By BARBARA OPALL-ROME, DEFENSE NEWS
RAMAT DAVID AIR BASE, ISRAEL — The Israel Air Force (IAF) is revamping
headquarters staff, planning procedures and air operations to support a
10-fold increase in the number of targets it can detect and destroy, the Air
Force’s chief of air operations said.
In an exclusive interview with Defense News, Brig. Gen. Amikam Norkin said
the institutional revamp — the service’s first since the 1973 Yom Kippur
War — aims to shorten the duration of future wars while reducing demand for
maneuvering ground forces through massive, persistent and punishing use of
precision air power.
More than a year in the making and slated for phased implementation in the
coming months, the changes are driven by IAF Commander Maj. Gen. Amir Eshel
and his Expanding Attack Capacity (EAC) program.
Officers here say the program affects all aspects of air operations, from
the orders received from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) General Staff to
the pilot in the cockpit and maintenance crews tasked with turnaround time.
It also involves wholesale changes in mission planning, resource management,
bomb damage assessment and the way the IAF coordinates movements with
western coalition forces that may be operating in the region.
But perhaps the biggest driver of EAC, experts here say, is significant
improvements in so-called sensor-to-shooter capabilities. By mating
persistent intelligence collection with precision weapons, the IAF expects
to generate an exponential number of new, time-sensitive targets during each
day of future fights.
Once implemented, traditional waves of air attack should give way to an
express train of precision strikes, allowing “first circle” enemies such as
Lebanon-based Hezbollah and Gaza-based Hamas little time to recover from the
initial shock and awe of previous campaigns.
“We’re focusing on the entire system across the full distance,” Norkin said.
“The RPMs [rotations per minute] of this engine must be much higher to
support a huge surge in the quantity of targets we detect and destroy each
and every day of a future campaign.”
In an Oct. 21 interview at this IAF hub in northern Israel, Norkin noted
that the 1,500 targets attacked in Israel’s November 2012, eight-day Pillar
of Defense operation in Gaza doubled the number of targets attacked in the
34-day 2006 Lebanon War.
“In Pillar of Defense, our daily attack capacity was twice that of Lebanon,
despite the fact that [Gaza] was a much smaller area and more densely
populated,” Norkin said. “Now, when we talk about the northern area of
operations, we’re aspiring for an order of magnitude expansion — maybe
more — in the number of targets to be destroyed every day.”
Despite IAF sensor-to-shooter capabilities demonstrated by its destruction
of 120-some rocket launchers in the last Lebanon war, Norkin said the IDF
realizes it can no longer waste time and assets going after individual
launchers. “We all understand that rockets will continue to fall here until
the last day of war. A residual capacity to launch will remain with the
enemy,” he said.
Under the new concept, Israel will focus on “hurting the enemy where it
hurts the most,” Norkin said, referring to leadership, commanders and
significant war-fighting assets.
“We won’t be able to push the enemy to the point where he can no longer
shoot rockets and missiles. Therefore we need to push him to the point where
he doesn’t want to shoot his rockets and missiles,” the IAF officer said.
In a memo to all IAF officers this month, Eshel described the EAC revamp as
historic, complex and fraught with risk.
“Some have compared it to a marathon race which demands — while running —
that we perform open heart surgery and still finish first,” Eshel wrote.
Nevertheless, the IAF commander said he believed his organization would
successfully implement the EAC plan and that prescribed changes would be
proven through concrete results.
Expediting the Endgame
Israeli officers and defense experts said the IAF revamp is an essential
element in IDF strategy for expediting the diplomatic endgame through
maximum destruction of enemy assets and minimal harm to uninvolved
civilians.
“As soon as war breaks out, the hourglass is overturned,” Lt. Gen. Benjamin
Gantz, IDF chief of staff, said of Israel’s race to achieve optimum
operational gain while preserving domestic and international support prior
to a brokered cease-fire.
With Hezbollah and Hamas vowed to Israel’s destruction and unwilling to
entertain any type of negotiated peace, officers here insist their only
option is to prolong periods of relative quiet between the inevitable
outbreak of future wars.
As such, IDF strategy demands inflicting as much pain as possible through
high-intensity combat and rapid battlefield gains to deter the next round of
fighting once a cease-fire takes effect.
In an address this month at Bar Ilan University’s Begin-Sadat Center for
Strategic Studies, Gantz cited the “blurring of definitions between
terrorist and civilian,” particularly in the context of Lebanon-based
Hezbollah, “where the living room and the missile room is in the same
house.”
