The US Midterm Elections and the Peace Process

Yes, the Congress Can, but Not Everything
Eran, Oded , INSS Insight No. 223,

The hammering of the Democrats in both houses of Congress in the November 2 elections presents a challenge to the leaders directly involved in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. President Obama will have to wrestle with dilemmas he faced before the elections, albeit with lesser intensity. In Washington lingo, President Obama is liable to become a lame duck whenever he seeks to advance initiatives that require the legislative process.

In terms of foreign policy, the president retains a relatively large amount of power, as not every foreign policy initiative is subject to legislation. Nonetheless, Congress has ways of expressing its opinion in decisions not requiring legislation, reflecting the “sense of Congress.” Moreover, even with a majority in both houses, every president must engage with Congress. A Congress that is militant and confrontational is liable to paralyze the president, even one who seeks dialogue and agreement. Although the Democrats retained their majority in the Senate, the upper house has only a few exclusive authorities not shared with the House of Representatives. The president can appoint judges and ambassadors through the Senate, but if the Democrats enjoy only a slim majority they will be unable to prevent filibusters and other steps by the Republicans, whose goal will be to complicate matters for President Obama.

Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iranian nuclear issue, the midterm elections results may perhaps not inject any new elements into the picture, but they can make the situation difficult for the President. Should the President want to signal to Israel that he is irritated by its conduct in the negotiations with the Palestinians, he will be able to do so, as did President Ford and President George H. Bush. In 1975, when Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was obstinate in the negotiations on interim arrangements following the Yom Kippur War, President Ford stopped the transfer of weapons to Israel as part of what he called a “reassessment.” In 1991-92, President Bush blocked American loan guarantees to Israel because of differences with the Shamir-led government over the settlements. Congress was unable to intervene in either situation. The administration could, should it so desire, avoid a public declaration about not providing Israel with weapons and simply drag its feet, using pretexts of a technical or administrative nature – though the political message behind them would be amply clear to everyone.

In light of reports that the Palestinian Authority and its supporters are considering a unilateral declaration on the establishment of a Palestinian state, to be adopted by a General Assembly and/or Security Council resolution, the American position and the split in Congress have practical ramifications. The American position will necessarily influence Abu Mazen’s considerations and those of the Arab League. The United States cannot – even if it wanted to – prevent a General Assembly resolution, because of the automatic majority enjoyed by the Arab-Muslim bloc. On the other hand, the United States can influence the large bloc of nations whose support is critical in order for a political achievement to be more than a mere numerical majority. The United States can also prevent the Security Council from adopting a resolution in support of a Palestinian state and its particular elements (borders, Jerusalem, refugees). Yet an American abstention in the Security Council would have the same effect as an approval of the resolution, because the other Permanent Members would not be expected to use their veto power.

Congress cannot force President Obama to instruct its ambassador to the United Nations to oppose the resolution. Nonetheless, the Congress – certainly the Republican-controlled House of Representatives – can retaliate for the president’s failure to authorize the veto. Twenty-two percent of the UN budget comes from American payments to the organization. It would only take refusal by House of Representatives to approve this line item in the State Department budget to cause real significant damage. This punitive measure would occur only after the United States already defied the majority opinion in the Congress, but the president must take this possibility into account.

If the proposal by Republican Representative Eric Cantor to separate general legislation on American foreign aid from the aid to Israel (a move that carries some negative aspects from Israel’s perspective) is passed, it is liable to work against the administration. Foreign aid legislation is not popular in the United States or in Congress, and the fact that Israel appears at the top of the list of countries receiving aid helps the administration gain approval for assistance to other nations and organizations. The separation proposed by Cantor would complicate the administration’s foreign aid policy.

In order to advance certain issues, President Obama will have to try to reach understandings with the Republicans in both houses. Therefore, one may assume that he will try to avoid confrontations on issues that are not at the heart of his agenda. Even if peace in the Middle East is a top priority for the administration, it is doubtful that President Obama wishes to invite a head-on confrontation with Israel that would strain his relations with Congress, especially since support for him is already at an all time low.

Another interesting issue linked to Israel is the United States effort to stop the Iranian nuclear project. Washington Post analyst David Brodet went so far as to say that the chances of President Obama winning the 2012 elections would improve if he unites the two camps in a decisive move against Iran. Even if this is the position of both houses, it cannot force the president to launch a military action. Perhaps President Obama will be persuaded that such action would ensure his reelection in the 2012 presidential elections, but the American defense establishment has already signaled unmistakable reluctance to take military steps to stop the Iranian program. On the other hand, should the US administration and its EU partners reach understandings with Iran, both houses are liable to criticize the president as overly compromising and conciliatory. This too is a possibility President Obama must take into account.

Despite all of the above, the Israeli government would be wise to avoid a situation in which it posits itself as a player in the confrontation between the President and Congress and involved in US domestic ideological disputes. An attempt to arrive at understandings with the administration was and remains preferable to conflict, despite the knowledge that in Congress there is a great deal of support – perhaps even decisive – to block initiatives that are liable to damage Israel or run counter to its political and security agendas.