The Spy: Everything You’re Not Supposed to Know — In a Nutshell

Peloni:  More on the Spy Affair, but this is still not the full story.

Yossi Baum | X | Jan 22, 2026

Translation by Peloni

Mandatory reading: There is a huge effort to silence the spy affair. And not just from the left. I’ll simply present the facts, and the public can judge. It will be shocking.

1. On October 8, as part of the critical intelligence Shmuelevitz obtained, he knew the suspected location of Sinwar, later also the locations of hostages. He passed the information on (later we’ll try to understand — to whom), and according to the claims, he “burned” the information, causing the cancellation of operational plans prepared for hostage rescue and for the elimination of Sinwar.*

2. The truth is, it took me some time to accept that the spy affair is not just an abomination — it is much more than that, a completely different opera. Here’s what brought me to this conclusion:

The indictment against Shmuelevitz opens with a plan that the spy came to implement (attached). Although the indictment is extremely frugal with words regarding the plan, it does note that on the morning the massacre began, the defendant started implementing “his plan.” In section 27, it is again noted that he acted to advance his plan.

When was this plan prepared? Immediately with the outbreak of the massacre? Already someone knew to anticipate its scale and prepare a plan to achieve what? And knew exactly to turn to Shmuelevitz? You would have to be profoundly foolish to believe all this happened in the early hours of the massacre, “from moment to moment.” No such possibility exists.

The extremely limited indictment* does not specify what the plan is, what its purpose is, who conceived it, and so on. It’s hard to assume this is accidental. The plan is the heart of the matter. It explains who initiated the espionage, when it was planned, and for what purposes.

And when the spotlight turns to the senders of the spy — who knows, perhaps they will be interrogated not only about to whom the critical information was transferred, but mainly why they saw fit to prepare a plan for a scenario that, in the eyes of the top security echelon, did not exist at all. Who and why thought Hamas would conquer settlements? What the hell is going on here? And who knows what the answer will be.

3. Weiss’s disclosure: In the indictment, Shmuelevitz was charged with treason — aiding the enemy in wartime, which could be punishable by death (attached). According to him, this is what was presented to the court during detention extensions. Later, someone made sure to remove this severe clause, perhaps in a move to “soften” the case.

4. Wow: Weiss also hints that a very senior figure in the protest is linked to enlisting Shmuelevitz for the plan. Apparently, more senior than Yair Golan (even if further from the public spotlight).

**5. Shmuelevitz underwent a “necessity interrogation” — interrogation under duress — to reveal to whom he transferred the information. According to Grinzeig, this is the second time in history a Jew has undergone such an interrogation (the first was in the Duma affair). Nevertheless, it was decided not to publish to whom he transferred the information. Could this be the reason for point 4?

Additionally, the Attorney General and the Military Advocate General at the time, together with the Shin Bet under Ronen Bar — are the ones behind the decision not to investigate any of the roughly 75 people involved, with an emphasis on those with whom the spy was in contact, according to Weiss.* Why? Is there any precedent in Israel for a similar decision in an espionage case?

6. By the way: If the figure Weiss hints at is indeed involved, this person is linked to highly powerful figures in the Biden administration.*

7. The defendant’s serious espionage activities included — among other things — photographing screens in the most classified and secure rooms in the IDF (according to the petition submitted by Deputy Minister Almog Cohen. The wording is close in the indictment*). These screens were presumably photographed using the phone he hid in his underwear, as Deputy Minister Cohen claims.*

8. A senior figure from “Brothers in Arms” drove Shmuelevitz and brought him into Southern Command.

We all already know the story — that same senior person entered with an officer’s ID while Shmuelevitz entered with a driver’s license…
What is less known — and critical in this context — is that this occurred on October 8, according to the indictment. At a super-critical stage, when the blood of the murdered was still flowing like water and the south was still crawling with Nukhba terrorists. This is also the stage when, according to the indictment, Shmuelevitz’s impersonation begins, wearing a captain’s uniform even though his rank is lieutenant.

9. More astonishing events from the indictment, which seems determined to “sweep under the rug” extremely serious events by any standard:

“On that day, October 8, the defendant entered a situation-assessment meeting in the Southern Command war room (apparently Unit 12), where he was not authorized to be present. After it, he approached a senior official there while falsely presenting himself as the operations intelligence officer in X — and then ‘while walking’ directed him toward a female soldier with a role there and asked her to sit with him.”

“While walking” — a completely meaningless expression that pops up in every indictment, with absolutely no intent to downplay the guilt of those involved. Of course, what question could there be.

