The most charitable explanation for support expressed for the Iran deal by former senior Israeli security officials is a total eclipse of their faculties of rational thought.
[After Gamal Abdel Nasser’s death] the ability of the Arabs to coordinate their political and military activities has diminished. Even in the past this ability was not great – now it is even less.
There is no need to call up our forces, even when threats are made and enemy forces are deployed along the [post-1967] cease-fire lines. Before the Six Day War, every Egyptian troop movement into Sinai compelled Israel to call up reserves on a significant scale. Now, there is no need for such a callup as long as Israel’s lines of defense are emplaced along the Suez Canal.
Israel’s military strength is sufficient to prevent the opposing side from attaining any military objective and the political realities prevailing between the superpowers is not conducive to a renewal of fighting as it was in 1969-1970.
Accordingly, Israel has freedom of action to deal effectively in preventing another round of fighting, should Egypt wish to open fire again. – Yitzhak Rabin, “The slow road to peace,” Ma’ariv, July 13, 1973
These lines appeared in a prominent article, covering almost an entire page in one of Israel’s major dailies, written barely two months before the Egyptians and Syrians launched a coordinated surprise attack against Israel – in the wake of which Egypt regained the entire Sinai Peninsula and Syria, a section of the Golan Heights, which both had lost to Israel in the 1967 Six Day War.
Their relevance for the Iran deal will soon become apparent.
Erroneous estimates by experts
Rabin published the article shortly after returning to Israel, after a five-year stint as ambassador to Washington, a post he was appointed to chiefly because he served as Chief of Staff during the Six Day War, in which the IDF, greatly outnumbered and outgunned, won stunning victories against several Arab armies – including those of Egypt, Syria and Jordan.
Yet, despite his impressive military and diplomatic experience, Rabin was spectacularly wrong in every aspect of his analysis of the strategic realities of the time.
He was wrong about parameters of US-USSR relations inhibiting the outbreak of war.
He was wrong about the Arabs inability to coordinate their military and political initiatives.
He was wrong about their inability to achieve any significant military objectives.
And, he was disastrously wrong about the need to call up reserves to deal with Arab military build-ups.
But Rabin was not the only expert to err disastrously in anticipating impending events.
On October 5, 1973, a day before the coordinated Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel, the then-head of Military Intelligence, Maj-Gen. Eli Zeira, informed a meeting of the General Staff: “There is a low probability of a coordinated Syrian-Egyptian attack. I would say the probability… even lower than low…”
Erroneous experts (cont.)
Zeira’s appraisal of the situation, proven catastrophically inaccurate within hours, was backed by the professional top-secret assessment from the Military Intelligence research branch, which on the same day provided the following intelligence estimate: “In the area of the [Suez] Canal, there are sightings of an emergency deployment, on a scale previously unknown… Despite the fact these sightings…ostensibly entail indications of an offensive initiative, to the best of our assessment, there has not been any change in the Egyptians’ appraisal of the balance of forces between themselves and the IDF. Accordingly, the probability that the Egyptians intend to renew the fighting is low.”
Of course, major misperceptions of enemy intentions by senior security experts were not confined to the 1973 Yom Kippur debacle.
Take for example another former IDF chief of staff (1998–2002), Shaul Mofaz, later defense minister (2002–2006).
In the Knesset debate (October 24, 2005) on the 2005 unilateral disengagement from Gaza, Mofaz in his capacity as defense minister declared: “I am convinced the [disengagement] process… will provide more security for the citizens of Israel, and will reduce the burden on the security forces. It will extricate the situation from its [current] stagnation and open the door to a different reality, which will allow talks toward achieving coexistence.”
Mistaken, misguided and misperceived
During the same debate, then-prime minister Ariel Sharon, with all his immense experience in security and politics, told parliament: “I am firmly convinced and truly believe that this disengagement… will be appreciated by those near and far, reduce animosity, break through boycotts and sieges and advance us along the path of peace with the Palestinians and our other neighbors.”
Since then, Israel has faced increasing international censure and an intensifying boycott, and engaged in four bloody military campaigns (three in Gaza) to quell attacks from “the Palestinians and our other neighbors [Hezbollah],” who seemed “ungratefully” unappreciative of Sharon’s unilateral initiative.
