The Real World Order

By George Friedman, Stratfor Intelligence Report

IRAN
The other country that is watching and thinking is Iran. Iran had accepted the idea that it had lost the chance to dominate Iraq. It had also accepted the idea that it would have to bargain away its nuclear capability or lose it. The Iranians are now wondering if this is still true and are undoubtedly pinging the Russians about the situation. Meanwhile, the Russians are waiting for the Americans to calm down and get serious. If the Americans plan to take meaningful action against them, they will respond in Iran. But the Americans have no meaningful actions they can take; they need to get out of Iraq and they need help against Iran. The quid pro quo here is obvious. The United States acquiesces to Russian actions (which it can’t do anything about), while the Russians cooperate with the United States against Iran getting nuclear weapons (something Russia does not want to see).

[..] The reality of the world order is that there are profound divergences of interest in a world where distrust is a natural and reasonable response to reality. In the end, ideals and visions vanish in a new round of geopolitical conflict.

The post-Cold War world, the New World Order, ended with authority on Aug. 8, 2008, when Russia and Georgia went to war. Certainly, this war was not in itself of major significance, and a very good case can be made that the New World Order actually started coming apart on Sept. 11, 2001. But it was on Aug. 8 that a nation-state, Russia, attacked another nation-state, Georgia, out of fear of the intentions of a third nation-state, the United States. This causes us to begin thinking about the Real World Order.

The global system is suffering from two imbalances. First, one nation-state, the United States, remains overwhelmingly powerful, and no combination of powers are in a position to control its behavior. We are aware of all the economic problems besetting the United States, but the reality is that the American economy is larger than the next three economies combined (Japan, Germany and China). The U.S. military controls all the world’s oceans and effectively dominates space. Because of these factors, the United States remains politically powerful — not liked and perhaps not admired, but enormously powerful.

The second imbalance is within the United States itself. Its ground forces and the bulk of its logistical capability are committed to the Middle East, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States also is threatening on occasion to go to war with Iran, which would tie down most of its air power, and it is facing a destabilizing Pakistan. Therefore, there is this paradox: The United States is so powerful that, in the long run, it has created an imbalance in the global system. In the short run, however, it is so off balance that it has few, if any, military resources to deal with challenges elsewhere. That means that the United States remains the dominant power in the long run but it cannot exercise that power in the short run. This creates a window of opportunity for other countries to act.

The outcome of the Iraq war can be seen emerging. The United States has succeeded in creating the foundations for a political settlement among the main Iraqi factions that will create a relatively stable government. In that sense, U.S. policy has succeeded. But the problem the United States has is the length of time it took to achieve this success. Had it occurred in 2003, the United States would not suffer its current imbalance. But this is 2008, more than five years after the invasion. The United States never expected a war of this duration, nor did it plan for it. In order to fight the war, it had to inject a major portion of its ground fighting capability into it. The length of the war was the problem. U.S. ground forces are either in Iraq, recovering from a tour or preparing for a deployment. What strategic reserves are available are tasked into Afghanistan. Little is left over.

As Iraq pulled in the bulk of available forces, the United States did not shift its foreign policy elsewhere. For example, it remained committed to the expansion of democracy in the former Soviet Union and the expansion of NATO, to include Ukraine and Georgia. From the fall of the former Soviet Union, the United States saw itself as having a dominant role in reshaping post-Soviet social and political orders, including influencing the emergence of democratic institutions and free markets. The United States saw this almost in the same light as it saw the democratization of Germany and Japan after World War II. Having defeated the Soviet Union, it now fell to the United States to reshape the societies of the successor states.

Through the 1990s, the successor states, particularly Russia, were inert. Undergoing painful internal upheaval — which foreigners saw as reform but which many Russians viewed as a foreign-inspired national catastrophe — Russia could not resist American and European involvement in regional and internal affairs. From the American point of view, the reshaping of the region — from the Kosovo war to the expansion of NATO to the deployment of U.S. Air Force bases to Central Asia — was simply a logical expansion of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a benign attempt to stabilize the region, enhance its prosperity and security and integrate it into the global system.

As Russia regained its balance from the chaos of the 1990s, it began to see the American and European presence in a less benign light. It was not clear to the Russians that the United States was trying to stabilize the region. Rather, it appeared to the Russians that the United States was trying to take advantage of Russian weakness to impose a new politico-military reality in which Russia was to be surrounded with nations controlled by the United States and its military system, NATO. In spite of the promise made by Bill Clinton that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet Union, the three Baltic states were admitted. The promise was not addressed. NATO was expanded because it could and Russia could do nothing about it.

