparently oblivious of the fact that Gaza is already supposed to be demilitarized under the Oslo Accords, and give little clue as to why future demilitarization is likely to be any more effective than in the past—or by whom it will be enforced and how such enforcement is to be effected.

Others have suggested that Hamas should be left to rule Gaza, but should be weakened so as to reduce its ability to harass Israel. This, of course, begs the question of how a “weakened” Hamas (never mind a demilitarized one) could contend with more even radical and extreme adversaries—such as the ascendant PIJ—especially with the backing of Iran.

To arrive at an effective policy formula, Israel must abandon the flawed assumptions that have underlain previous endeavors and confront the unpalatable realities head on.

Implacable enemy not potential peace partner; crucible not victim 

As I have repeatedly urged in the past, there are at least two widely held and wildly misleading assumptions that must be discarded.

Firstly, after a quarter-century and more of gut-wrenching Israeli concessions and obsequious good will gestures, Israel must come to the conclusion that the Palestinian-Arabs in general, and the Gazan-Arabs in particular, can no longer be assumed to be prospective peace partners, but implacable enemies—as they themselves declare themselves to be.

Secondly, it is time to discard the assumption that the Palestinian-Arab public in general, and the Gazan public, in particular, is the hapless victim of their despotic leadership. Quite the opposite! The public at large is the very crucible in which that leadership was formed and from which it emerged.

Thus, barring some dramatic metamorphosis that will radically transform the Gazan public into something it has not been for many decades and shows little sign of becoming in any foreseeable future, if a new leadership emerged from the same public, it is highly unlikely to emerge with characteristics that are significantly different from its predecessor.

Indeed, Israel would do well to desist from the self-delusion that some Palestinian-Arab will pull its “chestnuts out of the fire” for it and somehow disprove what is becoming increasingly undeniable—that for Israel to leave Gaza and expect the Gazans to manage their affairs peaceably and productively, was a gigantic mistake. The thirty year experiment has failed—disastrously and definitively. It is well past the time to abandon it.

Counterproductive calm

Attempts to create calm are, in many ways, counterproductive—for during periods of calm, instead of devoting energy and effort to the development of their society and economy, Hamas and its more radical offshoots/affiliates have focused on enhancing armaments and military infrastructures for the next round of aggression against the hated “Zionist entity”.

And, as the Gazan terror groups, whether Hamas or some more extreme successor, hone their abilities and enhance their arsenals, life for the Jewish population in the South will become increasingly more harrowing and hazardous. With their families continually exposed to escalating dangers, their livelihood regularly disrupted, the quality of life constantly degraded, less stressful places of abode further north will become increasingly appealing. 

As time goes on, a danger of depopulation of the Negev by the Jews could become a very tangible prospect and soon the Israeli leadership will have to contend with the grim possibility that there will either be Arabs in Gaza, or Jews in the Negev—but in the long run, there will not be both.

Indeed, during the last round of fighting, there have been increasing calls from residents for more forceful responses, and increasing expressions of impatience at their absence. The Israeli leadership will do well to heed these calls.

At the risk of being repetitive

I find myself ending this column—after this week’s fighting—in very similar vein to then manner, in which I ended my previous one—prior to this week’s fighting. For this, I make no apology. After all, repetition of a much needed truth can only help its much needed promotion.

Thus, the foregoing analysis confronts Israeli policy-makers with a grim assessment.

Given the proven failure of negotiated and unilateral attempts to resolve the Gaza problem, given that beneficent economic aid has proven ineffective, demilitarization unenforceable and weakening of Hamas likely to install an even more recalcitrant regime, we are left with the following logical chain:

* The only way Israel can ensure who rules – and does not rule – Gaza is for Israel to rule it itself.

* The only way for Israel to do this without “ruling over another people” is to relocate the “other people” outside the territory it is obliged to administer.

* The only way to effect such relocation of the “other people”, without forcible kinetic expulsion, is by economic inducements i.e. by means of a comprehensive system of enticing material incentives to leave and daunting disincentives to stay.

This, of course, will entail Israel retaking—and keeping—control of Gaza with all the cost and sacrifice that this will unavoidably imply. But the blame for the blood and treasure that will be expended on that endeavor must rest entirely on those who urged Israel to leave the Strip in the doomed quest for peace in exchange for land.

Martin Sherman is the founder & executive director of the Israel Institute for Strategic Studies

 

 

November 15, 2019 | 16 Comments »

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  1. The only way for the Jewish State Of Israel to continue it’s existence until today is for Some One to be “stacking the deck” enormously in their favor! The One you Jews timidly refer to as “Hashem” has had, presently has, and will reliably continue to have your backs. Tehillim 124!