Of course, no survey of mistaken evaluations of Israel’s adversaries’ intentions would be complete without reference to what, to date, is perhaps the most disastrous policy misperception of all, the Oslo Accords, made by the man awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for it, Yitzhak Rabin.
In a July 24, 1995, radio interview barely six months after the award, Rabin attempted to dismiss criticism of the accords with disdain.
Scornfully he declared: “The nightmare stories of the Likud are well known. After all, they promised rockets from Gaza… For a year, Gaza has been largely under the rule of the Palestinian Authority. There has not been a single rocket. Nor will there be any rockets.”
The subsequent barrages of thousands of rockets from Gaza, the millions of Israelis forced to seek shelter from them for weeks on end, are enough to make one cringe in embarrassment on encountering such a ludicrous prognosis from one of Israel’s best-known leaders.
Attributing nonbelligerent intent
Every time Israeli leaders have adopted a policy based on an assumption attributing benign, or even nonbelligerent, intent to an adversary, they have been proven dramatically and disastrously wrong.
It would seem that much the same detriment has afflicted US policy toward Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Thus the then-secretary of state Cyrus Vance and his associates believed in the “moderate and progressive” intentions of the Ayatollah Khomeini and his circle. Likewise, influential Princeton professor Richard Falk contended that Khomeini’s entourage was “uniformly composed of moderate progressive individuals [who shared] a notable record of concern for human rights and economic development.
Iran may yet provide us with a desperately needed model of humane government for a third world country.”
Today, much of the support for the Iranian deal draws on the same school of thought that believed the 1979 revolution would usher in the onset of liberal democracy in Iran; that the Oslo Accords were the harbingers of a peaceful, prosperous “New Middle East,” that Bashar Assad was a forward looking “reformer” and that the Arab Spring would herald an era of individual liberty across the Arab world.
The stakes involved in the Iranian deal are much higher and the cost of error would be commensurately greater – both for the US and Israel.
‘You have to pass it to find out what’s in it…’
In an April 2, 2015, MSNBC interview, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser at the time of the revolution, attributed super-power status to the floundering, economically emaciated, drought-ravaged Iran, warning that the alternative to the then-emerging deal was “self-destruction.”
Brzezinski was asked the following by his host: “How confident can we really be that inspectors are going to be able verify Iranian compliance…? In a response strongly reminiscent of Rep. Nancy Pelosi’s “We have to pass [it] so that you can find out what is in it…” on Obamacare, Brzezinski replied: “We’ll only know by trying. If the Iranians choose to be cooperative, I think that would be viewed very positively and would be reassuring. If they are not, I think that will open up questions at our end…”
Just how “reassuring” that is can be gauged from the remark earlier this month by US’s director of national intelligence, James Clapper, that Iranian compliance is a “big assumption” – which brings us to the disturbing expression of support for the deal by former senior Israeli security experts.
Defeatist drivel
In his interview Brzezinski alluded to “former highly placed Israeli officials in the security field” who dispute the harsh criticism of the Iranian deal expressed by Prime Minister Netanyahu.
This was a theme taken up by prominent J Street affiliated rabbi, John Rosove, in an opinion piece in the widely read Los Angeles Jewish Journal titled, “Many Israeli Experts Believe the Iran Deal is a Supportable Deal Despite its Flaws.”
In it, he declares his support for the noxious concoction brewed in Vienna “even with its flaws.” Invoking the false axioms and scaremongering the deal’s proponents invariably raise, in the hope of stifling any opposition/ criticism, Rosove declares: “Should this deal fail now as a result of a veto-proof congressional vote, not only would sanctions immediately fall apart, but Iran will have nothing to stop its forward march to nuclear capability….
Many political and diplomatic experts agree that realistically, no other deal is possible.”
As I have pointed out in my last two columns – and probably will do so in several future ones – this is patent poppycock. But rather than re-refute this defeatist drivel, I should like to focus on another no less troubling matter.
Unfortunate, inappropriate and unsubstantiated
To bolster his position Rosove cites an array of former senior Israeli security experts, who support the Iran deal, and appear to parrot the White House talking points – “good deal,” “no better alternative,” “sanctions unsustainable” – without offering an argued reasoning for their claims.
