Made in Venezuela: Iranian Drones

Peloni:  Iran’s setback in Caracus

Tehran’s “Axis of Resistance” expansion strategy just took a hit

Houthi Drone. Screengrab via Youtube.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Few seem aware of the interwoven strategic geopolitical relationships at play behind the headlines coming from both Iran and Venezuela. However, you can rest assured that neither Secretary of State Rubio, nor POTUS Donald Trump is so naive. The recent action against Nicolás Maduro was billed as taking aggressive steps against a chronic sponsor of narcoterrorism, but the issues are much deeper. At this very moment, a politically diverse range of social media influencers are busy criticizing this intervention. Still, none seem to be aware of or accounting for these deeper geopolitical issues.

This is not tiddlywinks, folks. This involves serious national security and geopolitical alliance issues. Yes, Virginia, there are clear ties between Iran and Venezuela, as there are between China and Venezuela. This is not some hyped up propaganda about chemical warfare or weapons of mass destruction, like what was used to justify the Iraq war. What we have here is clear, present, multidimensional danger.

It is helpful to dissect this strategically, because most mainstream reporting examines it only through the lens of sanctions or “rogue states cooperating,” while missing the deeper reality of the relationship. This isn’t just geopolitics; it’s the new face of modular, sanctions-resistant warfare.

Let’s focus on one example to illustrate the point. Over the past several years, there has been substantial evidence that Iran has indeed helped Venezuela establish local drone manufacturing capacity, particularly of Iranian-designed UAVs like the Mohajer and Shahed families.

The Core of the Iran–Venezuela Drone Collaboration

Iran’s drone program is one of its most successful export-ready industries. Drones became Iran’s key asymmetric deterrent capability in the 2010s and 2020s, primarily through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Around 2022, reports emerged that Venezuela had opened facilities believed to be assembling Iranian Shahed drones, possibly under local rebranding such as the “ANSU-200” or “Mohajer-6 variant.” The collaboration seems focused in the Aragua state near the CAVIM (Compañía Anónima Venezolana de Industrias Militares) complex. Engineers from Iran reportedly supplied designs, parts, and training for Venezuelan technicians.

This fits into Tehran’s expansion of its “Axis of Resistance” strategy.

Tehran’s “Axis of Resistance” is best understood as an Iranian-led proxy network created to destabilize the Middle East and elsewhere while providing Iran with plausible deniability. Instead of directly confronting the United States or Israel, Iran funds, supplies, and trains militant groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and aligned militias in Iraq and Syria to carry out asymmetric warfare, threaten civilians, and disrupt global trade routes. This approach allows Tehran to expand its regional influence, encircle Israel, pressure U.S. allies, and weaken sovereign governments, all while avoiding the risks of open conflict. In reality, the “Axis” functions less as a defensive alliance and more as a state-sponsored terror network that sustains conflict and erodes regional stability.

This is why Iran has established drone manufacturing hubs in friendly states to export influence. And as for Caracas, drones have offered internal security leverage and a psychological counterweight to the United States and Colombia.

This is not pure outsourcing like a corporation would do; it’s a strategic joint technological transfer. Iran effectively externalized parts of its drone production: components, training, or even complete assembly lines to allied nations, including:

• Venezuela
• Sudan (previously)
• Syria
• Russia (especially via Shahed-136 production)

Venezuela functions as a Latin American manufacturing node that reduces Iran’s logistical and political exposure while creating a regional arms customer base aligned with anti-U.S. movements.

Independent and institutional open sources converge on the strategic truth of the following factual points:

• Venezuelan state manufacturer CAVIM publicly showcased drones (otherwise known as UAVs) that are clearly identical to the Iranian Mohajer-6 drones.
• Iranian engineers were confirmed to be present under “technical cooperation agreements.”
• The partnership coincides with other Iranian drone export hubs in Russia, Tajikistan, and Syria.

Interested observers can easily verify the entire structure of the claim through these open publications; it’s not a rumor, it’s fully documented in official and defense-sector reporting across 2022–2024 (references found at the end of this article)

In early 2026, the use of Iranian-made drones by Venezuela has intensified, with the Mohajer-6 drone now reportedly operational in the Venezuelan military, capable of both surveillance and armed strikes. This development follows years of cooperation between Iran and Venezuela, including the transfer of drone technology and munitions, with U.S. sanctions targeting entities involved in the production and assembly of these drones in Venezuela. The United States has consistently accused Iran of supplying drones and precision-guided munitions to Venezuela, a claim Iran denies.