From the Russian point of view, the strategic break point was Ukraine. When the Orange Revolution came to Ukraine, the American and European impression was that this was a spontaneous democratic rising. The Russian perception was that it was a well-financed CIA operation to foment an anti-Russian and pro-American uprising in Ukraine. When the United States quickly began discussing the inclusion of Ukraine in NATO, the Russians came to the conclusion that the United States intended to surround and crush the Russian Federation. In their view, if NATO expanded into Ukraine, the Western military alliance would place Russia in a strategically untenable position. Russia would be indefensible. The American response was that it had no intention of threatening Russia. The Russian question was returned: Then why are you trying to take control of Ukraine? What other purpose would you have? The United States dismissed these Russian concerns as absurd. The Russians, not regarding them as absurd at all, began planning on the assumption of a hostile United States.

If the United States had intended to break the Russian Federation once and for all, the time for that was in the 1990s, before Yeltsin was replaced by Putin and before 9/11. There was, however, no clear policy on this, because the United States felt it had all the time in the world. Superficially this was true, but only superficially. First, the United States did not understand that the Yeltsin years were a temporary aberration and that a new government intending to stabilize Russia was inevitable. If not Putin, it would have been someone else. Second, the United States did not appreciate that it did not control the international agenda. Sept. 11, 2001, took away American options in the former Soviet Union. No only did it need Russian help in Afghanistan, but it was going to spend the next decade tied up in the Middle East. The United States had lost its room for maneuver and therefore had run out of time.

And now we come to the key point. In spite of diminishing military options outside of the Middle East, the United States did not modify its policy in the former Soviet Union. It continued to aggressively attempt to influence countries in the region, and it became particularly committed to integrating Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, in spite of the fact that both were of overwhelming strategic interest to the Russians. Ukraine dominated Russia’s southwestern flank, without any natural boundaries protecting them. Georgia was seen as a constant irritant in Chechnya as well as a barrier to Russian interests in the Caucasus.

Moving rapidly to consolidate U.S. control over these and other countries in the former Soviet Union made strategic sense. Russia was weak, divided and poorly governed. It could make no response. Continuing this policy in the 2000s, when the Russians were getting stronger, more united and better governed and while U.S. forces were no longer available, made much less sense. The United States continued to irritate the Russians without having, in the short run, the forces needed to act decisively.

The American calculation was that the Russian government would not confront American interests in the region. The Russian calculation was that it could not wait to confront these interests because the United States was concluding the Iraq war and would return to its pre-eminent position in a few short years. Therefore, it made no sense for Russia to wait and it made every sense for Russia to act as quickly as possible.

The Russians were partly influenced in their timing by the success of the American surge in Iraq. If the United States continued its policy and had force to back it up, the Russians would lose their window of opportunity. Moreover, the Russians had an additional lever for use on the Americans: Iran.

The United States had been playing a complex game with Iran for years, threatening to attack while trying to negotiate. The Americans needed the Russians. Sanctions against Iran would have no meaning if the Russians did not participate, and the United States did not want Russia selling advance air defense systems to Iran. (Such systems, which American analysts had warned were quite capable, were not present in Syria on Sept. 6, 2007, when the Israelis struck a nuclear facility there.) As the United States re-evaluates the Russian military, it does not want to be surprised by Russian technology. Therefore, the more aggressive the United States becomes toward Russia, the greater the difficulties it will have in Iran. This further encouraged the Russians to act sooner rather than later.

The Russians have now proven two things. First, contrary to the reality of the 1990s, they can execute a competent military operation. Second, contrary to regional perception, the United States cannot intervene. The Russian message was directed against Ukraine most of all, but the Baltics, Central Asia and Belarus are all listening. The Russians will not act precipitously. They expect all of these countries to adjust their foreign policies away from the United States and toward Russia. They are looking to see if the lesson is absorbed. At first, there will be mighty speeches and resistance. But the reality on the ground is the reality on the ground.

We would expect the Russians to get traction. But if they don’t, the Russians are aware that they are, in the long run, much weaker than the Americans, and that they will retain their regional position of strength only while the United States is off balance in Iraq. If the lesson isn’t absorbed, the Russians are capable of more direct action, and they will not let this chance slip away. This is their chance to redefine their sphere of influence. They will not get another.

