Israel’s Options for Dealing With a Nuclear Iran

With preemption obviated, the Jewish state will have to rely on a careful combination of active defense and reliable deterrence

By Louis René Beres , John T. Chain, US NEWS

Louis René Beres is professor of political science and international law at Purdue University, and retired Air Force Gen. John T. Chain was commander-in-chief, U.S. Strategic Air Command from 1986 to 1991.

It is the summer of 2011, and even the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna now concedes the obvious. Iran is closing in rapidly on full membership in the “nuclear club.” When, probably in the next two years, such membership can be conclusively confirmed, Israel’s preemption option will, by definition, have been lost irretrievably.

At that moment, the Jewish State’s remaining strategic options will be limited to a hopefully still-optimal fusion of nuclear deterrence and active defense. One may also suppose, under the very best circumstances, that this residual fusion will be complemented by certain presumptively suitable forms of diplomacy. These could include both bilateral and multilateral international agreements. [Read news stories about national security, terrorism, and the military.]

The core of Israel’s active defense plan for Iran remains the phased Arrow antiballistic missile program. Designed to intercept medium and short-range ballistic missiles, the various forms of Arrow are expected to deal especially with Iran’s surface-to-surface missile threat. Iron Dome, a discrete and critical system designed to deal with shorter-range dangers, is intended primarily for the interception of rocket attacks from Gaza and Lebanon. For now, threats from Gaza and Lebanon do not have any unconventional or WMD elements.

From Israel’s strictly technical side, everything looks very good. Test results for the Arrow, as well as for Iron Dome, continue to be positive.

It seems, therefore, that the cost implications of Israel’s nearly-lost preemption option may now appear less than existential.

If Arrow were genuinely efficient in its expected reliability of interception, even an irrational Iranian adversary armed with nuclear and/or biological weapons might, in fact, be dealt with effectively. Even if Israel’s nuclear deterrent were somehow made irrelevant by Iran, or by any other enemy state willing to risk certain and massive “counter-value” Israeli reprisal, an utterly worst-case scenario, that aggressor’s ensuing first-strike could, theoretically, still be blocked by Israel’s ballistic missile defenses (BMD). [See a slide show of 6 vulnerable terrorist targets.]

But there is a problem with such calculations. It lies in untenable assumptions about any system of BMD. No system of ballistic missile defense, anywhere, can be meaningfully judged as “reliable” or “unreliable.” Reliability of intercept is an inherently “soft” concept, and any missile defense system will have “leakage.” Whether or not such leakage could fall within acceptable levels must ultimately depend, in large part, upon the particular kinds of warheads fitted upon an enemy’s missiles.

In assessing its still-evolving plans for nuclear deterrence, Israeli planners will need to closely anticipate the expected leakage rate of the Arrow. A small number of Iranian missiles penetrating Arrow defenses might still be deemed “acceptable” if their warheads contained “only” conventional high explosive, or perhaps even chemical high explosive. But if the incoming warheads were in almost any measure nuclear and/or biological, even an extremely low rate of leakage would be “unacceptable.”

A fully zero leakage rate would be necessary to adequately protect Israel against any launched nuclear and/or biological warheads. Significantly, however, such a zero leakage rate is unattainable.

It follows from all this that Israel must move immediately to strengthen and refine its nuclear deterrence posture. To be dissuaded from launching an attack, a rational adversary would always need to calculate, among other things, that Israel’s second-strike forces were sufficiently invulnerable to any considered first-strike attacks. By having to face the Arrow, this adversary could then require an increasing number of missiles before expecting to execute an assuredly destructive first strike against Israel. Here, Arrow would improve Israel’s essential security not by offering any added physical protection, but rather by enhancing deterrence.
CONTINUE

June 19, 2011 | 3 Comments »

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  1. Hello, Yamit.

    You may can the dumping on Prime Minister “Bibi” Netanyahu. Here are his options, as far as I can see:

    1. Bomb the Iranian installations with nuclear weapons. This would probably have the following consequences:
    a. It would galvanize world opinion against Israel, to the point that they would invade it, Iraq-style (not Hiroshima-style, because they would know that Israel could and would retaliate in kind)
    b. Iran would be effectively neutralized, and Turkey would take up the banner against the “hated Jews”. They already have nukes on loan from the US, at a NATO air base. It would be messy.

    2. Bomb Iran with conventional weapons. The results:
    a. Israel has to run the gauntlet of US airpower to get to Iran. Since the IAF has superior pilots, I would suppose that their first sorties would get through with minimal damage anyway. They would get off a few good shots.
    b. The Obama administration would immediately conspire with the Soviets and other to thwart further effective Israeli action, just as they did in 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, etc.
    c. Iran would eventually get nukes, but it would have to play catch-up with several other Moslem countries in the area, which would now consider themselves fully justified with “going nuclear” to protect themselves against Israel. Obvious candidates: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Turkey, Iraq.

    3. Do practically nothing. The Iranians will have to work hard to get their nuclear warhead/delivery system in order; and when they perfect it, if they don’t blow themselves up trying, they are in serious danger of sabotage that could do the same. Stuxnet was an amateur operation, compared with what Israel is capable of.

    You might admit, Yam, that Option 3 is the most attractive, for ANY Israeli PM. If you were Israel’s leader, of course, things might turn out differently.

  2. It appears that BB 1996-2000 Sharon/Olmert and BB 2008 have either been lying to us, Bluffing or have caved to both Bush and Obama. Maybe all three options?

    Very soon if they already haven’t produced at least one nuclear device Israel will have lost it’s nuclear deterrent. By not acting promptly and effectively early during the beginnings of Iranian nuclear development, Israel’s cowardly and treasonous leaders have endangered the third Jewish commonwealth and made a nuclear WW3 more probable than ever before in History.

    BB promised us he would not allow Iran to attain Nukes?

    BB was elected mostly on the basis of that promise. BB has never kept a promise to the electorate since before 1996 when he ran against Oslo but then adopted it. Then gave away Hebron and kissed Arafat in a sickening display and called him “friend and partner and someone we could do business with.”

    BB is a pathological liar, traitor and political coward. Besides dumping him he should be tried and executed for willful endangerment to the State of Israel and her six million Jewish citizens.

    ‘Never Again’ means nothing to BB!!