Emirati Intellectual On UAE’s Withdrawal From OPEC: It Is A Political Statement And Perhaps Only The First Step

The UAE will not remain in any organization that does not support and protect or serve its interests.

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In an article posted on the Saudi news website Elaph and on his personal website, Emirati intellectual Salem Al-Ketbi discusses the motives behind the UAE’s recent decision to withdraw from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which will come into force on May 1, 2026. Al-Ketbi explains that the decision was connected inter alia to the war with Iran and the severe attacks carried out by this country — itself an OPEC member — on the UAE. He stresses that this move should not be viewed just as a technical step intended to free the UAE from OPEC’s oil-production restrictions, which are imposed for economic and political reasons. Rather, it is a firm political statement that the UAE will not remain in any organization that does not provide it with backing and with pro

tection against threats and which does not serve its national interests. Another message conveyed by the move, he says, is that the UAE is confident in its ability to make independent decisions, relying on its own economic and diplomatic strength. He also raised the possibility that the UAE might withdraw from other traditional regional or Arab organizations – apparently hinting at the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab League – “if it becomes clear that they no longer provide the backing, protection, or political benefit that it will need in the next stage.”

It should be noted that, since the war and Iran’s numerous attacks on several Arab states, the UAE has been furious with the other Gulf and Arab countries for refraining from responding to these attacks. Moreover, on April 27, 2026, one day before the UAE announced its withdrawal from OPEC, Anwar Gargash, an advisor to the UAE president, sharply criticized the performance of the GCC and the Arab League during the war with Iran and in the face of its attacks on the Gulf, saying that cooperation among these organizations’ member states had been the worst ever. “The Iranian aggression,” he added, “exposed the disintegration of Arab national security and of the Arab states’ security priorities… An event of this scale reveals [the need for] a comprehensive, realistic, and rational reassessment…”[1]

The following are translated excerpts from Al-Ketbi’s article.[2]

“The UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC and OPEC+ is not merely a technical step related to [oil] production quotas. It is closer to a clear political statement that Abu Dhabi is no longer willing to remain in any collective framework if it feels that the strategic and economic cost of doing so outweighs the benefit. The UAE, which in recent years has increased its [oil] production capacity, felt that the continued restrictions [imposed by] these collectives prevented it from fully realizing its oil capabilities and placed a political and economic ceiling on its ambitions as a rising energy power.

“However, this move cannot be separated from the broader changes imposed by developments in the region, particularly the ramifications of the war launched by Iran against the Gulf and the direct and profound impact of this war on the UAE’s security considerations. Anwar Gargash described the latest Iranian aggression as severe, deliberate, and premeditated, and viewed it as a decisive turning point in the region. This means that, in the postwar phase, the UAE’s interests can no longer be managed with the same old tools, or by relying on [the old] collective frameworks, which may be incapable of providing protection or deterrence or even of keeping pace with the magnitude of the threat.

“Therefore, the withdrawal from OPEC appears to be part of a broader need to adapt to new strategic circumstances. The gist is that the UAE’s security and interests can no longer remain dependent on collective considerations that do not necessarily reflect its priorities or the level of threat it faces. The war forced not only a reassessment of the relations with Iran, but also a deeper reassessment of the idea of relying on the traditional balances of power, and of the… effectiveness of the [existing] organizations and alliances when the state is under direct threat…

“Examining this move apart from its obvious technical aspect shows… that it conveys a set of political messages reflecting Abu Dhabi’s approach to managing its alliances, the limits of its commitment to them, and the nature of the criterion by which it measures their usefulness.

“Clearly, the first message of this withdrawal is that the UAE has begun to assess its alliances from a utilitarian perspective rather than a perspective of permanent commitment [to them]. It does not view any particular organization or bloc as a sacred framework, but rather as a means to promote its security, prosperity, and status. If that framework restricts it, or enables others to limit its freedom of action, then reassessing [its membership] or withdrawing from [this framework] becomes a legitimate option from its point of view as a sovereign [state]…

“The second message is that Abu Dhabi is capable of bearing the cost of independent decisions. Small or medium-sized countries often cling to collective bodies in order to compensate for their limited weight. But the UAE is acting on the assumption that it has accumulated enough mechanisms of power – [such as] money, investments, ports, active diplomacy, and bilateral cooperation – to offset some of the advantages offered by collective frameworks.

“The third message is directed at everyone, far more than at any specific actor: partnership with the UAE no longer means automatic consent on its part to arrangements that do not serve its national priorities – even if they come from major partners or from frameworks it has been part of for decades. This message is directly connected to Gargash’s statement that “our compass is [our] national interest and the stability and prosperity of the region,” and that “crises liberate decision-making rather than constrain it.” Thus, the withdrawal from OPEC is a practical application of this political outlook, not merely a circumstantial move…

“Therefore, the withdrawal from OPEC may not be the final step, but rather the beginning of a broader process of redefining the relationship with regional organizations and traditional Arab arrangements if it becomes clear that they no longer provide the support, protection, or political benefit that the UAE will need in the next stage. This does not mean that Abu Dhabi is headed toward isolation from its surroundings, but rather that it is headed toward a new mode [of conduct], whereby it remains [in frameworks that offer] real benefit, reassesses [its membership] when the cost increases, and withdraws when membership becomes a burden on decision-making and on [its] interest.

“There are indications that Abu Dhabi is moving toward more selective and flexible foreign relations, based on diversifying partnerships, spreading risks, and increasing its room [for maneuver]. Instead of depending on a single axis or framework, it will seek to manage a broad network of regional and international ties according to the [specific] issue, interest, and opportunity. In this model, relations will not be based on political sentiments or grand slogans, but rather on precise considerations [such as]: Where do benefit and security lie? Where can economy, investments, energy, and logistics be transformed into long-term influence? It thus appears that the UAE’s future relations will be based less on the traditional dichotomy of friend and foe, and much more on the rationale of a useful partner, a useful track, and an arrangement that preserves its independence and increases its gains.

“In conclusion, the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC is not a declaration of anger, but a declaration of a simple yet profound principle: there is no value in belonging [to any organization] if it does not serve the national interest, and there is no meaning to any alliance if it becomes a constraint on sovereign decision-making…”


[1] Al-Khalij (UAE), April 27, 2026.

[2] Elaph.com, April 28, 2026; salemalketbi.com, April 28, 2026.

May 1, 2026 | Comments »

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