Khaled Hassan’s Revised Assessment: U.S.-Iran Nuclear Standoff and Shifting Calculus

Peloni:  Clear likelihood of US strike remains, but down from previous estimate.

Khaled Hassan | X | April 23, 2025

Original Prediction (90% likelihood of U.S. strike):
My earlier forecast of an imminent U.S. military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities rested on five interconnected factors:

1. Iran’s Defiant Posture: Tehran’s refusal to engage in direct talks, rejection of demands to dismantle its nuclear program, and threats against U.S. regional assets created a volatile backdrop.
2. Trump Administration’s Maximalist Demands: The U.S. explicitly ruled out reviving JCPOA-style limits, insisting instead on full dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. President Trump’s threats of overwhelming military force (“bombing the likes of which they have never seen”) mirrored this uncompromising stance.
   
3. Negotiation Playbook Precedent: The administration’s approach to Hamas (2017-18), Russia (Crimea policy), and Ukraine (2020 peace talks) revealed a pattern: leverage economic/political pressure to extract concessions, offer a “surrender deal,” and escalate militarily if rebuffed. Trump’s public framing of an ideal deal as “just as good as if you won militarily” underscored this binary logic.
4. Military Buildup and Proxy Targeting: Unprecedented U.S. strikes against Iran-aligned Houthi forces in Yemen (March 2025) and deployment of advanced assets (B-21 bombers, carrier groups) signalled readiness for wider conflict.
5. Iran’s Vulnerability: Degraded air defences after Israeli strikes and economic strain from sanctions left Tehran in its weakest strategic position in decades.

New Developments Prompting Revised Assessment (70% likelihood):
Two critical shifts suggest potential flexibility in U.S. red lines:
1. Saudi Nuclear Deal Progress (April 2025):

• The U.S.-Saudi “pathway” to a 123 Agreement—conditional on nonproliferation safeguards but notably decoupled from Israeli normalisation—weakens the moral/logistical case for denying Iran any civilian nuclear capability. This tacitly acknowledges that zero enrichment may be untenable, opening space for a revised Iran deal with strict limits (e.g., 3.67% enrichment under intrusive inspections).

2. Mixed Signals from U.S. Diplomacy:

• Special Envoy Steve Witkoff’s trial balloons (April 11-14 interviews) floated JCPOA-like terms (capped enrichment, verification), only to retract them after backlash from Israeli officials and GOP hawks. This “negotiate-then-retreat” pattern reveals internal tension between pragmatic dealmakers and maximalists. Crucially, expert-level talks (April 23) indicate both sides are testing compromise formulas, even if success remains uncertain.

Implications and Scenarios:

• Israel’s Diminished Leverage: U.S. prioritisation of Saudi ties (Vision 2030) and willingness to bypass normalisation for nuclear cooperation marginalises Israeli concerns, reducing pressure for military escalation.
• Three Pathways Forward:

Scenario 1 (30%): A rebranded “Trump Deal” with JCPOA-style limits, marketed as a “tougher” framework via third-party verification.

Scenario 2 (30%): A breakthrough allowing direct U.S. inspections and permanent enrichment caps—aligning with Trump’s “just as good as if you won militarily” mantra.

Scenario 3 (70%): Military strikes if talks collapse, driven by renewed Iranian provocations or administration frustration with verification disputes.

Conclusion:
While the structural drivers for conflict persist, the Saudi nuclear pivot and diplomatic hedging suggest the administration is tentatively exploring off-ramps. However, Trump’s transactional style and risk tolerance mean military action remains the default option should Tehran reject serious compromises.