Deep Inside The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood

A MULTI-PART SERIES ON JORDAN’S MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD STRUCTURE, STATE LINKAGES, AND STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

Jafaj.net |  May 6, 2026

  1. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan is a structure made up of two bodies. The first is a closed organizational leadership, similar to secret groupings, that controls strategy and manages engagement with the street, the state, and external actors. The most important characteristic of this leadership is secrecy and the lack of clarity in its organizational structure to any outside observer. This means that the Muslim Brotherhood, in its outward appearance, is different from what it is internally, such that individuals and their publicly visible positions do not reflect their real influence inside. This makes it difficult for anyone trying to confront them from the outside to understand how the group actually operates. They are organized as a secret group, and this is how they manage their affairs and maintain their existence.
  2. The second part is the political arm of the group, currently represented by the Islamic Action Front Party. This arm is used in elections to deliver media messaging and apply pressure, and it serves as the channel for dealing with the outside world. However, real power within the group is highly centralized and hierarchical, operating through a strict chain of command, and does not match its public appearance. In other words, frequent visibility of any individual does not mean they are the most influential.
  3. The names in the following paragraphs represent the most influential individuals in the group, as well as the internal dynamics, or hierarchy, through which they operate.
  4. Murad al-Adailah, the General Controller. This man represents the highest organizational authority in theory. He is responsible for setting the strategic direction of the Muslim Brotherhood and maintaining non-public communication channels, including contact with the Royal Court in Jordan. He is considered the central point for escalation or de-escalation depending on what serves the group’s interests. If there is rapprochement with any party, Murad al-Adailah announces it, and if there is escalation, he is the first to declare it. [3]
  5. Hammam Saeed, a former General Controller of the group. Despite his advanced age, he remains the organization’s top ideological authority. He maintains both public and non-declared, deeply rooted channels in Jordan with the Royal Court itself, including the Chief of the Royal Court, the Special Intelligence Office affiliated with the Court, Jordanian intelligence, Hamas, the core of the global Muslim Brotherhood organization, Turkey, and other locations including Morocco. Despite his strong secrecy, he is believed to be one of the most influential figures in the Muslim Brotherhood worldwide, and some even consider him to be what is referred to as number one in the global organization.
  6. Hammam Saeed’s strength lies in his ability to think broadly and strategically, making him a mastermind within the Brotherhood. He understands the region and knows how to operate within it, and he has maintained advanced relations with the Iranians. He is also known for extreme harshness in managing the group, and even in managing his own family’s affairs. Many members of the group fear him.
  7. Abdullah al-Akayleh, a prominent leader in the organization, former MP, and former minister. He strongly represents the East Jordanian wing within the group. Although he is not the only East Jordanian, most of the leadership is now East Jordanian, and he is more emotionally tied to the concept of East Jordanian identity. He is pragmatic and is considered a stabilizing channel within the organization, especially regarding the sometimes difficult relationship between East Jordanian and Palestinian-origin members. Although the organization is generally cohesive, this issue occasionally appears publicly. In addition, he strongly believes in and follows the Hashemite system in Jordan. He is known for his famous statement broadcast on Jordanian television in 2017: “We stood with the regime in every square.” Despite his strong loyalty, he is not the closest figure to the Palace or intelligence.
  8. Zaki Bani Irshid, a former General Controller from Irbid and an East Jordanian from the north, is known for escalatory rhetoric and signaling pressure. He is used by the group as a spokesperson, typically to deliver ideas and statements, whether threats or pressure against certain parties. Despite his senior positions, he has no real authority beyond appearances. Although he is part of the leadership, he is among the least influential, despite the large image he projects publicly. His title is bigger than his actual weight. He is used by his superiors, particularly Hammam Saeed and Saleh al-Armouti, whose role will be explained later, to deliver pressure-driven messaging that is then managed by senior leadership for the organization’s benefit.
