The Disintegration of the Right-Wing Bloc — How Many Seats Are We Talking About?

Yossi Baum | X | May 13, 2026

Ch 14 Election Poll from May 7, 2026. Screengrab via X

I see publications from senior figures on the right claiming that the departure of Degel HaTorah has negligible significance for the bloc. If this is a tactic intended to prevent faintheartedness in the right-wing bloc — fine. If not — then this is a very serious mistake.

Here is the full analysis:

1. Degel HaTorah, currently leading the move, is worth 4 seats. Alongside it march the large Hasidic groups Gur and Vizhnitz, which add up to about another seat and a half. Total: 5–6 seats.
2. The remaining parties — Porush, Belz, and Shas — will have to withstand enormous internal pressure that will portray them as “compromisers,” especially in the face of the rulings of the leading rabbis of the generation from Degel HaTorah and very senior Sephardic rabbis, while in the background there is pressure from all the heads and students of the yeshivas.
3. The pressure in the Haredi street is very great. Not out of a desire to break the bloc — on the contrary, that is the painful part. The problem for the Haredi public is that it is in a state of “the waters have reached the soul”: draft evasion cases, prison, budget cuts to the bone, bans on leaving the country, and very, very soon — cancellation of the “Mechir LaMishtaken” housing program, property tax discounts, daycare centers, public transportation benefits, and more measures are expected.
4. It is also difficult to “build on” Porush and Belz remaining in the right-wing camp if most of the Ashkenazi factions turn toward the left, especially in a situation of quiet support behind the scenes and support in supposedly “specific” votes (a framework that already arose during the “change [Bennett] government” period). And this is why:

Porush himself is subordinate to a large extent also to Rabbi Landau, whom he has regarded as his teacher and rabbi since studying at the Slabodka Yeshiva about 50 years ago, so that too will carry weight. If Porush also joins the majority of United Torah Judaism that leaves the bloc, it is difficult to see Belz remaining alone in the arena of support for Netanyahu.

5. It should be remembered that there were already contacts of this kind during the “change government” period between the left and Porush and Belz, in exchange for about one billion shekels (!) for abstaining in the vote on the 2022 budget (attached). The framework that had already been agreed upon at the time was prevented at the last moment only because of internal pressure from the Lithuanian faction of Degel HaTorah alongside the Gur Hasidic movement. Right now the situation is reversed — they are the ones who would push Porush and Belz to cooperate with the left in exchange for budgets.

Later, another framework was formed for quiet support by Belz for the coalition in exchange for budgets for education (see the response to the post). The framework, which was backed by then-Justice Minister Sa’ar through Education Ministry Director-General Dalit Stauber, who was close to him, and which had already been written and signed, was again prevented only because of an all-out internal war waged against it by Degel HaTorah. Here too, the situation is now reversed.

In general: the Belz Hasidic movement has always been considered the leftward marker within “United Torah Judaism.” So support for the left in exchange for budgets is completely legitimate from its perspective.

6. Deri: even if Deri withstands the pressure and finds some sort of appearance game to play — he will not be able to withstand a practical possibility of resolving the draft issue when the left presents one, in exchange for supporting it or “abstaining from outside.”
7. Moreover: Shas is made up of a combination of “Torah scholars” and “ordinary folk.” Until now, the political pressure came only from the right-wing direction, which expected Shas to cling to Netanyahu as much as possible. Now a new situation has emerged — a separation between the Torah scholars and the ordinary folk, where the former — who are an integral part of the yeshiva world ultimately led by the Lithuanian leading rabbis of the generation — are beginning to create pressure opposite to the pressure created by the ordinary folk. It is still difficult to know the results of this clash and conflict of interests, but there is no doubt that this is a situation Shas has never faced before.
8. It should be remembered that Deri was disqualified from serving as a minister in the government, and there is a strong likelihood that he would receive approval from the High Court if he supported the left. So on a personal level he certainly has reasons to try to create some form of cooperation with the left.

Bottom line: Deri is now in a predicament unlike perhaps anything he has ever experienced, and he will have great difficulty providing Netanyahu with support at a useful level, especially since his personal level of motivation is also unclear (not to mention his support for Oslo). In the end, everything depends on Haredi public opinion regarding the draft issue — and in that arena the influence of the former is immeasurably greater than Deri’s influence.

9. Not to mention the chilling effect that this event has and will have on right-wing mobilization ahead of the elections, when it is clear to everyone that without the Haredim there is no possibility of a right-wing government. As a result — the opposite effect that the event creates on the willingness of the left to continue fighting with full force ahead of the elections, despite an entire term of attempts that largely ended in discouraging failures. Should one despair? No.

To conclude, I will mention that I am usually considered optimistic, if not overly optimistic. But this is not excessive optimism, just as this is not excessive pessimism. This is simply a sober reading of the situation in each matter on its own merits. Netanyahu’s security and economic plans in Iran and Gaza are taking shape under the radar, and because of that my worldview, being aware of those processes that are advancing, is optimistic.

By the same measure, the analysis of the current situation does not lead to optimism, but rather to simple and sincere concern. Nor is this some momentary and perhaps mistaken reading of the map — I have been warning about this consistently for two years (see the response to the post).

Does Netanyahu have the abilities to solve the crisis? Yes. Has he solved equally difficult problems in the past? Yes. But must everything possible be done to solve the matter, and quickly? Also yes. And the question is how engaged Netanyahu is in the event, in light of several reports about advisers in his office who do not understand the severity of the situation and who mistakenly paint a supposedly optimistic picture. And this is a serious mistake that must be brought to attention, because if this crisis is not treated in the most fundamental way possible — it is a slippery slope, as I detailed. Alongside this there is also a real problem of not insignificant support on the right for the approach of “going with the Haredim all the way” — without understanding the political implications that derive from it.

Let us hope for the best.