IRAN
The other country that is watching and thinking is Iran. Iran had accepted the idea that it had lost the chance to dominate Iraq. It had also accepted the idea that it would have to bargain away its nuclear capability or lose it. The Iranians are now wondering if this is still true and are undoubtedly pinging the Russians about the situation. Meanwhile, the Russians are waiting for the Americans to calm down and get serious. If the Americans plan to take meaningful action against them, they will respond in Iran. But the Americans have no meaningful actions they can take; they need to get out of Iraq and they need help against Iran. The quid pro quo here is obvious. The United States acquiesces to Russian actions (which it can’t do anything about), while the Russians cooperate with the United States against Iran getting nuclear weapons (something Russia does not want to see).

One of the interesting concepts of the New World Order was that all serious countries would want to participate in it and that the only threat would come from rogue states and nonstate actors such as North Korea and al Qaeda. Serious analysts argued that conflict between nation-states would not be important in the 21st century. There will certainly be rogue states and nonstate actors, but the 21st century will be no different than any other century. On Aug. 8, the Russians invited us all to the Real World Order.

August 19, 2008 | 5 Comments »

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  1. STEVE HARRIGAN SHOULD GET REPORTER OF THE MONTH AWARD! I’ve watched this brave and courageous Fox News hero with absolute amazement and hope he gets compensated well for a job well done! Thank you Steve for bringing us your reports on what’s going on in Georgia!

    I submit the following offer to the Democratic National Convention: That we take the BIGFOOT GORILLA costume and give it to Obama as a suite to wear at the DNC – after all, isn’t he the missing link that the democrats have been waiting for to lead them into a New Age of hell? Absolutely!

    I, Michael Sunstar, crown Obama with the hoax joke Gorilla suit used to fool the public into believing that we found Bigfoot, as a tribute to the fact that Obama is just one big hoax!

    You won’t hear an AMEN from Rick Warren – a hoax partner in crime! After Obama wears the gorilla suit, we should hand it over to Rick Warren to wear! AMEN!

    We can call it: RUSSIA, THE ANGRY HOAX BIGFOOT SUIT IN GEORGIA! Let’s get Rick Warren to wear the Gorilla suit in Georgia so he can make peace with the Russians and sing: KUMBAYA, holding hands with his missing link friend Obama, who in turn sings alongside with Michael Jackson: WE ARE THE WORLD! WE ARE THE CHILDREN!
    \
    Forget about V for VENDETTA! Everyone should wear the BIGFOOT GORILLA COSTUME in honor of Obama and Rick Warren – two birds of a feather that flock together in one big orgasmic hoax! Cha-Ching-Change! $$$!

    Sean Hannity sucked this week! Steve Harrigan is the Fox News hero of the month for sure! But I would still like to see Hannity sit on Sadaam’s Throne again – that would be an improvement for sure! Too many gorilla suits in Iraq right now! Heh! Heh! Heh!

    Well, the BIGFOOT gorilla suit hoax of the week goes to Barack Obama and his friend, -Iranian President –I-MEAN-A-JIHAD! We need to send the BIGFOOT GORILLA SUIT TO THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION and call it a week – because the DNC is also ONE BIG COMMUNISTIC HOAX!

    Sunstar wrote this report! HA! HA!

  2. Add this to the Mix: From: JP

    The resignation of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf on Monday has reignited concerns among some security analysts who say the prospect of an Islamist revolution in Pakistan – which is the world’s sole nuclear-armed Muslim state – keeps them up at night.
    Outgoing Pakistani President…

    Outgoing Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf leaves the presidential house in Islamabad, Pakistan on Monday.
    Photo: AP
    Slideshow: Pictures of the week

    Dr. Ely Karmon, an expert on Islamist movements and their drive to obtain weapons of mass destruction, says radical Pakistani Islamists have set themselves the goal of gaining access to Pakistan’s estimated 80 to 90 nuclear bombs, an arsenal they call “the Islamic bomb.”

    But he notes that there’s a “large distance between Pakistan and Israel,” adding that when it comes to Pakistani instability, India is justifiably the most concerned onlooker.

    At the same time, if jihadis do take control of Pakistan, Israel would have good reason to worry, he says.
    RELATED

    * Pakistan violence flares after Musharraf resigns

    “Pakistan does not control parts of its territory. There are tribes allied to the Taliban and al-Qaida, and very signficant Islamist movements consisting of hundreds of thousands of members,” Karmon said. “These are no less extreme than al-Qaida itself. The Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI, has maintained close connections with these elements, and has encouraged the Taliban in Afghanistan and Islamists in Kashmir,” Karmon said.