Future wars, Gantz said, will be “transparent” and subject to
round-the-clock media coverage and international scrutiny. “Every
irregularity of the IDF will be accompanied by attempts to delegitimize
Israel.”
While commanders across all sectors and services must be ready “to activate
maximum assets with ultimate force,” Gantz flagged a preference, when
possible, for precision, standoff operations.
As the officer in charge of last November’s standoff campaign against
Gaza-launched rockets, Gantz delivered significant results through standoff
strikes without having to embark on broad-based incursion.
More than 20,000 active-duty and reserve forces were poised at the border
for the real prospect of a maneuvering ground war. But after eight days of
punishing precision strikes, Israeli political leaders were convinced Hamas
had been sufficiently deterred and accepted the Egyptian-brokered cease-fire
that ended the fight.
Assaf Agmon, a brigadier general in the IAF reserve and director of Israel’s
Fisher Institute for Strategic Air and Space Studies, warned against
mistaking Pillar of Defense as a template for future wars that may require
ground maneuvering to support initial gains from standoff attack.
Nevertheless, he said operational efficiencies expected from the EAC effort
should, in many scenarios, “lessen the likelihood, or at least diminish the
duration,” of a costly and diplomatically damaging ground war.
“Air power assumes enormous added value in our defensive concept and in all
Western cultures that are less tolerant of the heavy casualties that come
from big maneuvering ground wars,” Norkin said. “It’s hard to stop the
lethality of tanks once they start to move. In contrast, air power can be
controlled in a very calibrated, surgical manner. It’s like a thermostat
that you can direct as hard or as soft as needed or turned off entirely when
it’s time to stop.”
Prescribed Changes
Organizational changes prescribed by the IAF’s EAC program call for
splitting training, doctrine and operational functions now performed by
Norkin, the air branch chief, into two separate one-star positions.
A new head of air operations will be responsible for planning and executing
all IAF operational missions. The new one-star position, approved by Gantz
on Oct. 14, will be supported by three bureaus, each commanded by a colonel
and focused on attack operations, active defense and international
cooperation. Training, doctrine and joint air exercises will remain the
purview of the air division chief.
The IAF also will establish a new department for joint operations with other
IDF service branches and augment the intelligence bureau that supports air
operations.
“For the past 40 years, we’ve been working according to the same structure,
with only minor patchwork modifications here and there. But the force
implementation chain of command is different from force training chain,”
said Norkin, the officer tapped to become chief of air staff — the service’s
No. 2 slot — once changes take effect.
Norkin underscored the fact that in Israel, there are no separate Army and
naval aviation branches. “This restructuring will optimize our ability to
meet the nation’s steadily increasing air power demands,” he said.
Israel made 2 bad mistakes: leaving southern Lebanon and giving up Gaza. We should take them both back, pushing Hamas out of Gaza, at least forcing them underground as before 2005 and into Sinai, killing and capturing as many as possible in the process. Those pushed into Sinai would then be fighting both Egyptian and Israeli forces.
The battle for southern Lebanon would not be a war of choice, but rather a preventative one. We know that Hizbullah is preparing for the next war, when they feel conditions are in their favor. The IDF may very well find them off balance now and in the near future. This of course is for the IDF and the Mossad to decide.
I have never heard of a military plan to wait till someone attacks and then attack to stop the war but only temporarily until the enemy has been given time to regroup.
How about instead announce that if the enemy starts a new war they will permanently lose 50% of territory which would be annexed. That might (but probably not)
provide some incentive not to attack. No sane person is for war, but if they start one, why not finish in a fashion that will permanently not allow the enemy to regroup?
Great news. I hope it does not take too long to implement.
I agree 100% with Viiit’s erudite comments.
Mickey Oberman
The biggest strategic error is that Israel is always waiting for the other side to start hostilities.
That’s idiotic. It should be enough that Hilbulah breaches ceasefire agreement by arming itself with rockets, by not integrating into the Lebanese military.
Likewise with Hamas. One single rocket from Gaza should be enough to destroy ALL their assets.
Why should Israel wait till they actually kill someone in order to have an excuse to strike back seriously?
Would it not be smarter to destroy them before they kill?
But no mention of the new roles of drones and RPVs? It’s not hard to imagine a ten fold increase in target availability is due to new capabilities in automation, remote sensing and remote control in general.