The list includes short citations from: V.-Adm. (res.) Ami Ayalon, formerly director of the Shin Bet and commander of the Israel Navy; Efraim Halevy, formerly director of the Mossad and head of the National Security Council; Chuck Freilich, former Israeli deputy national security adviser; Prof. Maj-Gen. (res.) Yitzhak Ben-Israel, chairman of Israel’s Space Agency; and Maj.-Gen. (res.) Israel Ziv, former head of the IDF Operations Directorate.
They all convey a similar message, aptly reflected by another cited expert, Eli Levite, former deputy director-general of Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission: “In the next 15 years, if Iran will respect its obligations, Iran won’t be a nuclear country…
The question is whether they will respect their obligation, and that is the hard question.”
That indeed is the hard question. And in light of the previously cited assessment by Clapper, that Iranian compliance is a “big assumption” – and the implications of likely Iranian noncompliance – endorsement by former Israeli security experts is both unfortunate and inappropriate.
An eclipse of rational thought?
After all, as Barack Obama once pointed out (June 9, 2010): “For years, the Iranian government has failed to live up to its obligations….
It has violated its commitments to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
It has ignored UN Security Council resolutions…
[W]hile Iran’s leaders hide behind outlandish rhetoric, their actions have been deeply troubling.”
Indeed, they have been – and continue to be. But this is something the Vienna deal is only liable to exacerbate. As Netanyahu asked during his March address to Congress: “Would Iran be less aggressive when sanctions are removed and its economy is stronger?… Would Iran fund less terrorism when it has mountains of cash to fund more terrorism?” Clearly it would not.
But even if the Iranians scrupulously comply with their obligations, the deal will ignite a frantic arms race across the most volatile region on earth, and enhance politically, enrich economically and empower militarily a homophobic, misogynistic tyranny, unswervingly devoted to the destruction of both Israel and Western civilization.
Why would any Israeli, especially one who has devoted his life to the security of Israel, endorse such an appalling agreement? The most charitable explanation for this lamentable phenomenon is a total eclipse of their faculties of rational thought – for any other alternative is far too unpleasant to contemplate.
Rent-an-expert?
However, a deeply disturbing alternative was raised last August during a Channel 1 broadcast when the highly respected anchor, Ayala Hasson, made a startling remark: “It is not pleasant to bring this up… but without mentioning names… the Americans also support all sorts of “former” senior IDF figures economically, so that they adapt themselves to [endorse] American positions.”
Turning to Channel 1’s military and defense correspondent, Amir Bar-Shalom, she remarked: “How’s that for a discreet formulation? To this Bar-Shalom replied: “These are opinion-makers who pop up here every time there is a need to defend the American position,” adding, enigmatically, “And by this I have said quite a lot, haven’t I?” Indeed, he had.
All Israelis should hope fervently these insinuations are unfounded.
Martin Sherman (www.martinsherman.net) is founder and executive director of the Israel Institute for for Strategic Studies. (www.strategic-israel.
The only relevant question is whether the world wishes to fight Iran as a non-nuclear power or as a nuclear power.
@ yamit82:
Thanks for this very interesting information.
Declassified protocols of the Agranat Commission on the October 1973 Yom Kippur War unveil previously undisclosed information regarding the IDF intelligence community’s debates and failures.
The Sunday releases focus on testimony by six mostly high-up IDF intelligence officials, some of whom have not been publicly scrutinized before, while others have come up in prior releases, but are now the subject of some of these declassified documents.
The six are: Lt.-Col. (res.) Yonah Bendman, head of the IDF’s Egypt intelligence desk; Brig.-Gen. (res.) Yoel Ben-Porat, head of IDF electronic signal intelligence unit 848; Lt.- Col. (res.) Yosef Zeira, head of the IDF’s double agents espionage unit and nephew of much criticized former IDF intelligence head Eliyahu Zeira; Brig.-Gen. (res.) Avraham Luntz, head of IDF Naval Intelligence; Maj. Gen. (res.) Shlomo Inbar, an IDF officer in electronic communications; and Maj.- Gen. (res.) Shmuel Gonen, former head of the Southern Command.
The Agranat Commission was the government inquiry commission that investigated the failures of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, generally focusing on who to blame for Israel being surprised and initially overrun by Egyptian and Syrian forces.