  9. Wael al-Saqqa, Secretary General of the Islamic Action Front Party, which is currently the only licensed wing represented in parliament, is the most important operational tool of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. He controls election strategy, parliamentary representation, the behavior of the parliamentary bloc, and public positions, and he serves as the gateway for escalation through parliament. Although he is a high-level executive and his opinion is considered within the leadership, he has less decision-making authority than others, even though he manages a large number of people. He is an executor who contributes to strategic decisions but is not the final decision-maker. This is expected in an organization built on obedience since its founding by Hassan al-Banna, where a small number of individuals ultimately control decision-making, and he is among the most important of them.
  10. Saleh al-Armouti, a prominent leader in the Islamic Action Front, an MP, and an experienced lawyer, acts as a legal shield for the Brotherhood both internally and externally when needed. He provides parliamentary protection, media management, and escalation. He is considered one of the most hardline hawks within the organization. He strengthens the rigidity of the Brotherhood structure and skillfully navigates the complex relationship between the Jordanian regime, the state, intelligence, and the Brotherhood. While they are allied, they are also careful to demonstrate power against one another at times, and al-Armouti is highly skilled in this area.
  11. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan enjoys deep support from the Jordanian intelligence apparatus, and the organization has had a close relationship with the Jordanian state since its inception. King Hussein summarized this relationship by saying: “The Muslims are the party of the state.” in a famous interview in 1996. [1]
  12. The overlap and partnership between the Muslim Brotherhood and Jordanian intelligence is extensive, going beyond basic coordination into decades of joint activity. Cooperation began in 1970 during the Jordanian civil war, when the Brotherhood supported the Hashemite regime and assisted intelligence operations on the ground, including campaigns against Palestinian factions and framing opposition to them as jihad. This played a major role in stabilizing the state and its security structure after the conflict. King Abdullah II later acknowledged this period and the Brotherhood’s role during his interview with The Atlantic. [2]
  13. The relationship between Jordanian intelligence and the Brotherhood is not hidden, but operational. One example is Dr. Abdullah Azzam, who was close to Jordanian intelligence, played a role in establishing the Afghan jihad, and had Osama bin Laden among his students.
  14. Likewise, al-Qaeda, in which Jordanians were among its most important members, including the terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, has networks that are connected in Jordan. Because Jordan presents itself as a country with political freedom, yet in reality the Jordanian intelligence apparatus maintains near-total control over public and political life, no one can act or form such organizations without the knowledge of intelligence. At best, the intelligence services did nothing to stop it; otherwise, such activity would have been shut down at its earliest stage.
  15. The situation developed to the point where the Muslim Brotherhood and their partners within the Jordanian intelligence apparatus operated across multiple arenas as one team. This included sending extremist Islamists to Iraq and Afghanistan during the second Afghan war, and later supplying ISIS with weapons, vehicles, money, and ammunition. American media reported that Jordanian intelligence sold weapons to ISIS in Syria.[4] British media also reported the theft of ammunition from the British army stationed in Jordan and its sale, with the knowledge of intelligence, to ISIS in Syria. [5] Russian media further reported that Toyota vehicles purchased by the Jordanian army ended up in the hands of ISIS. [6] At minimum, this reflects a failure to act; more realistically, it reflects awareness and tolerance within a system that tightly controls activity inside the country.
  16. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood organization has effectively become part of the state in Jordan. There are now officers within the security services who are aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood and influenced by its ideology. Where very few intelligence officers previously performed daily prayers, it has now become common to see officers praying in their offices, and the prayer room inside the intelligence building is nearly full during the five daily prayers.
  17. In addition, this Brotherhood influence within the intelligence apparatus has extended to some senior officers in the Jordanian army and even into parts of the leadership, to the point that the state in Jordan has become “Brotherhoodized” while external actors remain largely unaware.
  18. Therefore, confronting the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has become more urgent and at the same time more complex. This is not only because of the difficulty in understanding how they operate, as they function as a secret organization as explained above, but also because the Jordanian intelligence apparatus stands behind them, or at the very least allows their expansion, while maintaining full control over political life in the country. At the same time, the Jordanian state continues to present itself externally as modern and moderate.