  2. I must point out: The Gaza terror organizations are waging a religious terror war against Israel. True ; many Muslim Arab(Palestinian) occupants of Gaza could possibly be financially incentivized(?) to move out to a more peaceful environment. But the Islamic “hard-liners” with itchy trigger fingers, who harbor the demonic hatred of “Allah” in their hearts for the sons of Ya’akov, may well not be persuaded. They will wish to remain in Gaza, close enough to Israel to express said murderous hatred by continuing to terrorize, injure, maim, and kill Israeli Jews conveniently living next door. To do otherwise would be considered on their part to be blasphemous disloyalty to “Allah” and their fellow jihadi. They would lose their place in Paradise and their 72 virgins. Islamists a half-world away, even in the US Congress, are waging hateful jihad against Israel by any means at their disposal. They enthusiastically support, even envy, these Islamic terror organizations their proximal opportunity to do optimum harm to the Jews of Israel. This war is not political, territorial,or even ideological; it’s spiritual.

  3. @ Sebastien Zorn: I think the concessions focused on good treatment for Hamas and other terrorist prisoners in Israeli jails, and giving his father immunity from arrest and assassination. Both of these measures have been implemented by Israel, I think. Palestinian terrorists in Israeli jails can cook their own food, freeley associate with each other, have access to a large library of Arabic, Hebrew and English books, can take correspondence courses at Israeli Universities (some have earned PH.Ds), have unlimited access to family members, Red Cross representatives and their lawyers. and nearly all visitors, including representatives of the Palestinian Authority’s”Palestinian Authority’s Prisoners of War department. To the best of my knowledge, “Son of Has’s” father has not been killed or even arrested by Israel. So “Son of Hamas” has got everything he asked for in return for turning in many Hamas operatives to Israel. He claims that he has saved the lives of many Hamasniks by arranging to have them arrested by Israel, since otherwise the Israelis would have killed them sooner or later.

  4. @ Adam Dalgliesh:
    Yes, Mosab Hasan Yousef. “Son of Hamas” was the title of his autobiography which Amazon has. There was a documentary about him called, “The Green Prince.” I didn’t wade through them. What concessions did he demand? I remember reading there was some controversy about him later.

  5. @ Sebastien Zorn: Sebastien, that’s a fascinating explanation that I never even thought of. Yes, perhaps Israel’s generals and civilian Defense ministry officials are trying to please or appease secret contacts in the Arab world, who have provided them with useful information over the years, but have demanded concessions to Arab positions in return. I can’t remember his name, but there is a son of a major Hamas leader who worked for Israeli intelligence for years, but asked the Israelis to make certain concessions to Arab demands in return. I can’t remember his name, but he calls himself “Son of Hamas,” and now lives in the United States, where he was granted asylum. However, he still appears from time to time on Egyptian TV shows, where he claims he has always been serving the Palestinians’ best interests even as when collaborated with Israel.

  6. Somebody on FB reposted this: What do you think?

    “To those of you who keep on harping on us to “obliterate” Hamas, let me just make sure you realize what you’re asking for. Perhaps you haven’t really considered the following.
    Fighting and completely defeating a well armed and highly motivated paramilitary force that has embedded itself in an urban environment among civilians and with the support of those civilians will look a whole lot different than this tit-for-tat precision air strike in response to rocket fire warfare we find ourselves in at the moment.
    First of all, you can forget warnings. Fighting to win means no more dropped leaflets, autodial calls, or “knock on the roof” dummy warheads that give away the element of surprise. We will have to hit the terrorists without warning when they are most vulnerable which is also when they are most likely to be near civilians.
    We will have to get comfortable with bombing houses and apartment buildings as well as schools, hospitals, and other civilian infrastructure involved with Hamas.
    The new metric for victory will require a rewriting of how we measure success and that will be by attrition. Tallying up enemy dead against intelligence estimates of the enemy strength. In short, counting stacked bodies instead of whether or not deterrence has been achieved. By the way, attrition warfare is the kind most likely to be associated with war crimes. That brings me to my next point.
    We’ll have to toss the rulebook. International law with regards to warfare was not drafted with modern assymetric warfare in mind. We will have to make use of such frowned upon tactics as carpet bombing and free fire zones.
    Now, this will result in a backlash both from the international community and from our other enemies which could lead to things getting out of control fast. If other actors like Syria, Iran, or Hezbollah open up multiple fronts, we will have to use just about every ounce of force we can muster to end it quickly. You can’t imagine what that looks like.
    Ultimately, I imagine some of the people yelling the loudest for Hamas’s obliteration will quickly join in the chorus of those condemning us for honoring their request as it needs to be honored and not how they think it should in their imaginations.
    Rounds of rocket fire and a proportionate response are going to have to do until such time as circumstances change or we have no other choice. We aren’t there yet. And let me preempt a popular response.
    “Who cares if it escalates into a wider war? Just have it and get it over with.”
    The common denominator among everyone saying this is they don’t live here and won’t bear the brunt of that war. You’ll watch it on CNN while it kills thousands of us and forces us to kill tens of thousands of them.
    Israelis and their elected officials and the country’s security services know what they’re doing. If we do something, there’s a reason. If we don’t, there’s also a reason.”

  7. Adam Dalgliesh Said:

    Rather they are people who over the years have developed a lot of sympathy for Israel’s enemies.