It held IDF chief of staff Lt.- Gen. David Elazar broadly responsible for the IDF’s lack of preparedness and recommended his removal.
The commission also called for the removal of IDF head of intelligence Eliyahu Zeira, and his deputy, Arye Shalev.
The IDF’s initial failures and the report’s findings were so explosive that it led to former prime minister Golda Meir’s resignation.
Former defense minister Moshe Dayan escaped official scrutiny, but his prestige was permanently tarnished and he was excluded from Yitzhak Rabin’s government, which replaced Meir’s administration.
The released protocols delve into a level of intelligence analysis not previously matched.
Prior releases have disclosed Zeira’s intransigence in ignoring some of the intelligence warnings regarding an Egyptian attack, and stubbornly sticking to his preconceived notion that the Egyptians would not attack without significant technological upgrades, especially to their air force.
The current protocols, while maintaining the theme of an intelligence failure, paint a more complex picture.
For example, Bendman said one reason they failed to take an Egyptian troop buildup on the border seriously was because a similar build-up had occurred in May 1973, only a few months beforehand.
In that instance, the intelligence community, against some higher IDF officials’ assessments, had correctly predicted that it was a mere exercise, giving them confidence in a similar judgment this time.
Bendman said this leaning was so strong that most analysts still held this view as late as October 5, the day before the war broke out.
Ben-Porat said his unit tended to look backward at prior wars, and was not prepared for newer military challenges, such as the 1973 war.
He complained that his intelligence unit lacked a balance of soldiers who were both intelligent and proficient enough in Arabic.
In a different slant on prior accusations against IDF intelligence head Zeira, Ben-Porat said when he became more concerned about the Egyptian border and asked Zeira to call up between 100 and 150 reserves to amplify intelligence capabilities to war-footing, he refused pointblank.
Ben-Porat said Zeira’s response was that intelligence was supposed to “calm the nerves of the country, not destabilize society and the market,” adding that he would not let Ben-Porat draft “even one-quarter part of a reserve soldier.”
Furthermore, Ben-Porat reported that Zeira repeatedly disagreed with Dayan’s assessment earlier in the year that Egypt was preparing to attack.
Yosef Zeira, Eliyahu Zeira’s nephew, also described an atmosphere in intelligence of intimidating dissenting opinions, which led to his dismissal from a meeting for his unwillingness to retract an opposing point of view.
Zeira added that he was suspicious about an Egyptian attack and did not buy others’ interpretation that Egyptian troop movements were a mere exercise because of the nature of the troop movements and the amounts of armaments the troops carried.
Luntz seconded this assessment based on his observation from the naval perspective, warning then-commander of the Israel Navy, Benjamin Telem, on September 30.
Inbar and Gonen both discussed a myriad of problems with regard to their troops’ readiness and communications.
Hi Randy been a long tme! 🙂
an excellent article by sherman, well researched, factual, well analyzed
It appears to be a problem still as I regularly read of opinions being substituted for facts from military figures. Constantly we hear from them that hezbullah and hamas are not interested in another war now. whether true or not i would think that military leaders should not engage in casual opinions. In matters of security opinions should ALWAYS be secondary to fact and fact should NEVER be replaced with opinion.
It is astounding that such a poor record of accuracy goes unremembered and the perpetrators continue to return and be taken seriously rather than ridiculed, derided and run out of the house. It is a testament to the idiocy of the citizenry.
Hoping is insufficient, any such linkage should be considered dangerous and treasonous. Investigations should be carried out and any criminal charges applied. Being in the paid service of foreign gov who is seeking to defraud the Israeli public into an existential threat is no less a capital crime than that of Tokyo Rose in WWII
True intelligence goes far beyond the evidence you have and what you know into a realm of truth that you perceive. When you have a danger as great as a nuclear Iran, you do not rely on hard evidence alone but possibilities and likelihoods.
Rumsfeld stated:
The greater the danger of a possibility, the lower the threshold of hard evidence needed to take action. A number of people seem to think we bought ourselves ten to fifteen years with the Iran deal before Iran will have nukes. This is a very dangerous assumption, for which, there is no good reason whatsoever to put faith in. The most catastrophic events in history came as a shocker.