  19. The situation has now become more dangerous. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan reads the region carefully and understands that the current war on Iran is an American effort against the broader system established roughly 80 years ago, including the Brotherhood and extremist structures embedded in the region. They view any strike against Iran as a direct threat to themselves and also to the Jordanian state, which maintains close ties with the Iranian-Iraqi system in the region.
  20. The Muslim Brotherhood is now preparing for the post-war phase. They believe the next step will be the dismantling of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, with the Jordanian branch serving as the spearhead and headquarters of the global organization. The Muslim Brotherhood is now concerned because of the recent designation by the United States government of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood as a terror organisation.
  21. The Muslim Brotherhood is now studying “Plan B” to preserve itself and its organization, and they are convinced that they are up to a “serious” confrontation with the US Government. They are working to maintain influence in the country and keep Jordan as an international hub for the global Muslim Brotherhood organization. They have considered multiple options and understand that ignoring the situation or assuming things will remain the same until the end of Trump’s term will not work. They recognize that this is no longer possible after developments involving Iran, as they fear the U.S. administration might take tangible actions to destroy them after being designated as a terrorist organization by President Trump.
  22. The option in front of them now, and the one they prefer, is to try to move toward a constitutional monarchy with Prince Hussein or another Hashemite prince becoming king, especially since they question and believe that Prince Hussein may never actually become king. In that sense, this situation is similar to what happened with the King’s half-brother Hamzah, who was strongly aligned with the Brotherhood and whom the Brotherhood openly and strongly defended in parliament.
  23. That said, this same option has already been assessed by Jordanian intelligence, which remains in contact with the Brotherhood, as difficult to carry out at this stage, even though a Gulf state is backing the idea.
  24. The other option is what can be described as the Samson option, “on my enemies and on me,” which the Brotherhood has seriously discussed. The idea is to create security problems targeting the United States and Israel inside Jordan, making it extremely difficult to control the country if regime change were to happen. In that scenario, the Brotherhood would position itself as the lesser evil for the United States, based on the logic of “two bad options.” At the same time, the Brotherhood continues to publicly reject regime change. What they are actually considering is igniting a jihadist situation inside Jordan. This option is supported by senior figures within the Jordanian intelligence apparatus, particularly through the creation of security incidents and operations along the Israeli border, and by relying on thousands of members tied to the Popular Mobilization Forces and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard who are currently in Jordan holding Iraqi passports and who have access to sufficient weapons. From the Brotherhood’s perspective, creating this kind of instability would disrupt any effort to eliminate them.
  25. Confronting the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan requires understanding that the movement operates as a tightly controlled, secret organizational structure that is closely tied to the Jordanian regime and its intelligence apparatus. A first starting point is acknowledging that the Jordanian state is in a partnership with the Muslim Brotherhood itself.
  26. Second, there needs to be a plan to weaken and contain the Brotherhood’s penetration inside the Jordanian intelligence apparatus, especially among senior and mid-level officers. This requires a focused and dedicated effort, particularly since major regional changes are already underway, including in Jordan, and time is limited.
  27. Third, there needs to be an alternative, even if it has to be put together quickly. The Muslim Brotherhood has effectively had a monopoly over the political scene in Jordan, supported by the security establishment and by a level of media freedom that no other group has. That freedom still exists today, and there has been no real counterweight to it.
  28. The Brotherhood has been operating largely alone in Jordan in both media and politics. On top of that, the regime itself changed election and party laws in 2006 in a way that pushed all other parties out while allowing the Brotherhood to remain. This political vacuum, combined with the Brotherhood’s resources, has left it with no real opposition on the ground, especially since secular movements opposing and/or the regime were pushed out of the country or forced into exile. The threat of a Muslim Brotherhood takeover of Jordan is real. Addressing this situation will require serious resources and sustained commitment to make sure Jordan does not become easy ground for the Brotherhood.

Sources

May 7, 2026 | Comments »

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