The defendant also falsely presented himself to that soldier. She said she needed approval from an information-security officer and, by mistake or not, gave him her phone so he could enter his number into her contacts list. The defendant took the phone and, without her knowledge — oh dear — sent two WhatsApp messages to himself from it, in which she supposedly wrote:

“We would be happy if you could see in the war room how to streamline the work,”
“and tell us what to do when we receive contradictory reports from the field.”

These messages were intended to help him create a false impression for others, as if he had an active and significant role in the Southern Command war room.*

Who hasn’t had that happen? By mistake, they directed him to her; by mistake, she thought he was relevant; by mistake, she handed him her device even before information-security approval; by mistake, she didn’t notice what he was doing on it. Classic.

Then comes MK Cohen’s petition — surprise — noting:

“In the investigative material there is extensive detail about the content of the conversation between the soldier and the defendant, but for unjustified and even improper reasons, the respondents (the prosecution) deliberately refrained from publishing it.”*

10–12. False letters of appointment

10. The false “letter of appointment” 1

The next day, Monday after the massacre, the defendant went to S., the chief-of-staff aide of A., his former commander, and asked him to prepare a document that would authorize him to carry out various actions. S. prepared a document in the officer’s name, which read:

“I confirm that Captain (res.) Asaf Shmuelevitz will be appointed coordinator of special missions and operations in the Southern Command war room.”*

The aide, who trusted the defendant, did not check exactly what the defendant was writing, printed the document, and after the defendant said that the officer had supposedly approved it — the aide signed it.

11. False “appointment letter” 2 — an open intelligence and operational blank check

Two days later, Shmuelevitz’s boldness knows no bounds. He again turns to the same aide, receives his computer, and prints a document stating:

“I authorize Captain … to open special cells in the war room… and to serve as commander of the cell. The role of the cell is to serve as a long and secret arm and to initiate special boundary-breaking missions in the area… He is authorized to recruit any soldier or officer to the reserves from any unit and to use any capability required to complete the mission.”*

He returned to the officer, took advantage of the pressure of the fighting, asked the officer to sign the letter, and he did so without reviewing it. Shortly afterward, the aide went to the officer and drew his attention to what was written. The officer told the aide that he did not approve the content and ordered him to take the document from the defendant — but the aide did not do so. End quote from the indictment.*

The officer was never questioned under caution in this affair, if that wasn’t clear.

13. Before finishing: the Military Advocate General’s Office

The judge in the case, Rachel Toren, made her career in the military prosecution.

The spy’s first lawyer was Moshe Mazor. He did not agree to a declaration of “insanity,” so they arranged for him to be replaced by a relatively unknown lawyer, Adi Ritigshtain-Eisner, a major in the military prosecution.*

But even here they did not succeed in closing the insanity deal, and again the lawyers were replaced by a law firm owned by Efrat Nahmani-Bar — who, as if by miracle, is a lieutenant colonel in the military prosecution. Assisting her is Mark Perry, also a lieutenant colonel in the military prosecution.*

14. Conclusions — the questions that are really troubling

Deputy Minister Almog Cohen repeatedly emphasizes that he has no concern that the spy himself betrayed and transferred information to the enemy. That’s fine — there is no such suspicion, and it is important that a deputy minister who raises serious affairs ensure that they are not labeled as conspiracies.*

But there are two even more important questions here:

First: When was this espionage planned, and by whom? This may clarify whether any Israeli actor had foreknowledge of a planned massacre — something that, according to official intelligence agencies’ assumptions at the time, was completely ruled out.

Second: To whom was the highly classified information transferred? Not first-hand, but second- or third-hand. If the information, or part of it, reached an official or quasi-official American entity, in my view that could be very close to aiding the enemy — even if that was not Shmuelevitz’s intention.

Why? Because within the Biden administration, its branches, and the Democratic Party, countless Iranian, Qatari, and pro-Hamas elements circulate freely, and intelligence like this can circulate freely through the corridors of government.*

It is worth mentioning here Ariana Tabatabai, a senior figure in the U.S. Department of Defense close to the Iranian regime, who was exposed in October 2024 as someone who leaked Pentagon documents concerning Israeli preparations for an attack on Iran.*

Let that sink in. Understand the significance.

A sense arises that if we do not let up, we may eventually know the answers to these difficult questions.*

Every place marked with an asterisk on the left of the word — the statements are written according to the claim and/or information of Deputy Minister @almog_cohen08, without whom this affair would have been closed long ago. May there be many public representatives like him in the right-wing camp.

Links in the comments to the post.