    During Musharraf’s reign, Pakistan opted many times to appease rather than fight jihadis, which had infuriarated the Americans, Karmon said.

    Musharraf’s departure could see either of the two main contenders for power, former prime minister Nawaz Sharif or Asif Ali Zardari, widower of assassinated presidential candidate Benazir Bhutto, forge even closer links to Islamists, Karmon warned.

    “This instablity is influencing control over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal,” along with the country’s long-range missiles. An Islamist revolution in Pakistan would endanger “not only Pakistan’s neighbors but also longer-range states. Pakistani Islamsits clearly see Israel as a central enemy.”

    Furthermore, the Pakistani army, which has traditionally played a balancing role in Pakistani power disputes, “has been infiltrated by Islamists.”

    Throw into the mix the fact that two leading Pakistani scientists have been found to cooperate with al-Qaida members, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, and one can see why Pakistan’s instablity is holding the attention of Western governments.

    Should Pakistan lurch towards an Islamist regime, al-Qaida would become more of a threat than Iran, Karmon said. There was little Israel could do to avoid such a scenario, he added.

    But such scenarios are not at the top of Israel’s worry list, according to Ephraim Kam, an expert on Iran and the deputy head of Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies.

    “The fact that Pakistan has had a nuclear program for a few years is not seen by Israel as a threat to it,” he said. “The main reason is because these weapons are aimed at India. The bombs are more Pakistani than Islamic,” he said.

    That could change if an Islamist revolution took hold in Pakistan, Kam added, saying it was possible that Iran would seek to change its relationship with Pakistan from one of mutual suspicion to an alliance. “Iran could try to expand its axis eastwards if Islamsits seize control,” he said.

    Pakistan’s nuclear program may be linked to the Middle East in a more direct way: Some senior Israeli and Western experts have come to believe that Saudi Arabia funded some or most of Pakistan’s nuclear arms, as part of the kingdom’s attempt to secure its own nuclear shield.

    “The Saudis may have some kind of agreement with Pakistan over nukes, as the Saudis can’t produce them themselves,” one analyst told the Post. “This is a reasonable belief,” he added.

    But a hidden American hand may have the power to prevent any unwanted Pakistani nuclear activity, according to foreign media reports.

    Last year, The New York Times reported that the US had spent nearly $100 million in a secret program to train and equip Pakistani personnel in properly securing their country’s nuclear weapons.

    Citing unnamed US administration officials, the Times reported that the money was allocated in a secret part of the US budget, and included funding for construction of a nuclear security training center in Pakistan. Much of the funds went to physical security measures, including fences and surveillance systems.

    The report also noted that Pakistan had refused the American “permissive action links” system (or PALS), which prevented detonation without proper authorization, out of fear the Americans could leave special access codes in the devices that would allow them to prevent the detonation of the weapons.

    While some speculation exists relating to additional covert American safeguards on the Pakistani nuclear weapons – born of a genuine fear for the stability of Musharraf’s regime – the existence of such additional safeguards has not been confirmed publicly.

    Haviv Rettig contributed to this report.

  3. Typical Russian propaganda, just like when they blamed the Nazis for slaughtering those Polish officers in the Katyn forest, which was actually done by the Soviets. Anytime something happens that the Russians do not like, it is blame their main enemy, America, because L-rd knows the Ukranians obviously must not have wanted to get rid of their pro-Russian president. The Russian concern was not absurd as Americans said, but the Russians over reacted and overplayed their hand.

  4. Based on performance and subsequent actions I tend to credit Russian Intelligence over the American, who haven’t gotten it right since WW2. If they say the orange revolution was CIA funded I tend to accept their take over Americas denials.

  5. From the Russian point of view, the strategic break point was Ukraine. When the Orange Revolution came to Ukraine, the American and European impression was that this was a spontaneous democratic rising. The Russian perception was that it was a well-financed CIA operation to foment an anti-Russian and pro-American uprising in Ukraine. When the United States quickly began discussing the inclusion of Ukraine in NATO, the Russians came to the conclusion that the United States intended to surround and crush the Russian Federation. In their view, if NATO expanded into Ukraine, the Western military alliance would place Russia in a strategically untenable position. Russia would be indefensible. The American response was that it had no intention of threatening Russia. The Russian question was returned: Then why are you trying to take control of Ukraine? What other purpose would you have? The United States dismissed these Russian concerns as absurd. The Russians, not regarding them as absurd at all, began planning on the assumption of a hostile United States.

    The Russians are projecting their own nefarious aims onto us.