    I think that is one reason. I suspect another is that they are afraid that they will lose all the hidden sympathizers and voluntary spies among enemy populations and even high up. Remember how Nasser’s son-in-law, Ashraf Marwan, was a key asset for many years, especially in the lead-up to the Yom Kippur war. It’s a premise I haven’t seen explored anywhere, which, in turn, gives rise to the question, how do Israel’s crazy concessions really affect these hidden assets? What are the pros and cons, here? It would be interesting to have a debate between informed representatives in the appeasement and national camps. Or, is it possible that this is a third rail everyone is afraid to even talk about, preferring to let sleeping dogs lie for fear of the effect such a debate might have on them or on the renewed focus on ferreting them out by the enemy that it might provoke.

  8. Dr. Sherman, I believe that the quotation that you should have posted at the head of your column is the question asked by academician Pavel Miliukov in the chamber of the Russian Duma in December 1916: “Is this stupidity or is this treason?” While Israel’s “strategy” for fighting terrorism certainly appears imbecilic, I don’t think the people who have formulated the policy are imbeciles. Rather they are people who over the years have developed a lot of sympathy for Israel’s enemies. Included among them are not only politicians and Israel’s all-powerful judges and government lawyers, but many senior military officiers as well. Many have internalized the enemies’ propaganda that Israel is somehow to blame for the existence of the conflict, mainly through its “original sin” of coming into existence in the first place. This idea has been taught and is still by many of Israel’s academicians. And of course most army officers are college graduates. It has also been a doctrine taught by major sections of the Israeli press and much of the foreign press, all of which are read by Israel’s leadership classes, including its senior officer corps. And it has been endorsed by the leftist Meretz party. Many members of Israel’s elite classes grew up on kibbutzim where doctrines very similar to those of Meretz or its ideological predecessors were inculcated into kibbutz children at an early age.

    No, I am not suggesting that Israel’s strategic decision-makers are traitors any more than that they are imbeciles. But their views are so misguided on the subject of “peace” with the Palestinian Arabs that their policies are so misguided that the result is almost as bad as if they were either traitors or imbeciles, or both.

    That is why I think a necessary prerequisate to adoption of a military strategy based on a commitment to victory in the war with the terrorists, and Israel”s other enemies, is the replacement of its present ruling elite with people who are convinced of the righteousness of Israel’s cause, and unequivocally committed to the pursuit of victory at all costs.

  9. While future Prime Minister Benny Gantz is advocating a tough response to the attacks from Gaza, his partner Yair Lapid proposes throwing money at the Gazans as the solution. From today’s Jerusalem Post:On Saturday, Blue and White leader and former chief of staff Benny Gantz called to “bring back deterrence” with “lots of force” after Hamas fired rockets at Israel on the previous night.
    Party co-leader Yair Lapid called for extending what he called “financial cranes” to Gaza and to “lift the civilians [there] from the circle of poverty and distress; the change will begin in Jerusalem,” he wrote on social media.”

  10. @ Adam Dalgliesh:
    Gaza according to military experts is not currently the biggest danger. If Israel gets attacked from the North it will need to enter Lebanon to stop Hezbollah. Israel prefers not to do two major operations at once.

    There are also other reasons reluctance to reoccupying Gaza because though people like myself advocate allowing the population to go, not many others talk about this so the questions is after we recapture they ask now what do we do with 2 million more Arabs.

    Politicians like Bibi worry about if capture it and many soldiers dies will I get blamed.

    Sebastian, did a good job of explaining one of the main reasons. It is very possible a major conflict up north with Iran and its surrogates could break out at any time and fighting on two or three fronts is not ideal.

  11. @ Adam Dalgliesh:
    Because it would require a full-scale, boots on the ground, military occupation, and Israel’s human resources are finite. As long as Iranian forces, including proxies, are surrounding Israel from all sides and waiting for an opportunity to invade from any direction, Israel can’t afford such a committment if it can be avoided.

  12. @ ketzel:
    I agree. Moreover, liberals are fond of saying that rule over another people is unstable. Really? history says otherwise. It’s democracies that are unstable, fragile and short-lived historically. The U.S. is the oldest Democratic republic in history. This aside from the fact that Democracy means rule of only those people designated as citizens, since Athens. Jewish and Democratic doesn’t have to include non-Jews even inside Israel for that matter to be classed as “Democracy”.

  13. Israel should occupy Gaza and control schools and religious education. Free food and expensive soccer programs with cool uniforms. Mosques run by fake liberal imams. In one generation, they’ll leave voluntarily, unemployable pacifist snowflakes, fit only for making coffee drinks in Europe. Look at Japan and every other place that’s been occupied by the West without leftist coddling. This is how my parents became Americans instead of Yiddish speaking peasants like their parents. If the young are forced to assimilate, they do.

  14. This “ruling over another people” cliche is just manipulative language from enemies. It doesn’t bother me at all to consider that as a solution, if the alternative is wiping them out. Enemies have no right to self-rule.