• Iranian Drone Proliferation in Venezuela: Iranian-made Mohajer-6 drones have been confirmed in service with the Venezuelan military, with images showing them at El Libertador Air Base. These drones can carry small guided munitions and perform reconnaissance and strike missions, marking a shift from earlier surveillance-only roles. The drones are believed to be equipped with Iranian Qaem guided glide bombs, which have been displayed in Venezuela.
• U.S. Sanctions and Diplomatic Pressure: The U.S. has imposed multiple rounds of sanctions targeting Iranian and Venezuelan entities involved in the drone trade. In December 2025, the Treasury Department sanctioned Venezuela-based company, Empresa Aeronautica Nacional SA, and its chair, Jose Jesus Urdaneta Gonzalez, for coordinating drone production with Iranian and Venezuelan military officials. In January 2026, the U.S. imposed further sanctions on companies linked to a combat drone network tied to the Maduro regime.
• Recent Drone Activity and Escalation: A drone strike on a Venezuelan port facility on December 29, 2025, was publicly claimed by Donald Trump and later attributed by reports to a CIA operation, heightening tensions between the U.S. and Venezuela. While the attack’s details remain unconfirmed, it underscores the growing role of drones in regional conflict dynamics and U.S. strategic operations.

New photographic evidence confirms the deployment of Iranian-made Mohajer-6 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) at Venezuela’s El Libertador Air Base, marking the first visual confirmation of the drone’s operational presence in Latin America and highlighting the deepening military cooperation between Iran and Venezuela. This development underscores the expansion of Venezuela’s drone capabilities, now including armed reconnaissance platforms produced with Iranian assistance, which pose new operational risks to U.S. forces in the Caribbean region.

• The Mohajer-6, a combat UAV with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, is manufactured by Iran’s Qods Aviation Industries (QAI) and assembled in Venezuela under the oversight of Empresa Aeronáutica Nacional S.A. (EANSA), a Venezuelan state-owned firm. EANSA maintains and oversees the assembly of QAI’s Mohajer-series UAVs in Venezuela and has directly negotiated with QAI, contributing to the sale of millions of dollars’ worth of Mohajer-6 drones to Venezuela.
• The drone program began in 2006 with a technical-military agreement between Iran and Venezuela, which included drone technology transfer, training, and parts supply. Iranian-made Mohajer-2 kits were used to assemble the first Venezuelan drone, the Arpía-001, in 2009, and the program has since evolved into a sophisticated arsenal modeled on Iranian designs.
• The ANSU-100, an updated, armed version of the Arpía-001, is a direct derivative of the Mohajer-2 and is capable of launching Iranian-designed Qaem air-to-ground guided bombs, making Venezuela the first Latin American country to operate armed drones. The ANSU-200 is a flying-wing prototype inspired by Iranian stealth designs, presented as “next-generation technology”.
• As of December 2025, the Mohajer-6 has been confirmed in service with the Venezuelan Air Force, with the first visual evidence appearing in images shared on social media on December 30, 2025. The drone is used for both reconnaissance and strike missions, capable of carrying Qaem missiles.
• The U.S. Treasury Department has designated EANSA and its chair, José Jesús Urdaneta González, for materially assisting QAI, citing their role in the production and maintenance of Iranian drones in Venezuela. The U.S. State Department has also described the collaboration as part of Iran’s broader strategic projection in Latin America, with Venezuela serving as the central axis.
• Iranian military personnel are reported to maintain a presence at El Libertador Air Base, where drone manufacturing and training facilities are located, and they retain control over the facilities, with Venezuelan personnel requiring Iranian approval to access them.

Implications

• Regional Security: A Venezuelan-UAV (drone) program has introduced advanced surveillance and strike capabilities into South America’s security environment for the first time.
• Sanctions Evasion: Drone tech can be shipped as “aerospace equipment,” concealing military use.
• Future Trend: Expect more “Axis of Resistance” nodes like this. That is, proxy drone factories as an alternative model of military-industrial collaboration among sanctioned states.

Iran has effectively outsourced or co-established drone production in Venezuela. But that wording downplays it: it’s part of a decentralized manufacturing strategy, turning Iranian drone technologies into a distributed, deniable export industry that uses their “Axis of Resistance” partner nations’ facilities and local labor.

This isn’t just geopolitics; it’s the new face of modular, sanctions-resistant warfare.

Conclusion

If the United States and its allies fail to grasp this shift, they will continue to misread the architecture of global power; focusing on visible battlefields while ignoring a sprawling network of silent factories, hidden engineers, and modular weapons ecosystems operating far beyond conventional oversight.

The battlefield of the 2020s is not merely kinetic; it is manufactured in the margins. And drone capabilities and manufacturing capacity will play a key role in determining the outcome of kinetic warfare for the foreseeable future. Current Iranian military leadership is many things, but stupid is not one of them.